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ABSTRACT 
As world transport has grown in complexity, so has public pressure for safe 
flight. The scheduled airline industry has a consistently good safety record. 
Unfortunately, the business jet industry has not kept pace with the airline safety 
statistics and lags far behind. During safety surveys and reports over the past 5 
years there has been increasing comment and concern over the perceived 
safety standards of business jets operations compared with normal scheduled 
airline services. The UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has reported that based 
on flight hours flown, the fatal accident rate for smaller jet aircraft below 15 
tonnes was twice that for large passenger aircraft (CAA 2006a). The CAA also 
identified that the majority of the accidents occur during the approach and 
landing phase of the flight.  
There is however, a lack of research concerning business jet operations. Due to 
the unique and varied style of operations, business jet flights have many factors 
that differentiate it from normal scheduled airline operations. Business jet 
accidents have been reported but they have not been further investigated for 
any overall causes. The study described in this thesis, a Grounded Theory 
analysis of accident data was conducted to develop a model of the factors that 
contributed to the accidents. The model that was developed demonstrated that 
Pilot skills, Command and Crew Resource management are the key central 
elements, with the ground organisations such as engineering and ground 
operations personnel as a contributory influence. 
As piloting skills were determined as a key factor in the accident statistics and 
the accident model, a simulator trial was also conducted to assess the manual 
flying skill levels of business jet pilots. The trial was both a challenging manual 
flying task and a profile that is included as part of the Pilot Skill test prior to the 
issue of a commercial pilot’s licence. The simulator trial confirmed that although 
all the pilots were correctly tested and certified commercial pilots, a significant 
proportion did not fly an accurate airspeed on approach within the CAA 
examination tolerances. 
ii 
The simulator trial data and the grounded theory model found that there are 
concerns for the piloting skills of business jet pilots in their ability to fly an 
accurate airspeed on approach. 
The results from this investigation yield findings concerning the piloting skill and 
accuracy of the business jet pilots that had not previously been identified. The 
results also emphasise the need to include adequate testing and supervision 
during business jet operations. It is recommended that further research be 
conducted to evaluate actual piloting skill and accuracy during the licence skill 
test.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 Rational for the Research 1.1
In 2004, the following was published in Business & Commercial Aviation (April 
2004). 
 “High profile accidents, often involving celebrities, unfortunately can 
 leave the misimpression that business jets are somewhat less safe and 
 piloted by less professional aircrews than the major airlines. Such 
 accidents provoke the question, “how safe is business jet aviation and 
 where do we need to improve?” (Veillette 2004). 
The article was a review of the business jet accident statistics from 1991 to 
2002 which found that business jet flights were not as safe commercial airline 
flights (Veillette 2004).  
Over the last few years the situation has not improved (IBAC 2008, 2010, 2011, 
2012). The number of globally operating business jets has risen from 17,382 in 
2009 (IBAC 2010) to 18,460 in 2011 (IBAC 2012). As the fleet of privately 
owned and operated business jets continues to grow, their relatively poor safety 
record has continued to be a concern. The UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) 
has commented on the situation and raised it concerns as part of its Safety Plan 
2006/7-2010-11 (CAA 2009b). However, the primary causes of the business jet 
poor safety record are uncertain (CAA 2009b, CAA 2006a). 
The study set out in this thesis has undertaken to consider the particular 
operating conditions and regulations relevant to business jets and has 
conducted a study to suggest “where do we need to improve”. 
 Aim and objectives of the Study  1.2
The aim of the study was to investigate business jet operations and determine 
operational areas in need of improvement. This study has 3 research 
objectives: 
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 Review and discuss the business jet operations, regulations, 
operating conditions, accident data, and crew skills compared to 
commercial airline operations. 
 Conduct a study of the business jet accident data, to create an 
overall accident model relevant to their operating conditions. 
 Carry out a simulator trial assessment of business jet pilots’ 
operating skills. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Background to the Study and Literature Review 2.1
This study is an investigation into the safety of small passenger carrying jet 
powered aircraft, termed “Business Jets”. The aircraft size varies from 
approximately 4700 kg (such as Cessna 525), to 42,400 kg (Bombardier Global 
Express).  Also, in order to be classed as business jets and not as scheduled 
airliners, they may not be operated to a fixed schedule or timetable (FAA 2010). 
Therefore, business jet operations are conducted either by the aircraft owner, a 
corporation or company or by a charter company granted a licence by the 
regulators and the regulations are discussed in the following Chapter. As noted 
above, business jet operations are becoming a large part of the international 
aviation scene, with over 18,000 aircraft operating around the world (IBAC 
2012). 
The initial research objective was to review the unique style of business jet 
operations in comparison with commercial airlines and from the literature the 
major topics of concern were: 
 CAA and FAA Regulations 
 Airfield Categories and limitations 
 Pilot Performance  
 Pilot Training  
 Pilot Crew Resource Management 
 Safety Data 
 Safety Initiatives 
 Regulatory Oversight 
 Previous Research 
 Technical Failures and Outside Support 
It is notable that studies have been conducted into military operations, civilian 
flying in both General aviation and Commercial scheduled operations, such as 
Orlady (1999) Human factors in Multi-crew Operations, Soeters (2000) Culture 
and Flight safety in Military Aviation and Wood (2004) Flight Crew Reliance on 
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Automation. More recently, Keller (2013) has reported concerns of the decay in 
piloting skills for instrument flying and approaches for General Aviation, (which 
includes private pilots and turbo prop aircraft). Also, the rail and electricity 
generating industry has included both human factors and Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) in its safety studies (Wilson et al. 2005, Strater 2005, 
Sheridan 1997). However, apart from safety concerns dating back to 1991 
(Veillette  2004)  it was not possible to reference material directly concerning 
business jet operations apart from the papers from Cranfield University (2005) 
and the CAA (2009a). 
 
 CAA and FAA Regulations  2.2
Business jets do not operate to a fixed schedule or to a fixed number of 
destinations, in the same way as commercial airlines. The aircraft may be 
operated by a charter company to a destination of the customer’s choice or on 
behalf of a company or aircraft owner to various destinations for their own use. 
Therefore, for all passenger operations, each aircraft’s state of registration 
regulates commercial passenger flights, including both airlines and smaller 
operators. (In some states, the smaller operators are often termed “Air Taxi or 
On Demand”). The following is a review of the regulations in the USA, the UK 
and Europe. 
In the USA, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) uses Federal Aviation 
Regulations (FAR) to define the various types of operation. Airline operators are 
FAR Part 121 (FAA 2010). This regulation is for scheduled Air Carrier 
operations such as Airlines, which offer a schedule or timetable of pre-planned 
flights designated by both destination and departure time (FAA 2010). FAR Part 
121 also limits the operations to controlled airspace and controlled airports 
including, specific weather limitations, navigational, operational and 
maintenance support. The CAA has a similar designation for airline operations, 
in that a Type A Route Operating licence is issued for scheduled and non-
scheduled operations for aircraft with more than 20 seats (CAA 2010a, FAA 
2010). 
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FAR part 135 covers the less restrictive operations in 2 types. The first is 
“Scheduled Part 135” which allows scheduled passenger carrying operations to 
smaller airports that do not provide the high level of support required for FAR 
Part 121. This is commonly referred to as commuter airlines and includes air 
carriers flying smaller jet and turbo prop aircraft. The second type of operation is 
“On Demand Part 135” which allows commercial passenger carrying flights 
(including medical evacuation flights), for which the departure location, arrival 
location and time are all negotiated by the customer (FAA 2010). The customer 
may charter the entire aircraft or book a single seat on an air taxi. Part 135 does 
however; limit the number of return trips between the same fixed points to less 
than 5 per week. This is directly comparable to the CAA Type B licence which 
permits operations, for aircraft with fewer than 20 seats and/or weighing less 
than 10 tones (this class covers almost all business jet aircraft). The type B 
licence may be issued for either scheduled or non-scheduled operations in the 
same way that FAR 135 designates non-scheduled as “On Demand”. Finally 
FAR 91 is the class equivalent of General Aviation in the UK.  
It is worth noting that not all passenger carrying aircraft are covered by these 
FAR. Aircraft owned and operated by their owners or for company use are 
governed by FAR part 91 (General Aviation). Most of the FAR 91 operators own 
the aircraft and do not carry fare paying passengers and are therefore subject to 
far less stringent regulations. The overriding consideration for both FAR 91 and 
General Aviation is that the flights must not be for a fee or payment. FAR set 
the regulations for the conduct of passenger carrying operations; they do not 
however, distinguish by the type of aircraft but rather by the type of activity 
carried out. 
In the UK a commercial company is governed by the grant of an Air Operators 
Certificate (AOC) and is subject to the appropriate regulations, such as Civil Air 
Publication (CAP) 371 which governs duty time limits and the avoidance of 
fatigue in pilots (CAA 2004). The AOC is specific to the type of operation, for 
example scheduled or non-scheduled, cargo or passenger. The AOC also 
defines and limits the operations, some of the conditions include; the type and 
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number of aircraft, minimum weather conditions, and the geographical area 
allowed for the operation (CAA 2010a). Another condition is when a company or 
corporation operates their own aircraft that is not for “Hire or Reward”, then an 
AOC is not required and it is regulated as General Aviation (CAA 2010a). A 
table showing the FAA and CAA requirements is shown in Appendix A. The 
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is also setting out its regulations and 
has issued an initial definition for commercial operations, which does not limit or 
define the size and type of passenger carrying operations (EU OPS 2008). 
In summary, business jet operations are regulated by the major authorities but 
in a less stringent manner by not defining the routes, timetables and weather 
limitations. The business jets are also not limited to fixed destinations, in the 
same way as established commercial airlines, as these are dictated by the 
customer. So, the business jets have a more varied itinerary yet apparently less 
regulation and, as reported by the National Business Aviation Association 
(NBAA), are often operated by small companies with the majority having only 
one or two aircraft.  
 Airfield Categories and limitations 2.3
It is part of CAA and European Regulations (CAA 2010a, EU OPS 2008) that all 
airfields are categorised according to the type of terrain, approach aids 
available and any special considerations required. This airfield designation 
system specifies the experience level and training required for each crew in 
order to operate into each airfield. For example a Category A airfield has all the 
normal instrument approach aids (such as Air Traffic Control (ATC) radio 
facilities and Radar) and is without undue terrain or approach hazards. 
Category B airfields do not provide the Category A airfield facilities. Also, there 
may be limitations due to local conditions that required extra caution.  
Finally a category C airfield requires special training and operating conditions, 
with detailed company records of all pilots qualified for that airfield. For example 
the airport of Chambery, in France, due to its relatively steep approach into a 
deep valley, has a requirement for special simulator training. Also, the captain 
should operate into the airfield under the supervision of a training captain prior 
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to his/her first operational flight. A full Joint Aviation Authority (JAA) airfield 
category description is shown in Appendix B. In the UK, the CAA Operations 
Inspectors ensure that each airline maintains training records, thus confirming 
adherence to the procedures. For the smaller and more diverse operators, it 
could be difficult to ensure the specialist training is conducted prior to the flight. 
The CAA has raised their concerns and cited the difficulty of regulatory 
oversight, and considers this may be one of the causal factors for the business 
jet poor safety record (CAA 2009a). Furthermore, since the destinations are 
chosen by the customer, it may not be possible to confirm whether extra training 
is required. Business jet operators routinely send aircraft, with only a 2 pilot 
crew, to wide ranging destinations and, as part of a flight safety campaign, the 
International Business Aviation Council (IBAC) has a safety programme. This 
programme includes prescribing standards of operation, company monitoring 
procedures and company flight safety audits, to monitor companies to improve 
the operating standards across the industry. The results are published in their 
annual accident reviews (IBAC 2008a, 2010, 2011, 2012). 
 Pilot Performance  2.4
The CAA regularly conducts research programmes and one area of concern is 
that of pilot performance (Courteney 2009). Periodically, the pilots are required 
to demonstrate adequate flying skills to maintain their licence, during the 
Licence Skill test (LST) (CAA 2010c). However, in order to complete the 
mandatory licence requirements, there is rarely any remaining training time to 
practice other flying skills. During the periodic testing and recurrent training, the 
time dedicated to manual flying may be the minimum required (CAA 2009a). 
The tests include pilot skill and closed loop flying tasks such as engine failures 
and an approach and go-around in instrument flying conditions. This aspect of 
Commercial airline pilot performance has already been the subject of research 
by Ebbatson (2007, 2009) and Wood (2004) but there is a paucity of research 
concerning business jet pilots. 
Since the introduction of Extended Twin Engine Operations (ETOPS) in 1985, 
engine reliability has improved to such an extent that the rate of engine shut 
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down or failure in flight has reduced to less than 2 per 100,000 engine flight 
hours (Airbus 2010). For this reason, it is most unlikely that pilots today will ever 
face an engine malfunction that is sufficiently serious to warrant an engine shut 
down. Even though the engine failure rate has improved, all aircraft certified for 
passenger carrying must demonstrate safe and acceptable emergency handling 
characteristics, as required by the regulators (CAA 2012a, FAA 2010). Despite 
the aircraft design requirements, the rate of accidents, primarily due to incorrect 
crew response, following an engine failure has remained constant (Airbus 
2010). Safety studies have confirmed that although the majority of failures were 
handled correctly, the more obscure malfunctions were harder to identify and 
resolve, since most pilots had no experience of actual failures. However, in 
order to obtain a licence all pilots are expected to demonstrate their 
competence after an engine failure as part of their final examination. Also, the 
LST examination procedures closely follow the engine handling procedures and 
techniques that are fully listed in the procedures manuals (AOPA 1987, 1994, 
Airbus 2010, Boeing 2003, Hawker 2008).  
In the busy ATC controlled airways and airport airspace, passenger aircraft are 
only separated by 1000 feet vertically. So, when under strict ATC control, 
altitude deviations constitute a flight safety hazard. However, the CAA and the 
National Air Traffic Service (NATS) has reported the rate of “Level Busts” by 
business jets, when compared to the number of incidents from scheduled 
airlines (Riley 2009). (A Level bust is when an aircraft deviates by 300 feet or 
more from its assigned altitude when under radar control or in controlled 
airspace). For example although business jets only account for 6.12% of flights 
within the UK airspace but during the period January 2006  to December  2008 
business jet reports were 19.63% of all incidents. In comparison, scheduled 
airlines which flew 92.96% of flights, reported only 76.73% (Riley 2009). 
Furthermore, a lower percentage, 3.64% of incidents were due to military flights 
(Riley 2009). All Level Busts are investigated and allocated a level of severity by 
a NATS working group, “Work stream”. This group determined that from 
January 2007 to December 2007, the business jet community accounted for 10 
out of the 19 most serious level busts. This was 52% of the serious level busts 
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recorded by UK registered aircraft. The working group then considered whether 
there was a clear need to focus the industry and improve the response within 
the business jet community (Riley 2009). 
From accident report evidence, IBAC (2012) concluded that pilot experience 
was not necessarily a primary factor in the accidents that were reviewed. 
Although IBAC did not find that pilot experience was a factor, Todd and Thomas 
(2012) found that the level of accident risk was significant below 5000 pilot 
flying hours and stable above 10,000 pilot flying hours. It may be that 
experience could be considered a factor for the business jet community, since 
the CAA business jet pilot survey (CAA 2009a) reported that the average pilot 
flying experience was 2800 flying hours, well within the significant level below 
5000 hours, reported by Todd and Thomas. 
Furthermore, even though pilot flying experience may not be directly linked to 
flying ability, an IBAC business jet accident analysis identified that skill based 
pilot ability was a causal factor in 149 out of 232 accidents (IBAC 2008a). 
The categories were; 
 Knowledge based (No standard solution)  37 
 Rule based (need to modify behaviour)   46 
 Skill based (routine practised tasks)   149 
In summary, although IBAC (2012) did not link pilot experience with primary 
accident factors, the overall fleet experience (CAA 2009a) may be relevant, 
since the business jet pilot flying hours are predominantly within the zone of 
significant risk, below 5000 hours (Todd & Thomas 2012). In addition, pilot 
ability, whether related to experience or not, should be further considered, since 
it a major factor in the 2008 accident review (IBAC 2008a). 
 Pilot Training  2.5
2.5.1 Initial Training 
At present the recruitment of commercial pilots is competitive, with the most 
sought after places being with the major airlines. Some airlines will sponsor 
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their pilot candidates and provide all the necessary training. Apart from those 
pilots entering commercial aviation following a military career, (Direct Entry 
Pilots), there are still many pilots, without sponsorship, wishing to fly 
commercially. (Harris 2006) The majority of these will have to pay for their own 
training either through a recognised course established by a training provider or 
by gaining each qualification as time and money allows (Harris 2006). These 2 
training styles are defined in CAP 804 (CAA 2013) as either Modular or 
Integrated: 
 Modular flying training course. The course consists of modules, 
which  may be taken separately or combined. 
 Integrated flying training course. The integrated course shall 
complete all  the instructional stages in one continuous course of 
training.    (Cap 804 Appendix 6) 
 
Once the newly qualified pilots seek employment, they often join an Air Taxi 
Company or fly for a business jet operator. However, the CAA has raised 
concerns over the levels of training provided, as the new pilots would have the 
minimum of experience and may not obtain further operational or systems 
knowledge working with their new companies (CAA 2009a). The pilot training 
industry considered what may be required to improve the standard of both the 
candidate and the training (Petteford 2009). Petteford did not consider that the 
training organisations were at fault. However, he did suggest that the content of 
the courses could be re-examined, to improve any recognised deficiencies.  
Due to the high cost of flying training, it is understandable that most only cover 
the minimum requirements (Harris 2006). Therefore, new pilots seek a 
commercial position, often with the minimum of experience, and training. Some 
of these pilots are operating business jets or Air Taxi operations all around the 
world. As noted by the CAA (2009a) many pilots felt ill prepared to commence 
work as a corporate or business jet pilots due to lack of training in the additional 
duties of corporate work. In contrast, military and major airline junior pilots 
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undergo a long and intensive period of supervision and training prior to being 
declared fully operational.  
2.5.2 Recurrent Training 
After the initial examinations to obtain a commercial pilot’s licence, each pilot 
must undergo recurrent training, including both annual and bi-annual 
examinations in flying skills, the LST. The simulator exercises are often planned 
to mimic the normal operations and are termed Line Oriented Flight Training 
(LOFT). Unfortunately, for some types of business jet in the UK, either a 
simulator was not available for the type of aircraft operated (for example, 
Citation Excel) or the simulator was of limited use (CAA 2009a). With the 
apparent lack of simulators or adequate facilities to improve pilot handling, the 
investigation by the CAA Accident Analysis Group (CAA 2009a) listed the 
causal factors in the 59 worldwide fatal accidents to business jets for the years 
2000 to 2007. The investigation confirmed that Flight Handling was responsible 
for 27% of the accidents and the lack of positional awareness (in air) was 
responsible for 19%. Furthermore, over 50% of accidents were during the 
approach and landing phase (CAA 2006a, 2009a).  
The CAA Business Jet Safety research (2009a) report included comments from 
a pilot questionnaire, which had been distributed to pilots holding CAA 
professional pilot licences, UK Business jet companies and their senior/training 
pilots. The questionnaire included approximately 30% questions about training 
methods and experience levels. Many of the respondents were happy with the 
standard of the initial training received, (an example is the syllabus in AOPA 
1994) but raised concerns over the level of pre course study material available 
and the lack of further, follow up training once allocated to a company and 
commencing flying operations. It was noted that only 40% of all respondents 
had completed the requisite Multi Crew Co-operation (MCC) course that is 
required prior to operating commercially on a multi crew aircraft. The aim of the 
MCC is to instruct on the principles of CRM and train the pilots for multi – pilot 
airline operations, including the safe crew co-operation by maintaining a 
standard set of operating rules (SOPs).  It is not surprising, therefore, that there 
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were many comments concerning the lack of SOPs and the poor standard of 
CRM among the Captains. Some pilots also commented on the poor standard 
of re-current training in that it was often repetitive and nothing new was learnt 
from the previous year, unless a safety notice required a new emphasis. Other 
respondents reported that simulators used for recurrent training, were unable to 
reproduce major failures and were therefore of limited training value. This is in 
contrast with major airline operators, where a sophisticated simulator should be 
available (CAA 2011c) and the airline training organisation would provide new 
training scenarios for each summer and winter operating period. A serious 
concern was raised by the company senior pilots/trainers was that some pilots 
had no understanding of the required planning/actions in the event of a failure, 
such as engine failure on take-off (CAA 2009a). 
2.5.3 Training for Emergencies 
Once an engine has failed, this aircraft would lose 50% of its available thrust 
and its capability is dependent on the airspeed, configuration and drag of the 
aircraft. It is therefore desirable to fly accurately, especially if there are limiting 
conditions when a safe go-around, from a baulked landing is not assured (ref 
Hawker Beechcraft 2008, page 2-28). 
The Hawker Pilots’ Manual is quite specific on the importance of maintaining the 
correct airspeed and this is emphasised in the Pilot’s manual section on single 
engine flying. 
  “Basic Single Engine Procedures. 
1. Maintain airplane control and a safe airspeed at all times. 
2. THIS IS CARDINAL RULE NUMBER ONE “ 
(Hawker 2008, Section VII, page 21). 
 
Similar training and advice is also part of the commercial pilot training and is 
included in the Boeing and Airbus Flight crew training manuals (Airbus 2010, 
Boeing 2003). The Airbus training manual quotes, with a special reference to 
smooth power changes for accuracy: 
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 a) Once safely established in a visual or instrument circuit, aeroplane 
performance must be considered before reconfiguring for landing. Is sufficient 
excess performance available to cope with the extra drag of gear and flap? At 
high mass and/or ambient temperature some multi engine aeroplanes may not 
be able to maintain level flight with the gear down.  
 b) Power changes can be kept to a minimum by using gear and flap 
selection to assist in the control of speed and flight path. 
Thrust settings and the resultant airspeeds will always be linked to the correct 
pitch attitude for a constant glide path (CFS 1995). Once the final configuration 
of undercarriage and flap for landing has been set and the 3 degree glideslope 
attained, the primary airspeed control is thrust, with commensurate minor pitch 
adjustments as the speed changes. However, once established keep engine 
handling smooth and power changes slowly and only as required. So, what 
could be a good control strategy? The following quote from the Private Pilot’s 
Licence (PPL) course guidance illustrates the point.  
“The key to a smooth approach is to make corrections as soon as they are 
judged required. A series of minor corrections is greatly preferred to a couple of 
major changes of power and attitude.”  (AOPA, 1994) 
2.5.4 Training Standards  
Although pilot training is quoted as paramount in safety (FAA 2012), there is 
little evidence of investigation into the standards. It is further relevant that pilots 
have commented on the lack of training for adverse weather operations (CAA 
2009a). However, in a further study of business jet accidents, pilot experience 
and fatigue were listed as non-contributory factors (IBAC 2012). However, the 
International Business Aviation Council (IBAC, 2012) findings did also conclude 
that runway length, low cloud ceilings or poor visibility and day /night were not 
significant issues. In contrast, IBAC (2012) did list the following 4 major causes 
of runway accidents. 
 Poor speed control and unstable approaches, most prevalent 
 Incorrect or lack of reported runway conditions. 
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 Crosswinds and gusts in bad weather. 
 Poor runway conditions and snow clearance. 
From a training perspective, both the regulators and the pilots in all types of 
operations have stated their concerns that their manual flying skills are 
diminishing (CAA 2009a, Ebbatson 2007). During several data surveys and 
interviews, most pilots believed their flying skills were degrading (CAA 2009a, 
Veilllette & Decker 1995). Since an autopilot is normally required and utilised in 
controlled airspace (CAA 2010d) some pilots had stated the need to manually 
fly the aircraft whenever possible in order to maintain their flying skills 
(Ebbatson 2007). Furthermore, in 2004 the CAA acknowledged the need to 
maintain manual flying skills. An operations department communication was 
issued by the CAA (Vivian 2004), which considered that manual flying was 
acceptable, provided it was adequately briefed and discussed beforehand. 
However, it was agreed the most sensible place for training was the simulator, 
not the aircraft on line operations (Vivian 2004, Ebbatson 2007). Also, in order 
to improve both the scope and the validity of training, operators were given the 
opportunity to provide innovative and more operator specific recurrent training 
under the Alternative Training and Qualifications programme (ATQP) (CAA 
2011c). 
 Pilot Crew Resource Management 2.6
Good crew behaviour, such as co-operation and effective leadership are an 
essential element for the safety of flight operations (Flin 2003). The monitoring 
of crew behaviour “Crew Resource Management” has been established by the 
CAA and is included in the pilot licencing requirements (CAA 2006 b). The 
appropriate skills for crew behaviour are separate from the technical knowledge 
and flying skills required by pilots. As such they are annotated as “NOTECHS” 
and are included in the pilot training syllabus (CAA 2006b).  It is now accepted 
that a pilot may possess adequate flying skills yet their personal behaviour and 
relationship with the other crew members could pose a flight safety risk (CAA 
2006b). Subsequently several behavioural types, including two social skills, 
(Co-operation, Leadership and Management), and two cognitive skills, 
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(Situation awareness and Decision Making), have been established for use in 
pilot assessment.  Airline operators regularly review crew CRM in regular safety 
audits to improve flight safety and crew situation awareness during Line 
operational Safety Audits (LOSA) (Helmreich 2001). The importance attributed 
to CRM by the FAA and NTSB can be inferred from its inclusion as a major 
requirement in the “Most Wanted List” for 2003, 2004 and 2009 (NTSB 2009b). 
The FAA has now increased the requirement for CRM training (FAA 2012). 
All aircraft operators, both airline and business jet, are required to have a 
system of CRM training and assessment, to provide feedback to the crew and 
identify any need for retraining and improve CRM and safety (CAA 2006b, JAA 
2001). In spite of the requirements, since the regulating authorities have 
included CRM in the pilot syllabus, reporting by the FAA and NTSB has shown 
that there is a lack of effective CRM in the business jet community (NTSB 
2009b).  
 Safety Data 2.7
Annually, the CAA, FAA and NTSB issue annual safety updates and accident 
data for all types of flying. The data normally covers everything from the 
smallest hang glider accident to the accidents of the largest airliner. However, 
only data for commercial passenger flights will be considered with special 
interest in the comparison between scheduled airlines and business jet 
operations.  
In 2007, the CAA Safety regulation Group (SRG) commissioned the Business 
Jet Safety Research paper with regard to operations in the United Kingdom 
(CAA 2009a). The CAA report discussed the operations and safety aspects 
from the SRG Accident Analysis Group (AAG) Annual review of 2006. This 
included data on the aircraft normally utilised in business jet and corporate 
aviation. The concern was the disproportionately high number of fatal accidents 
involving this type of aircraft.  
In 2008, the safety record for the previous ten years has been consistent, with 
similar fatal accident records for business jets (CAA 2008). The CAA 2006 
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safety review also contains similar statistics (CAP 776). The CAA Flight Safety 
accident rates quoted are for fatal accidents per million hours. For example, the 
2006 global fatal accident data shows that airline operators achieved a rate of 
0.65 accidents per million hours but a much higher rate for business jets 
operations at 1.27 accidents per million for large business jets, above 27 tonnes 
and 0.88 for the smaller jets between 15 and 27 tonnes (CAA 2006a). The 
overall rate of 1.27 was almost twice the accident rate of commercial airlines. 
The CAA data noted above, supported that of other agencies including the 
NTSB (NTSB 2007) and  IBAC, Summary of Global Accident Statistics 2006-
2010 (IBAC 2011). The safety incident rate per million flying hours for 
scheduled airline flights is far lower than commuter jets and Air Taxi or “On 
demand “operations. In 2005, Air Taxi operators had approximately 10 times 
more safety incidents than scheduled airlines. The trend is worse for fatal 
accidents per million flight hours (NTSB 2007). In 2008, the Scheduled Airline 
rate was 0.15 per million hours but for small commuter jets it was 2.88 per 
million hours or almost 20 times greater (NTSB 2009a). Another 3 year FAA 
survey of all General Aviation, on demand operators and business jets 
considered that 65% of business jet operations are in the USA and the 
distribution of operators was representative of the world fleet (IBAC 2012). 
When the data from the European fleets was applied, the sensitivity analysis 
tables concluded a difference ranging from 0.01% to 0.08% in the fatal accident 
rates, which demonstrates acceptable level of error for the comparison 
purposes intended by the statistics (IBAC 2012). Therefore, for the purposes of 
this study, the FAA accident data may be considered as representative of the 
world fleet. 
The IBAC Safety Summary, (IBAC 2011) reported the global accident rate for 
business jets. Although the accident rate is reported at a rate per 100,000 hours 
rather than as previously discussed, per million hours, the business jet safety 
record is still significant.  Table 1 Illustrates the Business Jet Global Accident 
rate per 100,000 hours. The accident rate is broken down to show the 
difference between the Commercial Air Taxi operators that provide aircraft “as 
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required “ and the owner operated/ corporate operations. The reported accident 
rate of 0.17 is a great improvement on the previous 5 year value (2003-2007) of 
1.09 but is still far above that of commercial aircraft operations. The overall rate 
for the owner operated and corporate aircraft is the lowest at 0.03 as these 
aircraft tend to be limited in geographical area and type of operations compared 
to the Air Taxi operations which may operate world-wide.  Even though IBAC 
considers the difference in operations within the business jet organisations, 
there is no breakdown geographically or for airfield facilities and environment.  
 
Table 1 Business Jet Global accident rate per 100,000 flight hours 2006-2010 
(Adapted from IBAC 2012) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
The global data for all accidents are widely reported and is summarised in CAP 
776. The regions are considered as large geographical areas, for example the 
whole of Africa is one zone. Also there is no further information concerning the 
airport environment, such as high terrain or the standard of the runway 
approach aids. The global distribution of business jets is shown at Table 2 
 
 
 
 
Type of business jet operation Accidents per 100,000 flight hours 
Commercial Air taxi 0.44 
Corporate Operations 0.03 
Owner operated 0.11 
All Business Aircraft 0.17 
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Table 2 Global Business Aircraft Population (Adapted from IBAC 2012) 
Geographical Area Percentage of world 
population 
North America 65% 
North America, without the US 8% 
South and Central America 7% 
Europe 11% 
Rest of the world  9% 
 
There is no related information for business jets regarding the type of operating 
environment, terrain, weather or airport facilities in order to make a reasonable 
comparison and define safety concerns. For example, two airfields with very 
similar operating conditions, (such as mountainous terrain, single runway and 
limited runway approach aids) are Taba in Egypt and Aspen in Colorado but 
they have very different accident statistics. Taba is a tourist destination for 
commercial airline operators with annual passenger numbers of 210,000 to 
340,000 and no reported accidents in the last 12 years. However, Aspen is 
mainly a business jet destination with approximately, 40,000 aircraft movements 
per year, yet has had several accidents, including 18 fatalities in 2001 (NTSB 
2012a). Taba is only one example of the many tourist destinations for 
commercial airlines, which also include the winter skiing resorts in Europe that 
are very similar in terrain and access to Aspen. However, the commercial 
airlines retain a better overall safety record.  
All the accident statistics quoted so far have been based on flying hours 
accumulated by the various types of passenger carrying operations. However, 
the most prevalent business jet accident by phase of flight from 2003 to 2012 
has been during the landing phase (IBAC 2008 a, 2011, 2012). Similarly of the 
552 jet and turbo prop accidents recorded between 1998 and 2003; there were 
72 approach accidents and 111 landing accidents (A rate of 33% overall, R. 
Woodhouse. 2006). The business jet accident data for 2006-2010 confirms that 
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approach and landing remains the critical phase of flight with 10.6% of all 
accidents on approach and 54.4% during landing (IBAC 2011). The approach 
phase has shown a consistent level of accidents and the most recent data 
confirms that 60% of all accidents have occurred during the approach and 
landing (IBAC 2012).  The 2012 Accident summary for phase of flight is shown 
at Table 3. 
Table 3 Business jet accident summary by phase of flight. (Adapted from IBAC 
2012)  
Taxi Take 
off  
Climb Cruise Descent During 
manoeuvre 
Approach 
to land 
Landing TOTAL 
10.9% 6.9% 8.3% 3.2% 2.6% 0.6% 8.3% 52.2% 100% 
 
With the majority of accidents occurring during the landing phase, and as all 
departures and normally finish with a landing, the fatal accident rate per 
100,000 departures is the next consideration. The relative safety record of the 
business jets is still apparent in the following statistics.  
The fatal accident average, 2006 - 2011 per 100,000 departures has been 0.18 
for all business jets and 0.034 for Scheduled Commercial aviation (IBAC 2012). 
However, the Corporate owned aircraft tend to be limited in operations related 
to the company place of business and are therefore more stable in the their 
operations and have a rate of 0.01 per 100,000 departures. Table 4 shows the 
IBAC 2012 comparison summary of the 5 year fatal accident rates. 
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Table 4 Summary of 5 year Fatal Accident rates (Adapted from IBAC 2012) 
 
 Note 1: Rate is IBAC 5 Year average 
 Note 2: Boeing Statistical Summary of Commercial jet Airplane Accidents, Worldwide 
 operations 1959-2011, dated July 2012. Rate is for Scheduled Commercial Operations 
 for a 10 year period. 
In summary, whether reported per flying hour or by departure rate, and when 
operating away from Class A airports, the business jets do not match the safety 
record of commercial passenger carrying operations and the majority of 
accidents occur in the approach and landing phase of flight. 
 
 Safety Initiatives 2.8
Part of the IBAC safety initiative was to recommend the implementation of a 
Safety Management System (SMS). The safety Management system is a 
method of reviewing every part of the company in order to audit safety levels 
and operating procedures for any possible errors; oversights or failures that 
could in any way contribute to an incident or accident. Once the safety review 
procedures are in place and any improvements implemented, there should then 
AVIATION SECTOR FATAL ACCIDENT RATE PER 100,000 
DEPARTURES 
ALL BUSINESS AIRCRAFT (jet & turbo prop), 
Note 1 
0.44 
CORPORATE AVIATION (Jets), Note 1 0.01 
ALL BUSINESS JETS, Note 1 0.18 
BOEING ANNUAL REPORT- JET AIRCRAFT 
OF MCTOM OVER 60,000 LBS. (engaged in 
commercial scheduled passenger operations) 
Note 2 
0.034 
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be a periodic review of improvements in working practices to further maintain 
safety awareness. In all major flying organisations and large airlines, there 
exists some central authority for Command and Control or overall responsibility. 
It is essential, therefore, that any flying organisation has a positive attitude to 
safety and operations that reflects throughout the staff both air and ground 
based (CAA 2010a). This is the safety culture and a poor safety culture or 
attitude would be detrimental to safety and appears to be lacking in the 
business jet community. This attitude had been confirmed in a quote from an 
accident report by an NTSB Board member. 
 
“When asked about the flight department's standard operating 
procedures (SOPs), the chief pilot advised that they did not have any…” 
(NTSB 2009 b) 
IBAC has completed a study to monitor trends and proposed a safety initiative 
and code of practice (IBAC 2008b). In April 2008 the World Business Jet 
association announced a new programme of SMS. Also, a planning toolkit was 
proposed, the International Standard for Business Aircraft operations (IS-BAO) 
(IBAC 2008b). Subsequently, assessments were made to assess the possible 
impact of the improved SMS and code of practice on 500 accidents between 
1998 and 2003 (IBAC 2008a). This study concluded that an improved SMS and 
good company practice would be conducive to improved flight safety. 
The EASA safety plan 2011 to 2014 has listed safety initiatives to address 
concerns in major areas (EASA 2011), including the increasing numbers of 
Loss of Control incidents and the increasing number of runway overruns (I.e. 
when an aircraft cannot stop on the runway and continues off the end of the 
prepared surface). Other factors in the Safety Plan  are concerning pilot 
handling, for example high airspeeds on landing , high on approach path, poor 
decision making, poor braking techniques and lack of runway performance 
knowledge (EASA 2011). Unstable approaches have also been identified as 
possible safety hazards. An unstable approach is when the aircraft is either 
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much faster than required or in the wrong configuration prior to landing, 
between 1000 ft. and 500 ft. above touchdown (FSF 1998). 
The IBAC (2008a) study compared the probability of accident prevention with 
regard to some human factors designations. The analysis of deliberate 
violations, inadvertent violations and mistakes confirmed the high number of 
failures to follow defined procedures. The most significant (40% combined) was 
concerning adherence to procedures and pilot monitoring. 
The safety initiatives are indicative of the regulator’s concerns with the safety of 
business jet operations. The EASA safety plan for 2011 /2014 again 
emphasises issues with Loss of Control, Runway performance, pilot handling. 
Similarly, IBAC has an almost constant programme to improve company safety 
standards and the adherence to procedures. 
 Regulatory Oversight 2.9
Business jet operators are becoming more diversified and many companies are 
choosing to register the aircraft operation in a country of convenience. The 
aircraft operator may hold a worldwide AOC, allowing world operations and 
never returning to the country of registration. Once the AOC is issued and 
operations commence, it is almost impossible for the flight operations inspectors 
to oversee every aircraft operator. For example, the CAA UK 2009 Register 
Database listed 219 aircraft in the categories of light, light/medium, medium and 
heavy business jets. All these aircraft could operate under an UK AOC with the 
right to fly anywhere in the world (CAA 2012b). 
With the conditions listed above, this is extremely difficult to monitor with a non-
domiciled operator. This is recognised in the CAA (2009b) safety report 
“Producing a complete picture of these aircraft in the UK is further complicated 
by the fact that many of the resident aircraft in this group are not on the UK 
register” and is therefore registered elsewhere. The UK register is growing in 
this aircraft category. During June 2005, there were 98 registered aircraft of the 
business jet type between 5700 kg and 10000 kg. In May 2008 the total was 
208 (CAA 2012b). As discussed in Para 2.2, there is a group of operators who 
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do not carry fare-paying passengers (operated by the owners or flown purely on 
company business). These operators do not require an AOC; therefore it is 
difficult for the regulating authorities to have effective oversight.  
EASA has shown concern over the management oversight of operations, since 
reports have confirmed that some operators are no longer applying a safety 
margin (15%) when calculating landing distances required (EASA 2011). Part of 
the basic flying skill required of any pilot is to touch down accurately in the 
landing zone. Unfortunately, practice suggests that pilots are making long 
landings when the runway is very long or attempting to land very close to their 
runway turn off point, with hazardous results (EASA 2011). Runway 
performance may be critical, especially since the operations manual 
performance data is not normally certified and is advisory only. (EASA 2011) 
There is a requirement for aircraft over 27 tonnes to have an on board system 
of Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) (CAA 2003).  The FDM allows the flight to be 
recorded and the flight parameters (such as speed and configuration) to be 
verified after landing. Commercial airlines are required to monitor the FDM and 
address any possible flight safety hazards, such as excess speed on approach. 
However, business jets are primarily below this weight category and are 
therefore exempt. Therefore, any routine violations or persistent skill errors as 
defined by Wiegmann & Schappell (2003) would be difficult to monitor during 
normal operations. By monitoring all the flight parameters, situations such as 
poor flying technique or not following the correct flight profiles could be 
examined (EASA 2011).  
The CAA safety plan 2011 -2013 (CAA 2011) raised similar safety concerns, 
highlighting ‘Significant Seven’ Safety Issues (in priority order); 
 1. Loss of Control 
 2. Runway Excursion 
 3. Controlled Flight into Terrain  
 4. Runway Incursion 
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 5. Airborne Conflict  
 6. Ground Handling  
 7. Airborne and Post-Crash Fire 
The CAA has initiated a Flight Safety programme of actions and publicity to 
improve safety in these seven areas. Another safety initiative has identified 
deficiencies in Business Jet operations, with the intention gaining a desired 
safety outcome as follows (CAA 2011).  
1. Reduce the number of and relative contribution to level busts in UK 
airspace by business jets. 
2. Reduce the proportion of incorrect response to Aircraft Collision 
Alerting System (ACAS) RA warnings by business jet pilots. 
3. Extend Alternative Training and Qualification Programmes (ATQP) 
into business jet operations. 
The safety initiatives proposed by the regulators cover all aspects of passenger 
carrying operations and may not be specific to business jets. However, many of 
the regulators’ concerns are focused on the flight safety aspects discussed in 
the business jet safety data, Para 2.8. 
 Previous Research 2.10
The CAA has already been involved in a simulator trial to ascertain a method of 
assessing pilot manual flying skills. In this study, the Instrument Landing 
System (ILS) tracking data was utilised to measure pilot performance (CAA 
2009c). One reason for the pilot performance study was the consideration that 
the use of automation in modern passenger aircraft was affecting the pilot’s 
ability to retain essential flying skills (Wood 2004). Most modern jet transport 
aircraft utilise an auto-flight system which has the flight profile programmed or 
selected rather than the aircraft being controlled by manual pilot inputs. With 
much more use of automation, it may be that during an aircraft failure or 
degradation, poor pilot skills would pose a flight safety hazard (Ebbatson 2009). 
In general aviation, Keller (2013) has reported concerns for the decay in 
instrument flying skills on approach since more than half of instrument approach 
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accidents occurred within three and a half months of the last instrument flying 
test. 
The Cranfield (2005) paper concerning risk assessment and the 2007 NTSB 
safety review both quote pilot handling as major factors in reported accidents 
and incidents. The Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) (2009) database 
lists 795 cases of accidents or incidents where Pilot handling is quoted as a 
factor. Also, as previously discussed pilot handling and training is one of the 
major influences on business jet safety. 
Commercial Airline operations have an established system of safety audits. In 
some airlines, the primary flight operations audit is the LOSA.  For these audits, 
the pilots are observed on routine line flights and any safety concerns are 
reported. The findings of the NTSB safety review were supported by Helmreich 
(2000, 2001) during an evaluation of Commercial Airline flights during a LOSA. 
Even though the LOSA was devised around airline operations, these same 
problem areas are evident from the business jet accident reports (IBAC 2012). 
The inter-reaction with agencies such as maintenance and ATC could be the 
most difficult for the crew to manage and Klinect (2002) found for commercial 
airlines that during the approach phase, outside threats associated with ATC 
resulted in errors or undesired aircraft states. The most frequent were incorrect 
aircraft configuration, vertical deviations and excess speed (Helmreich 2001).  
In general, for the inter-reaction of man and the environment, Harris & Thomas 
(2006) found the central spheres of the Human, Machine and Mission were 
influenced by the spheres of influence of the Management and the Medium. For 
example, for an airliner to perform its mission the management must obtain the 
aircraft, which must be capable of the task in the physical medium and the pilot 
must comply with the medium of licences and capability. The pilot performs a 
defined goal in flying from A to B, the union of man and machine. For the safe 
operation, the management and requirements demanded by society need to be 
actioned accordingly. In the framework of the operation, all aspects are 
influenced and controlled by the surrounding aspects (Harris & Harris 2004). 
 26 
Previous research has concentrated on the operational aspects commercial 
airliners, with little research conducted into business jet operations. As 
discussed in the Safety Data, Para 2.8, there are annual safety reviews and 
accident data statistics, without further research into business jet the 
operations. 
 Technical Failures and Outside Support- 2.11
Flight operations are dependent on other agencies and individuals involved in 
the support of the flights, maintenance, ATC etc. (Helmreich 2001). The 
business jets operate throughout the world. In Europe and North America, 
engineering support to a high standard is normally available. However, once 
farther afield in Africa or Asia, this may be increasingly scarce. In extremes this 
would ground the aircraft awaiting repair or operating with reduced efficiency to 
return. Also, maintenance errors have caused equipment failures in flight, which 
required emergency action by the crew. The inter-reaction of ATC and Ramp 
Maintenance with the pilots, who could not operate in isolation but needed to 
inter-react, was discussed by Li (2007). 
The effect of technical failure was reported in CAP 776, which discussed the 
number of accidents that occurred after an in-flight failure. Even though the 
aircraft manufacturers provide procedures and drills for dealing with failures, 
(Airbus 2008, Boeing 2003, Hawker 2008) the report contained emphasis on the 
subsequent loss of control after engine failure/malfunction. In addition, the 2 
highest circumstantial factors were inadequate regulatory oversight and the 
failure of company oversight and management (CAA 2009b). The company 
commitment to flight safety and organisational culture also had an overall 
influence on many accidents (Cranfield 2005).  
 Summary of Findings 2.12
Business jet operations do not operate to a fixed schedule, or a fixed set of 
destinations. So, when compared to the scheduled airlines, they have a more 
varied itinerary and a different set of licencing regulations. By the very nature of 
the operation, business jets are more difficult to oversee and regulate (CAA 
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2009 a). The disparity of global operations, which may require extra training and 
the possible lack of supervision, has raised concerns within the industry and the 
regulators. (CAA 2009a, IBAC 2008b) 
Piloting skills are regularly tested as part of the annual licensing requirements, 
yet compared to the airlines the training and standard of simulation has come 
into question (CAA 2009a, Ebbatson 2007, 2010). In the IBAC and the CAA 
accident safety data (IBAC 2012, CAA CAP 776), the approach and landing 
phase is reported as a major accident statistic. Engine reliability has greatly 
improved, possibly after the introduction of ETOPS in 1985. However, on those 
occasions when an engine has failed there was evidence of incorrect crew 
response or poor pilot handling (CAA 2006a). 
CRM, training and assessment is required for professional pilots and is a major 
part of airline training (Flin 2003, Helmreich 2001). Unfortunately, both pilot 
reports (CAA 2009a) and industry feedback confirm a low standard of CRM in 
business jet operations. 
The 5 year average for Fatal Accident rates confirms that business jets have a 
poorer safety record than scheduled airlines (IBAC 2012).  Moreover, the safety 
data from as far back as 2003 have consistently shown the same safety record. 
There are now at least 18400 business jets in global use, but apart from the 
concerns expressed by the regulating authorities and the Safety Initiatives from 
the industry, there is no evidence of a deeper investigation into Business Jet 
Operations. 
Even though business jets are supervised and subject to the same safety 
criteria as scheduled airliners, the operations do not have the same safety 
record. Overall, with the same pilot licences, training and syllabus there exists 
an imbalance in the proportion of accidents during the landing phase, especially 
when there is a technical failure. Also, commercial airlines are regularly 
inspected and conduct LOSA to report on the level of flight safety. However; 
there has not been a formal investigation into business jet operations. 
Therefore, in order to further understand business jet operations and the 
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accident rate, an in depth study of the accident history was conducted and is 
reported in Chapter 3. Further, a simulator trial was conducted to obtain pilot 
handling data on a representative task that would emulate the majority of 
reported accidents. This is reported in Chapter 4. 
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3 ACCIDENT DATA INVESTIGATION  
 Introduction 3.1
The purpose of this Chapter is to follow on from the Literature Review and 
explain the rationale for the next stage of the accident investigation. This 
Chapter addresses the second research objective as listed in Para 1.2. This 
Chapter examines the business jet accident history to build a representative 
accident model which then provides a link to the simulator phase of the study. 
The CAA has raised it concerns for the safety of business jets as part of its 
Safety Plan 2006/7-2010-11 (CAA 2009b). Previous research has already 
outlined the types of accidents. However, the primary causes of the business jet 
safety record are uncertain (CAA 2009b, CAA 2006a). Subsequently, there was 
no clear indication of how the business jet operation varied from the relatively 
safe scheduled airline operations. 
The safety of Scheduled Airline operations has already been the subject of 
research in several key areas. LOSA have been conducted by monitoring flight 
crews during normal operations (Helmreich 2001, Klinect 2002), which did 
highlight critical safety concerns during the approach and landing phase. Airline 
pilot attributes and behaviours have also been the considered for CRM and a 
crew assessment system created (Flin 2003).  
However, even though LOSA have not been reported for the business jets, in 
2009, the CAA Accident Analysis Group reported the primary causal factors in 
the 59 worldwide fatal business jet accidents from 2000 to 2007. In the reported 
data “Flight Handling” was responsible for 27% of the accidents, followed by the 
“Lack of Positional Awareness (in air)” being responsible for 19%. In the same 
summary, the data confirmed that over 50% of accidents occurred during the 
approach and landing phase (CAA 2009a). 
3.1.1 Data Investigation Rationale 
Several taxonomies exist for investigating the human factors which contribute to 
an accident. The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), 
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Wiegmann & Schappell (2003) has often proven to be the first step to accident 
analysis. HFACS is organised upon 4 hierarchical levels and each level is sub 
divided into specific sub elements. The primary 4 levels are; 
1. Organisational influences. 
2. Unsafe supervision. 
3. Preconditions for unsafe acts. 
4. Unsafe acts of the operator. 
For an investigation into flying skill errors or deficiencies, the area of concern 
would be in level 4 under “Unsafe Acts”, which is then divided into three types of 
error 1) Decision errors 2) Skill-based errors, and 3) Perceptual errors. 
Subsequently, the skill based error would cover hand flying or “stick and 
rudder”, which are basic flight skills as a continual process, without significant 
conscious thought (Wiegmann & Shappell 2003). However, there are many 
more factors within this one task that could have an influence and the levels of 
the HFACS system would need to be amplified to include these factors. For 
example, poor instrument scanning or poor technique may be evident. An 
accepted model for performance levels and skill learning is offered by Reason 
(1990). For a skill - rule – knowledge based performance, the lowest level is to 
follow the knowledge based actions, and then as experience grows the rule 
based behaviour takes over. This is especially pertinent where a pilot has very 
little experience and may have an incomplete or erroneous knowledge base for 
the situation thus becoming overwhelmed by the task.  
Further Human Factors analysis may prove useful in evaluating accidents and 
defining the accident causality (Shappell & Wiegmann 2006). Typically there are 
a multitude of factors which contribute to an accident. Studies have associated 
a number of causal factors in the following areas, Environment, Human, 
Machine and Task (Harris 2006, Wiegmann 2003). Evidently, it may prove 
difficult to isolate each single event or factor. In support of taking several factors 
into account, Helmreich (2001) validated the importance of operating skills into 
essential groups, Team Climate, Planning, Task execution and reviewing. 
These essential groups improve the level of accident investigation outside the 
initial levels proposed by HFACS. Also, HFACS can be limiting in that it can be 
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difficult to collate information about the latent conditions or inter-relation of 
conditions in the accident reports. The deeper investigation of human factors in 
accidents has shown the value of going beyond HFACS by gaining a broader 
insight into the crew actions and developing a central theme that links the 
human factors of each accident, such as CRM or training where several aspects 
all link together (Li 2007). For example, Li (2007) found that accidents rarely 
involved a single error and overall it was possible to show as many as eight 
individual errors linked across the HFACS framework. CRM was often found to 
be a major factor and was then linked across three out of four categories at the 
HFACS level one framework. Therefore a broader approach was considered 
that would provide a representative accident model of business jet operations. 
It was considered that an accident data analysis such as the Grounded Theory 
approach, suggested by Strauss & Corbin (1990) would establish an accident 
model that was pertinent to the particular operations of business jets. For 
example, when utilising HFACS, in order to assess an unsafe act, the 
researcher must first designate it to either an Error or Violation. If the example is 
an error, then it must be allocated to one of the next sub sets of Skill, Decision 
or Perceptual based errors. In contrast, when the evidence is collated by the 
Grounded Theory method, it is grouped by type or similarity of context and 
content, with minimal researcher input or opinion. Once all the initial groups or 
categories are created, then further assessment is completed to refine the 
model and establish similarity of action or groups that could improve the 
definition of the final analysis. Furthermore, the evidence “speaks for itself” and 
the groups or categories are created by the facts themselves. So, groups like 
Team, Task, Skill or Environment become self-evident and as noted above 
overall effects, such as CRM may become apparent. Therefore, for these 
reasons, Grounded Theory study was considered advantageous over HFACS in 
gaining an objective view of the business jet accident record. 
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3.1.2 Data Origin  
As stated earlier, a CAA study had evaluated the accident data prior to 2007. 
So, the accident analysis in this Chapter continues from the year 2007. The 
accident analysis was further refined to a specific flight phase from the data 
reported in the annual safety summaries. In particular, IBAC (2008a, 2011, and 
2012) reported that the majority of accidents of business jet accidents occur 
during the approach and landing phase of flight (over 60% in 2012). IBAC 
further list the 4 major causes of runway accidents, including, poor speed 
control, unstable approaches, runway conditions and crosswinds. The approach 
phase was further considered representative, since the EASA safety plan 2011 
to 2014, proposed safety initiatives to address factors such as high landing 
speeds, high approach paths, unstable approaches and poor braking 
techniques. Also, when operating to smaller, less sophisticated airports, some 
operators were not allowing sufficient landing distance margins or the pilots are 
landing too far down the runway to stop safely (EASA 2011). The basic flying 
skill required of any pilot is a safe and accurate touch down in the correct part of 
the runway, yet pilot skills, including loss of control, were identified in several 
safety initiatives (EASA 2011, CAA 2011). Considering the safety concerns of 
the regulators and the majority of landing accidents during business jet 
operations, it was identified that the approach and landing phase was the critical 
area of interest. 
The data for this Chapter was obtained from the NTSB accident data statistics 
for the years 2007 to 2010 in the flight phase “Approach and Landing” for all 
business jet listed accidents (NTSB 2012a). The NTSB database is an 
independent organisation with reports for  all accidents within their domain and 
all aircraft with a United States registration, to the accepted standards as define 
ICAO annex 13 (NTSB 2012b, ICAO 2012). Also, during 2010, the North 
American fleet represented 63.7% of the global business jet fleet, whereas 
Europe only 13.9% (IBAC 2011). Other accident investigation organisations 
were also considered. Although the AAIB is of equal merit it is only responsible 
for the investigation of the accidents occurring to UK registered aircraft and 
foreign registered aircraft whose accidents occur in the UK (AAIB 2009).  During 
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the years 2007 to 2010 NTSB reported a total of 59 landing accidents, whereas 
for the same period the AAIB reported only 5 business jet accidents, in all 
categories (AAIB 2009). 
 Methodology 3.2
The study was based on the procedures for data gathering and coding as 
outlined by Strauss and Corbin (1990) (format listed in Figure 1), in order to 
develop an accident model that could reflect the particular operations of the 
business jets. 
 
 
Figure 1 Grounded theory application steps (from Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
3.2.1 Data Gathering  
The data were collected from the NTSB accident data files for the years 2007 to 
2010. In order to gather the evidence, a set of qualitative statements from the 
NTSB accident investigation reports were collated, verbatim, into a database. 
This was followed by a line by line analysis as described by Strauss & Corbin 
(1990). The accident and incident data from all the approach/landing categories 
listed in NTSB data files were broken down into individual phrases or 
sentences, which referred to a single incident or observation concerning the 
facts of the accident. 
For each phrase, the sampling criteria were that it should contain evidence of 
the following: 
1. Statements and evidence from either the crew or witnesses. 
2. Description of the conditions pertaining to the accident. For example; 
the weather reports, the aircraft state (either fully serviceable or with 
Data 
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equipment failures), the runway in use, Air Traffic Control reports and 
the runway conditions (either wet or dry etc.) 
3. The relevant operating drills or procedures that were required or 
recommended by the manufacturer. 
4. The evidence of the investigating officer. 
3.2.2 Open Coding 
In accordance with the procedure defined by Strass & Corbin (1990), the Open 
Coding category list was established as follows; the tabulated data groups were 
obtained by from a line by line analysis of the lines of text from the NTSB 
accident reports to gather items of evidence or witness comments. 
Each item was then examined in order to consider a relevant category. The 
analysis was conducted using the constant comparison technique (Partington 
2002). In the process each line of text was compared with the preceding 
examples to see if it repeated the same phenomenon as stated in one of the 
previous lines. If this were true, then it could be allocated to an existing 
category, if not, then a new category was required and allocated to that line of 
text. This procedure was followed by the first rater and an initial set of coding 
categories was created. During this phase each phrase had been given an 
identifier linking to the original report, so that it may be read and cross checked 
in its original context, if required. Subsequently, the complete listing, along with 
its identifiers plus the original NTSB reports, was passed to a second rater. The 
second rater was asked to repeat the procedure outlined above, where each 
phrase would be compared with the preceding examples and either included in 
a new category or added to an existing category. In order to check for inter- 
rater reliability, once the second rater had created an independent list, the 
differences in coding were discussed by the two raters and a consolidated list of 
categories was agreed. 
3.2.3 Axial Coding 
Following the procedures outlined in Strauss & Corbin (1990) axial coding was 
the next stage of proceedings. Axial coding specifies the properties and 
dimensions for a higher level of coding. Strauss views axial coding as building a 
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‘dense texture of relationships around the axis of a category’. Thus it begins the 
development of a higher order category although it may be at an early stage of 
development. Initially, the open coding results were further examined to confirm 
that each phrase was in the appropriate category. This was done by comparing 
the content of each phrase against the other phrases in the same category. The 
open coding categories were then arranged into groupings containing similar or 
linked content. This new format became the basis for the High order categories. 
3.2.4 Selective Coding 
The final segment of Strauss & Corbin defines Selective Coding as  
“The process of selecting the core category (and) systematically relating it to 
other categories”  
During the Selective Coding process the categories identified by the axial 
coding were further examined to identify if there were relationships between 
these categories to develop a core model of the accident data. The high level 
groups in isolation would not completely build a working model for accident 
analysis. For example, the pilot may have lacked the ability to land in the 
prevailing conditions, yet the weather had not been considered prior to the 
accident. So, the skill of the pilot could be listed as a cause of the accident, 
even though, the situation could also be the responsibility of the commander, 
who ignored weather conditions. The core strategy was therefore established to 
show the overall model and demonstrate the relationship of the higher order 
categories. 
 RESULTS 3.3
3.3.1 Open Coding 
The data were taken from the NTSB on line data base for all Final Factual 
reports for Turbo jet and Turbo fan engine business jets (NTSB 2012a).  This 
yielded a total of 47 accidents which fulfilled the sampling criteria.  
The NTSB data included two fatal accidents where the aircraft was completely 
destroyed and the facts of the accident could not be determined. Therefore, 
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these 2 accidents were excluded from the listing. In 2 other reports of accidents, 
the aircraft was either parked or taxiing and in each case the crew could not 
affect the outcome. For example, one aircraft was parked prior to start up and a 
refuelling truck drove into the wingtip. Since these accidents did not involve any 
flight crew action or inaction, these reports were excluded.  
3.3.2 Open Coding: Category Descriptions. 
During the open coding process, 164 phrases fulfilled the sampling criteria and 
from these phrases 15 open coding categories were established. The list of 
open coding categories, with the number of phrases allocated to each category 
is shown in Table 5. After the table, each category is described in detail. 
Table 5  Initial Open Coding Categories. 
CATEGORY  Phrases 
allocated 
Pilot skill or accuracy. 31 
Systems awareness 23 
Captain’s command or judgement 8 
Failure to follow a drill or procedure 16 
Maintenance Error 15 
Actions reported as correct, in the situation. 14 
Understanding the aircraft’s  runway 
performance 
12 
Aircraft systems knowledge 9 
Examining the Conditions 3 
CRM  or company CRM policy 9 
Ground Personnel 6 
Operational Procedures 8 
Reluctance, uncertainty or confusion 3 
Rules or Regulations 5 
Outside the aircraft Clearance 2 
TOTAL PHRASES 164 
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3.3.3 Piloting Skill or Accuracy  
Aspects of the pilots’ flying abilities were listed in several reports. An example is 
shown in the following quote where a co-pilot is having difficulty achieving the 
required approach and makes several inputs to correct the situation. However 
the aircraft was damaged during the hard landing and subsequent go-around. 
 “The first officer then saw the runway threshold, and as he descended 
 below the MDA (Minimum Descent Altitude), the airplane was high and 
 indicating an airspeed of 150 knots. The first officer momentarily 
 deployed the speed brakes, but stowed them about 200 feet AGL, 
 (above ground level) and reduced the engine power to flight idle. About 
 20 feet AGL, the airplane descended at an excessive rate and impacted 
 the runway. The airplane drifted right, bounced, and the first officer 
 initiated a go-around.” 
3.3.4 System Awareness 
The category for “System Awareness” contained examples of crews that did not 
seem aware of the aircraft state for the safe conduct of the flight. An example is 
where the aircraft ran out of fuel following several attempts to land in poor 
weather conditions. Here is the report extract showing that the Captain did not 
appear to appreciate the severity of the situation. The aircraft crashed once the 
engines had stopped due to a lack of fuel. 
 “On the third missed approach, the No. 1 engine shut down and the pilots 
 requested a vector from air traffic control (ATC) for a fourth approach. 
 The first officer then stated to ATC that they were low on fuel. In the 
 report, the captain stated that the airplane "ran out of fuel” 
3.3.5 Captain’s Command & Judgement 
The accident data contained evidence of situations where the captain’s 
decisions could prejudice a safe flight, such as uploading insufficient fuel for the 
flight or continuing to land in adverse weather conditions. The category for 
“Captain’s Command or judgement” was included. In one particular accident, a 
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captain landed in adverse conditions, even though the evidence confirms that 
the information was passed to the pilot. The following quotation from the 
accident investigator, in this accident, lists several of the facts (including 
evidence from ATC and the Flight Data Recorder) plus the comments about a 
slippery runway by the Pilot in Command (PIC). In the event, the aircraft could 
not stop on the runway and ran off the far end.  
 “They stated that the airplane appeared "high and fast" as it crossed over 
 the runway threshold The data revealed the airplane's groundspeed at 
 touchdown was about 140 knots The PIC reported that he thought the 
 runway might be covered with an inch or two of snow, which did not 
 concern him. The co-pilot reported encountering light snow during the 
 approach. At 0904:23, the PIC stated, “now expect it to be icy and 
 slippery okay so..” 
3.3.6 Failing to Follow a Drill or Procedure 
During several flights, the incident had been initiated by a system or component 
failure on the aircraft. In this situation, the crew would have been expected to 
complete the required failure or emergency drill/procedure in preparation for 
landing. As will be listed in the next paragraph, this would normally be the case. 
However, it became apparent that a further category of “Failing to follow a drill 
or procedure” was required. The particular crew, in this extract, could not stop 
on landing after a hydraulic system failure, since they did not complete the drill 
and the emergency brakes were not selected “on”. 
 “The flight crew did not evaluate the auxiliary hydraulic pump to see if it 
 could restore system pressure, and continued to trouble shoot the fluid 
 loss without following the checklist. During the flight crews evaluation of 
 the hydraulic system, the A side pump was turned on and the PTU circuit 
 breaker was engaged which enabled the normal landing gear extension. 
 The flight crew did not complete the Landing checklist.” 
 39 
 (Note: the PTU is a Power Transfer Unit, part of an emergency system.) 
3.3.7 Maintenance Error 
During the statement collation there were 12 phrases or statements that 
illustrated an accident or incident that was directly attributable to maintenance 
error. In 2 other statements there was evidence of material or design failure. In 
these 2 situations the components failed in flight but were causes which could 
not be influenced by any flight crew action or inaction. However, it was noted 
that in the majority of cases the flight crew dealt correctly with the situation and 
safely recovered the aircraft. Since the correct actions and all other 
consequences were already covered in other categories, these phrases were 
included in the category of “Maintenance Error”. For example, in one accident 
report, an engine cover did not have the correct fasteners and was not securely 
re-fitted following engine overhaul. Subsequently, the panel opened in flight and 
the crew made an emergency landing. 
3.3.8 Actions Reported as Correct for the Situation 
Although, there were 13 entries in the category for the crew failure to follow a 
drill, there were still 10 cases of correct crew action followed by a safe/ 
uneventful landing (“Actions reported as correct for the situation”). As in the 
following example, accident reports of correct crew action were often very short 
with few comments. 
 “The pilots shut-down the left engine and declared an emergency. The 
 airplane diverted to Palm Springs where it made an overweight, single-
 engine landing without further incident.” 
3.3.9 Understanding Aircraft Runway Performance. 
Included in the investigation, several accident reports contained references to 
the crew landing or taking off when the runway conditions and /or length were 
unsuitable. Therefore a category for “Understanding of the aircraft’s runway 
performance” was included. The following example, demonstrates a crew using 
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a runway of less than 5000 feet, when the manufacturers quoted performance 
required a far longer distance.  
 “The required landing distance on a runway contaminated with 1-inch of 
 snow, at a Vref of 110 knots was approximately 5,800 feet. At Vref + 10 
 knots, the required landing distance increased to about 7,750 feet. 
 (Actual runway 4800 feet)” 
3.3.10 Aircraft Systems Knowledge 
The runway performance and capabilities of the aircraft was not the only area 
demonstrating a lack of crew knowledge. The next category of “Aircraft systems 
knowledge” became necessary when the accident reports contained instances 
of crew apparently not having the knowledge or understanding of essential 
aircraft systems. In the report extract a pilot reported he could not lower the 
landing gear (undercarriage), so landed with it retracted. However, the 
investigator found that the serviceable emergency system had not been utilised. 
 “Airplane and Systems, also noted that the landing gear was electrically 
 controlled and hydraulically operated, and that there was an emergency 
 extension system that could be actuated by a red AUX GEAR 
 CONTROL, T-handle located under the pilot's instrument panel.” 
3.3.11 Examining all the Conditions 
Even though some crews appeared to complete their pre-flight briefing actions, 
there was evidence that all the relevant conditions, (such as the changing 
weather conditions, whether the destination airfield was suitable and if adequate 
landing aids were available), had not been considered. The category of 
“Examining all the conditions” was included. This extract demonstrates that a 
captain used a runway that was too short for the weather conditions and 
afterwards admitted that he knew the requirements. 
 “The pilot remembered observing a weather report that reported light rain 
 at RIL; however, the report was not current after the flight departed 
 Scottsdale. The pilot "did not use wet runway performance numbers”, 
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 [and] did note the 135 landing distance requirements as an aid for 
 safety margin; approximately 6,600 feet.” 
(Note: 135 refers to the FAA rule for obtaining an adequate safety margin for 
landing) 
3.3.12 CRM or Company CRM Policy 
As discussed earlier the actions and the attitudes of the captain may impact on 
the safe conduct of the flight. It is generally accepted that good CRM is 
essential to maintaining situation awareness; preventing breakdown of 
teamwork and helping prevent the wrong decisions leading to an accident (CAA 
2006b). Unfortunately, accident report extracts highlighted the lack of CRM, 
which led to the next category for “CRM or Company CRM policy”. In one case 
2 Captains were flying together, with neither knowing who was in command 
(PIC), as shown in the following quote. 
 “When queried as to who was in command of the flight, the pilot stated 
 that he was confused as to who was the PIC and advised that both he 
 and the captain were “co-captains.” When asked about the flight 
 department's standard operating procedures (SOPs), the chief pilot 
 advised that they did not have any, and that the flight department had 
 started out as just one pilot and one airplane, He believed that there was 
 a lack of CRM, and advised that there were no SOPs or "company 
 manual" and that the chief pilot "kind of takes over.” 
3.3.13 Ground Personnel  
Pilots do not operate in isolation and require the assistance and support from 
other agencies. For example, Air traffic control is required for flight clearances 
and control; also the ground operations staffs provide the planning and weather 
information for the crews. The accident data provided several cases of influence 
or action by these support agencies. In one particular case, Air Traffic Control 
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tried to avert an incident by persuading a crew to divert to another airfield where 
the weather conditions were more suitable. The crew did not however accept 
the advice and persisted in their landing attempts until the fuel was exhausted. 
Further reports reflected the type of operations carried out by some business 
jets operators. In contrast to the scheduled airlines, business jets do not always 
operate flights to large established airfields. Rather, they operate charters to 
remote or unmanned airfields then returning to their home base outside the 
normal operating hours. In the following instance it is apparent that airport staffs 
were normally available but the aircraft arrived outside their operating hours and 
the crew did not receive adequate warning of the snow and ice prior to landing.  
 “He reported that N165TW arrived several hours after the airport staff 
 had left for the evening. Prior to the accident, the airport crew arrived and  
 found the runway covered with ice and snow, December 21, 2008, at 
 about 0100 Eastern Standard Time.” 
In the example quoted above, Air traffic control had considered the weather 
conditions at the various airfields and by offering their support and advice 
attempted to avert an accident. In contrast during the particular style of 
business jet operations, where adequate and responsible support was not 
forthcoming from the airfield personnel, this had directly attributed to a landing 
accident.  Therefore, the category of “Ground Personnel” was included. 
3.3.14 Operational Procedures 
The next group shows evidence of pilot actions that did not appear to follow 
normally accepted operational procedures. This category was labelled 
“Operational Procedures”. The following extract lists how the base engineers 
offered advice concerning the snow and ice, then witnessed the aircraft taxi out 
to the runway, even getting stuck in a ditch and powering its way out. Finally the 
aircraft crashed on take-off. The accident report did not, however,   contain 
details or explanation for the crew actions. 
 “The pilot declined to have the airplane de-iced when asked by the FBO. 
 (Engineering Base Operators) He also noticed the airplane was not on 
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 the taxiway as it taxied, but rather on the grass area on the south side of 
 the asphalt taxiway. At that time the ground was covered with snow and 
 ice.” 
3.3.15 Reluctance Uncertainty or Confusion 
The importance of good crew relations and CRM has already been discussed 
with regard to the Captain’s responsibilities and decision making. However 
another aspect of crew co-operation and understanding came from the 
transcript evidence of the on board voice recorder. There were instances of the 
Pilot Flying (PF), often the co-pilot, showing their concern or apprehension but 
being urged on  by the pilot who is not actually flying (PNF), the Captain. 
Although this may reflect on the crew CRM at the time, it is included as a 
separate category since it demonstrates the co-pilot situation and their 
treatment by the captains. This category was listed as “Reluctance, uncertainty 
or confusion” and is demonstrated in the following report extract. 
 PNF asks the PF if she would like to try to circle the airplane down to 
 land.  
 The PF starts by saying “I don’t...” but is cut off by the PNF saying 
 “circle this way.”  
 The PF says “uuhhh...,” followed by the PNF replying, “try it.” 
 The PF responds “No, I don’t see anything yet.” The PNF states 
 “There’s the runway”.  
 The PF replies, “Oh <expletive>, are you kidding me?” 
3.3.16 Rules or Regulations  
The safe flight of an aircraft is often governed by relevant rules and procedures. 
Although it has already been stated, several incidents or failures were correctly 
handled by the crews. Some other, instances included crews not following the 
applicable “Rules or Regulations”, such as continuing to operate even though 
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the weather conditions were below the prescribed minima. In the accident report 
quoted below, this crew utilised a flap setting that was not authorised for use. 
 “The crew reported that the landing was performed utilizing a flap setting 
 of 30 degrees based on the landing conditions, with a landing approach 
 speed of 135 knots. The airplane was certified for normal landings with 
 the flap system at 45 degrees only, and there was no flight test data to 
 certify the airplane to land with the flap system not at 45 degrees during 
 normal operations.” 
3.3.17 Outside the Aircraft Clearance 
The final category is where pilots go outside the certification and clearance 
capabilities of the aircraft. Passenger carrying aircraft are not certified or 
cleared for aerobatic manoeuvres. However, this pilot carried out an aileron roll 
at high altitude, lost control, recovered at 5000 feet and damaged the aircraft. 
This category is listed as “Outside the Aircraft Clearance”  
 “The captain reported the airplane was "functioning normally" prior to the 
 intentional aileron roll manoeuvre. The captain stated that the "intentional 
 roll manoeuvre got out of control"  while descending through flight level 
 200 (20,000 feet).” 
 Inter – Rater Reliability 3.4
 
Different raters can disagree about the results from the same object of evidence 
by difference in interpreting the meanings or expected results. In order to 
improve the rater reliability, reduce the experimenter’s bias and improve the 
consensus of the results, the open coding was repeated by a second, fully 
qualified rater and the results reviewed and compared.  
After the initial coding, the NTSB data files of accident and incident reports were 
passed to an RAF and Civil Aircraft Industry Test Pilot, experienced in accident 
investigation. An independent review of all the accident information and coding 
groups was completed by the second investigator, using the same accident 
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data as the first rater. The results were collected and discussed at length to 
determine any differences from the open coding process.  A comparison of the 
open coding categories and phrases allocated is shown in Table 6. 
Table 6 Inter-rater reliability. Comparison of coding categories 
OPEN CODING CATEGORY  FIRST 
RATER 
SECOND 
RATER 
Pilot skill or accuracy. 31 23 
Systems awareness 23 19 
Captain’s command or judgement 8 16 
Failure to follow a drill or procedure 16 13 
Maintenance Error 15 14 
Actions reported as correct for the situation. 14 10 
Understanding of the aircraft’s  runway 
performance 
12 11 
Aircraft systems knowledge 9 9 
Examining all the Conditions 3 4 
CRM  or company CRM policy 9 5 
Ground Personnel 6 5 
Operational Procedures 8 7 
Reluctance, uncertainty or confusion 3 4 
Rules or Regulations 5 3 
Outside the aircraft Clearance 2 2 
TOTAL PHRASES 164 145 
 
 
The first point for discussion was the total number of statements in the final 
listing. Of the 164 phrases obtained from the sampling criteria, the second rater 
determined that 38 phrases were duplicate statements of the same fact from the 
evidence and therefore only categorised 145 phrases.   
The initial discussion was centred on the phrase contents to explain the 
difference in the numbers of comments. Since the comments were extracted 
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verbatim from the accident reports, in some instances the same aspect was 
described by two or more witnesses or the crew repeated an action. Since the 
first rater considered this pertinent part of the accident report, these comments 
were initially included as part of the data set.  For example:  
 a. Crew Statement: “One crew member stated that the approach was 
 flown faster than the planned approach speed.”  
 b. Findings of the Aircraft data recorder: The aircraft airspeed was 
 analysed, confirming the speed was higher than that required by the 
 aircraft weight and configuration. 
However, there were now two separate phrases from different sources showing 
the same fact. The second rater had listed these phrases but annotated them 
as a single entry. All the phrases were re-checked and any duplicated facts 
consolidated into one entry. It was evident that the categories for Systems 
awareness, Maintenance Error and Failure to Follow a Drill or procedure, 
required the phrases to be amended. 
During the review a further case of duplication was considered, in the category 
Rules or Regulations. One of the accident reports contained details of a crew 
completing an approach to an airfield, even though the weather conditions were 
below the prescribed minima. Since the visibility was very poor, the crew could 
not see the runway to land, so they carried out a “go around” to fly back to the 
initial navigation beacon and commence a second attempt to land.  The first 
rater considered this to be two statements for violation of the rules, yet the 
second rater only considered this as one reportable occurrence. This was 
discussed and agreed that only one reportable statement for each occurrence 
would be included. Once this was agreed, further review confirmed that the 
categories for Actions reported as correct, Ground Personnel and CRM or 
Company CRM Policy also contained duplicated statements.  
The next point of discussion was that the first rater had included 31 phrases for 
Pilot skill or accuracy and only 8 for Captain’s command or judgement. 
However, the second rater had allocated only 23 to Pilot skill or accuracy and 
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16 to Captain’s command or judgement. The category for Piloting skill or 
accuracy was a cause of further discussion due to 8 of the statements listed by 
the first rater. However, the second rater had allocated these statements to 
Captain’s command or judgement. The difference of opinion being that the 
second rater considered that the crew were placed in a difficult situation due to 
poor leadership rather than due to poor skill on the part of the pilot actually 
flying the aircraft. This was shown in several accident reports. In this example, 
just as the aircraft came in to land, the Captain says "I know you don’t want to 
listen to me put it down...don't float it...put it down”. This accident occurred on 
landing as the aircraft actually touched down 20 feet off the side of the runway. 
During the data review, the question of skill level was considered and whether 
the captain’s attitude had a detrimental effect on the crew’s performance. 
Finally, it was agreed that the Captain’s actions could strongly influence the final 
outcome, since the Commander should be aware of the crew abilities and 
therefore act accordingly. Each of the 8 statements was discussed at length and 
agreement reached for their inclusion in the category Captain’s Command or 
judgement. 
Following on from the Piloting Skill discussion, it was obvious that the accident 
reports contained several statements concerning the flying ability of the crews, 
such as a hard landing causing damage. There were also accidents where 
inaccurate speed control on approach was quoted as a factor but the evidence 
also confirmed that there was damage on landing. For example, in an accident 
where airspeed was apparently too high, the evidence further confirmed that the 
landing tyre marks were off the side of the runway, on the grass. Therefore, the 
category Piloting skill or accuracy  was further assessed, as the reports 
contained evidence of both failure to fly an accurate airspeed and difficulties 
during the landing itself. All the examples were re-examined and the contents 
were considered by both the raters. Finally, it was decided that sub categories 
of “Flying faster than optimum on approach” and “Pilot skill”, should be included 
as sub groups of the primary category Pilot skill or accuracy. This was 
considered possible, since the airspeed was accurately reported and could be 
isolated as the criterion for the category. For example: 
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 “In one accident, although the FAA had cleared an airfield approach for 
 all aircraft flying at up to 120 knots and turning with a maximum of 30 
 degrees of bank angle, the aircraft data recorder confirmed the crew 
 utilized upwards of 48 degrees of bank with airspeeds varying from 132 
 to 147 kn.” 
Finally, in each of the categories: “Understanding of the aircraft’s runway 
performance”, “Operational procedures “, and “Reluctance, uncertainty or 
confusion” there were phrases which needed more discussion and agreement. 
These phrases were finally included in the category “Examining all the 
Conditions.” There was agreement in the entries for “Aircraft System 
knowledge” and “Outside the Aircraft Clearance”. 
The accident reports initially provided 164 phrases or statements of evidence. 
Once the duplicated statements and the conditions for repeat occurrences were 
removed, the number allocated to the Open Coding was 143. Ultimately, the 
statements were coded according to their content and are shown with the 
number of statements listed for each category in Table 7. 
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Table 7 Final Open Coding Categories 
CODING CATEGORY DEFINITION NUMBER OF 
STATEMENTS 
1 Pilot skill or accuracy. 23 
(1 A = 15)  
(1 B = 8) 
1A Pilot skill 
1B Flying faster than optimum on approach. 
2 Systems awareness 19 
3 Captain’s Command or Judgement 16 
4 Failure to follow a drill or procedure 13 
5 Maintenance Error 12 
6 Actions reported as correct for the situation. 10 
7 Understanding of the aircraft’s  runway performance 11 
8 Aircraft systems knowledge 9 
9 Examining all the conditions 7 
10 CRM  or company CRM policy 5 
11 Ground Personnel 5 
12 Operational procedures  4 
13 Reluctance, uncertainty or confusion 4 
14 Rules or Regulations 3 
15 Outside the aircraft Clearance 2 
 TOTAL STATEMENTS 143 
 
 Axial Coding 3.5
The Axial coding investigation examined the possible links between the Open 
Coding Categories. The first area to be examined was the largest category of 
Piloting Skills. This was followed by Captain’s Command and then Crew 
Resource Management. 
3.5.1 Skills and Knowledge  
During the open coding phase, the categories “Pilot skill or accuracy”  was the 
leading category, with its two subgroups, “Pilot skill” and “Flying faster than 
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optimum on approach.” Several accident reports contained evidence of 
approaches flown at airspeed above that required and the excess speed quoted 
as one of the significant accident factors. In another accident, the pilot was high 
on the normal approach path, attempted to correct but landed harder than 
normal and damaged the aircraft. However, even though pilot accuracy and 
skills were reported factors of the accidents, all the accident reports confirmed 
that the crews were correctly licensed and had passed the relevant skill tests 
and examinations for the award of a licence.  
Also, the 2 categories, “Understanding of aircraft performance” and “Aircraft 
systems knowledge” contained several failures of the crew to safely operate the 
aircraft. In one example, a crew required approximately 7000 feet of runway, yet 
landed on a 4800 feet runway and therefore could not stop in the runway length 
available. In another case, the aircraft crashed due to lack of fuel. The captain 
was just able to reach the runway but the undercarriage would not lower 
normally. Although, the normal systems ceased to function, the crew did not 
operate the emergency undercarriage system, thus landing on the belly of the 
aircraft. The investigation did confirm that the undercarriage was serviceable 
and available on the emergency system. It could not be determined from the 
reports,  what level of crew training was achieved or what had been the crew 
reasoning in each case, either for not using a longer runway or for failure to use 
an aircraft emergency system. 
Since these accident reports contained comments on the skill or ability of the 
pilots, it was considered that the crews lacked either the skills or knowledge that 
was required. Therefore, the following categories were included in the high level 
category “Skills and knowledge”. 
 Pilot skill 
 Flying faster than optimum on approach 
 Understanding of the aircraft’s  runway performance 
 Aircraft systems knowledge  
 
 51 
3.5.2 Command and Decision Making 
During the preparation of the open coding stage, the Captain’s command and 
leadership was identified as one of the top 3 categories. However, command 
and leadership was also considered as a component of several other categories 
such as those instances when the crew did not comply with either the required 
rules or the operational procedures. The extracted statements in all the 
remaining categories were reviewed to identify if the Captain’s attitude was 
reflected in the crew actions. Comments from the categories; “Systems 
awareness”, “Failure to follow a drill or procedure.”, “Rules or Regulations” and 
“Captain’s command or judgement” were re-examined.  
In the accident, where the aircraft ran out of fuel, the captain did not seem to be 
aware of the aircraft low fuel state (systems awareness). Also, the report 
concluded that “the crew do not take into consideration the amount of distance 
and time to complete the flight” (operational procedures). In the 13 accidents 
listed under “Failure to follow drill or procedure”, there were reports of 
incomplete crew actions. One crew landed on the aircraft belly, as they did not 
complete the drill. In another a crew landed but did not select a back-up pump 
for the wheel brakes and could not stop.  
The captain is responsible for the conduct and planning of a flight. However, 
during another accident the captain did not collect adequate weather 
information, attempted to land outside the weather limits and subsequently 
crashed. (Examining all the conditions and Rules or Regulations) For the 
category, “Captain’s Command or judgement”, there were other examples of 
Captains continuing in adverse conditions. One Captain continued to land even 
though ATC had passed the fact that there was snow and ice. 
All these examples reflect on the poor standard of command and leadership. 
There were, however examples of good leadership and as noted in the category 
“Actions reported as correct for the situation” and this was considered. The safe 
outcome of these particular flights demonstrated good levels of crew co-
operation and high quality leadership could be effective. 
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Finally, one further category was also added to the analysis under the 
command sector. One of the business jet pilots rolled the aircraft upside down 
in an unauthorised aerobatic manoeuvre and lost control. This was in the 
category “Outside the aircraft clearance” and was an example of poor 
judgement by the captain 
Therefore, by reviewing the comments included in these categories a high level 
category was included for the actions and decisions of the Captain.  “Command 
and Decision Making” was identified as a high level category and the following 
open coding categories were included: 
 Systems awareness 
 Failure to follow drill or procedure 
 Actions reported as correct for the situation 
 Captain’s command or judgement 
 Examining all the conditions 
 Rules or Regulations 
 Operational Procedures 
 Outside the aircraft Clearance 
3.5.3 Crew Resource Management 
In aircraft operations, the role of the Captain is primary in the conduct of the 
aircraft and its safe operation. However, the Captains perception of the role as 
commander is affected by many factors, including, company organisational 
culture and national social norms. In the reports there were several different 
command styles observed by crew members. An example of good leadership is 
from open and affirmative captains, who state their intentions and manage the 
flight. These captains are more likely to enlist the cooperation and assistance of 
the crew than those who are overbearing and autocratic (CAA 2006b).  It is this 
balance between “Leadership” and “Followership” that establishes the 
“Command Gradient” across the flight deck, generally from the Captain in the 
left seat to the co-pilot in the right seat. A steep gradient would be a situation 
where all decisions are made by the captain and the other crew members have 
little or no choice but to agree. 
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In the first case there was an obvious disregard for the regulations and 
conditions. For example, a crew flew an approach to an airfield even though the 
reported weather conditions prohibited the approach. Consequently, they were 
unable to land but repeated the profile in another attempted landing. 
 “On arrival at KTEX, the weather was reported to be below minimums, so 
 a missed approach  back to the VOR [radio beacon] and a further 
 approach requested” 
In the second case the Captain urged an unwilling co-pilot to continue landing 
even though the co-pilot was uncertain or unable to comply. The following 
extract is from the NTSB report, the Pilot Not Flying (PNF) is the Captain and 
the Pilot Flying (PF) is the co-pilot. 
 “20 seconds prior to touchdown the PNF tells the PF “just put it down. 
 Put it down”. The PF replies “I’m trying, where is it?” Eight seconds prior 
 to touchdown the PNF says “I know you don’t want to listen to me …put it 
 down…don’t float it …put it down”. 
During the investigation, the effect of an over bearing or forceful Captain was 
considered regarding the efficiency and ability of the crew. In the transcripts, 
there was no evidence of co-pilot input either to question the captain’s decisions 
or raise concerns prior to the impending accident. The crew co-operation and 
working attitudes were assessed and a comparison technique was applied to 
the initial categories, in order to confirm if the data supported this view. 
Subsequently, the comments concerning the role of the commander and his/her 
relationship and command style during the conduct of the flight were compared 
to other categories such as “Reluctance, uncertainty or confusion” and “CRM or 
company CRM policy”.  
In the example case of Captain urging an unwilling co-pilot to continue, there is 
an apparent lack of consideration for the other crew member even though the 
co-pilot is uncertain and may not be able to see the runway; 
 “Co-pilot “I’m trying, where is it?” followed by Captain “I know you don’t 
 want to listen to me.” 
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 The following extract from the cockpit voice recorder is further example of 
confusion and reluctance by a co-pilot;  
 “….don’t...” but is cut off by the Captain saying, “circle this way.” The co-
 pilot says “uuhhh...,” followed by “Oh <expletive>, are you kidding me?” 
Since these examples contained evidence of poor crew co-operation and inter 
pilot reactions on the flight deck, the following categories were consolidated into 
the high level category, “CRM”. 
 Reluctance, uncertainty or confusion 
 CRM or company CRM policy 
3.5.4 Support Environment 
Finally, the categories of “Ground Personnel” and “Maintenance Error” were 
reviewed. Consideration was given to the essential requirements for operating 
an aircraft. This included such support aspects as aircraft maintenance, the 
operational support of the company personnel and the interaction with Air 
Traffic control. For example, the crew would be reliant on the maintenance team 
for the serviceability of the aircraft. Also, all the Flight Planning data (flight plan 
routeing, fuel plan, time, total distances and weather information) would be 
provided by dedicated ground personnel. Finally, the following categories were 
combined into the high level category of “Support Environment”. 
 Maintenance error 
 Ground Personnel 
3.5.5 Axial Coding – High Level Categories 
As described above, the final Axial Coding High Level categories were: 
 Skills and knowledge 
 Command and Decision Making 
 Crew Resource Management 
 Support Environment 
The final results from the Axial Coding phase are shown at Table 8. 
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Table 8  Axial Coding High level Categories and Sub Categories. 
HIGH LEVEL CATEGORY SUB CATEGORY 
COMMAND AND DECISION 
MAKING 
Systems awareness 
 Failure to follow drill or procedure 
 Actions reported as correct for the 
situation 
 Captain’s command or judgement 
 Examining all the conditions 
 Rules or Regulations 
 Operational Procedures 
 Outside the aircraft Clearance 
  
SKILLS OR KNOWLEDGE Understanding of the aircraft’s  
runway performance  
 Aircraft systems knowledge  
 Pilot skill 
 Flying faster than optimum on 
approach 
  
CRM Reluctance, uncertainty or 
confusion 
 CRM or company CRM policy. 
  
SUPPORT ENVIRONMENT Ground Personnel. 
 Maintenance error 
 
 Selective Coding 3.6
Selective coding level is the final task to obtain a higher level of group 
attribution in refining the categories and their relationship. From this new 
attribution, a linking can be defined for all the accident codes or groups that 
have already been developed. Therefore, the business jet accident safety 
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model will show the overriding relationship between all of the aspects (factors) 
of the high level categories defined in the axial coding process. 
3.6.1 Linking CRM with Skills and Knowledge  
In this investigation CRM was evident as a factor from the accident reports; this 
was especially applicable for the co-pilots behaviour and the captain’s actions. 
In the reports it was apparent that the co-pilots could not provide input or 
comments nor were they considered as part of the team. Furthermore, poor 
consideration of the co-pilot’s skill is shown in an accident report, where the 
captain urges the co-pilot to land saying “I know you don’t want to listen to me- 
just put it down.” Upon investigation, it was found that the aircraft had touched 
down on the grass at the side of the runway, yet the captain’s evidence stated 
“the landing was normal”. In contrast, there was an example of good pilot skill 
supported by good CRM, when a large bird struck the nose of an aircraft 
immediately after take-off. The captain elected to continue the 20 minute flight 
to the intended destination, completed all the drills, flew an approach without 
incident and landed safely. 
In these examples, the CRM plus Skills and Knowledge factors are linked and 
both influence the final safety of the flight.  In order to demonstrate this, the 2 
spheres of influence for the factors are linked as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Figure 2.  The Linked Spheres of influence for CRM with Skills and Knowledge 
CRM Skills 
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3.6.2 Linking Command and Decision Making with CRM 
As stated, the accident reports contained examples of poor leadership, 
management and flying skills. Some crews did maintain the required 
performance standards (correct speed on approach). Others did not follow or 
maintain procedures (incomplete checklists). Another consideration for flight 
safety is Situation Awareness, such as an appreciation of .the external 
environment. This may be whether the pilot collects relevant information e.g. 
weather, traffic, etc., or if the pilot ignores the information. In two accident 
reports, one captain did not load sufficient fuel for the planned flight. In the 
second, prior to commencing a flight; the captain had operated to his 
destination several times and was “very comfortable with the weather” but could 
not stop on landing due to the wet runway. As these Captains demonstrated 
poor leadership, there is also a lacking of CRM and teamwork which would 
allow the co-pilots to voice their opinions. This was re-enforced in the accident 
when an aircraft ran out of fuel on approach, by the co-pilot informing ATC that 
they could not divert as they were low on fuel. However, there was no evidence 
that he discussed this or that any contingency plan was considered by the 
captain. The captain also demonstrated a lack of leadership and CRM as 
immediately after the co-pilot had informed ATC of the fuel state, he requested 
a further attempt to land in the prevailing weather conditions.  
As shown in the quoted accident reports, the factors of Command and Decision 
Making together with CRM jointly influence the crew actions and the safe 
conduct of the flight. Therefore, the spheres of influence are shown linked 
together as in Figure 3  
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Figure 3. The Linked Spheres of CRM and Skills or Knowledge 
3.6.3 Linking Skills and Knowledge with Command and Decision 
Making 
It is a requirement that all pilots are required to demonstrate adequate flying 
skills to obtain their licence. The testing includes elements of emergency 
training, such as the ability to land safely after an engine failure. However, in the 
Open Coding process, the major category was Pilot Skills. For example, an 
accident occurred following a hydraulic failure and the crew   “continued to 
troubleshoot the failure without following the checklist “. During this sequence of 
events the checklist was not completed and the wheel brakes were inoperative 
on landing. Furthermore, the captain demonstrated a lack of command and 
leadership when the landing checklist was not completed. In this instance, the 
Captain compounded the in- flight emergency by accepting poor standards of 
both skills and knowledge.  
The captain is ultimately responsible for the safe conduct of the flight. 
Therefore, it is within his or her remit to decide whether a course of action is 
both safe and within the skill levels of the crew. This is demonstrated in the 
accident, where the pilot deliberately rolled an aircraft upside- down and lost 
control. The pilot statement after the accident confirmed that “the intentional roll 
manoeuvre got out of control while descending through 20,000 feet.” The 
CRM 
Command 
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aircraft commander attempted a manoeuvre that was beyond the skill of the 
pilot and outside the performance clearance of the aircraft.  
In the accidents quoted above, the commander should have considered the skill 
levels of his crew in order to operate safely. In this way Command and Decision 
Making together with Skills and knowledge are jointly influential on the conduct 
of the flight. The spheres of influence are shown linked in Figure 4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4  The Linked Spheres of Command and Decision Making with Skills and 
Knowledge. 
3.6.4 The Linking of all Three Factors 
The following accident report extract demonstrates the interdependence of 
CRM, Skills and Decision Making with Command and Decision Making on the 
flight deck. From the factual evidence of the accident it may be argued that this 
was a pilot skill and handling accident but it has all the indicators of the other 
groups. 
“The approach was flown at a speed higher than that allowed by the procedure. 
Once visual, the aircraft was out of position and too high for a safe landing, so 
the Captain suggested an orbit (360 degree turn) to reposition for the landing. 
However, this is not prescribed in the procedures. Once re-aligned with the 
runway the co-pilot could not see the runway and did not want to continue, but 
was coerced by the captain to continue following his verbal instructions down to 
Command 
Skills 
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the runway. Finally over the runway, at a higher speed than normal for landing, 
the co-pilot has difficulty getting the aircraft to land and touch down. The captain 
made further comments to encourage the co-pilot to land. Finally the aircraft 
touched down but too fast and too far down the runway to stop”. (NTSB 2012a)  
This evidence indicates that every aspect should be considered before 
allocating a primary cause. The report contains the following elements that are 
all significant in the outcome of the accident.  
 Failure to follow regulations (Command) 
 Approaching too fast to land (Skills) 
 A 360 turn this goes outside the normal procedures (Command) 
 Captain leadership in poor judgement to continue (Command) 
 Poor CRM talking the co-pilot into his actions (CRM) 
 Poor CRM, the co-pilot’s comments were ignored and did not feel 
capable of deciding himself (CRM) 
 Lack of performance knowledge, landing too far along the runway 
(Skills) 
As shown previously, the individual factors of CRM, Command and Decision 
Making plus Skills and Knowledge are each coupled together for their influence 
on flight safety. Moreover, during the accident quoted above, the initial decision 
by the captain to conduct an approach outside the regulations was poor 
command. However, by coercing the co-pilot to orbit was a demonstration of 
poor CRM. Ultimately, the captain failed in his responsibility by urging the co-
pilot to continue an ill judged and poorly flown landing. In fact, the captain 
demonstrated a lack of Command and CRM and also failed to take into account 
the co-pilot’s flying skills. This inter relationship is represented in the diagram by 
the intersection of the circles representing the three factors. 
Thus, this final accident demonstrates that the 3 elements of CRM, Command 
and Skills are all influential on the outcome. Therefore, considering the previous 
pairing of the 3 elements, the next stage of the business jet accident model 
should also demonstrate the conditions when all the factors combine, as shown 
by the intersection of the circles in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5  The Linked Spheres of CRM, Command and Skills. 
 
3.6.5 Support Environment 
The final aspect of the core model is “Support Environment”, since the flying 
operation cannot be considered in isolation. All flights are dependent, to varying 
degrees, on aircraft maintenance, the operations and planning departments, 
airport weather information and other support organisations such as Air Traffic 
Control. The importance of safety support is included in the Open Coding and 
Axial Coding categories. Several reports contained evidence for the lack of 
support from ground personnel, directly involved with the operations and 
maintenance. For example the ground crew finished duty and left without 
informing the arriving crew of the icy runway (CRM and good team work should 
also apply to ground personnel). In other reports, maintenance errors caused 
equipment failures in flight, which required skilful emergency action by the crew. 
In one case an engine cover was incorrectly fitted and came loose in flight. 
Fortunately, this was correctly handled by the crew and a safe landing ensued. 
In another case, whilst attempting to land in poor weather conditions, the Air 
Traffic Control offered the crew an alternative airport, (with better weather 
CRM Skills 
Command 
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conditions), but were ignored by the aircraft commander. Since the coded 
categories were outside the crew control (Maintenance Error and Ground 
Personnel); they should stand outside the normal crew actions and 
responsibilities. 
However, all the support concerning the flight, whether good (ATC assistance) 
or bad (Maintenance Error) reflects on the crew actions and may be considered 
as a two way path or flow of information. The information depends on crew inter 
reaction with the ground personnel, such as an in - flight emergency due to an 
aircraft fault, aircraft equipment failures corrected after being reported. Similarly 
it may be timely advice and assistance, such as a weather or airport information 
update from ATC that is acted upon for a safe landing. The two way flow of 
information does not link to a specific area and may have further implications. 
For example, information from ATC may be of no use to the crew if the co-pilot 
feels unable to voice an opinion, even if the situation warrants it. Similarly, the 
captain may elect to depart with insufficient fuel, against the operations and 
ATC reports of weather or airport availability. In one accident report, the captain 
considered the weather and disregarded any advice, then found the conditions 
beyond his or the co-pilots skill level. In another instance, the pilots reported 
that there were no SOPs and the chief pilot “kind of takes over”. Thus, the two 
way flow was still relevant between the pilots and the management but was 
flawed since the pilots felt unable to use the two way flow of information to set 
better standards and improve the SOPs.  
Therefore, the two way flow of information may be represented by two way 
arrows linking all the high level categories, with equal merit and include 
“Support Environment” with additional influence on the overall operation. The 
final business jet accident model is shown as the Selective Coding Model at 
Figure 6. This demonstrates the previous relationship of CRM, Skills and 
Command, but now includes the influence of the Support Environment. 
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Figure 6 Business jet Accident Model. 
 Discussion 3.7
The core model of the business jet accident profile, shown at figure 6 
demonstrates the linking and interdependence of the CRM, Skill and Command 
categories found in the accident report evidence. The main theme of the model 
is constant inter-reaction between the 3 central aspects. Good CRM is essential 
for the safe and effective operation of the crew (CAA 2006b). Pilots are tested 
prior to the issue of a licence to ensure that they possess the minimum flying 
skills to operate the aircraft (CAA 2013). The Captain as the aircraft 
Commander is ultimately legally responsible for the safe conduct of the flight 
CRM Skills 
Command 
Support 
Environment 
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and he/she must therefore take responsibility for all command decisions (CAA 
2010d). 
The final model established from the accident reports included these crew 
responses. However, the consequences were always linked to the other central 
categories, sometimes the link was across all three categories. The flight 
operation was also shown to be dependent on support from other agencies 
involved in the “Support Environment” (maintenance, ATC etc., Helmreich 
2001). These factors for crew interaction and working issues with both ATC and 
Ramp Maintenance were in agreement with Li (2007). Considering the actions 
of the crew and the influence of outside agencies, this thesis model supports 
the Five M model of Harris & Thomas (2006), where the central spheres of the 
HuMan, Machine and Mission are influenced by the spheres of influence of the 
Management and the Medium. It is also consistent with CAP 737 (CAA 2006a) 
explanation of CRM, command and outside agencies;  
 “In order to be effective, team members must be able to talk to each 
 other, listen to each other, share information and be assertive when 
 required. Commanders should take particular responsibility for ensuring 
 that the crew function effectively as a team. Whilst the emphasis in CRM 
 is primarily upon the cockpit crew, and how they work as a team, it is 
 also important to look at wider team effectiveness, namely the whole 
 flight crew. CRM principles may also extend to situations where ATC, 
 maintenance, company experts, etc., are considered to be part of the 
 team (especially in emergency situations).” (CAA 2006a) 
All aircraft operators, both airline and business jet, are required to have a 
system of CRM training and assessment, to provide feedback to the crew and 
identify any need for retraining and improve CRM and safety (CAA 2006b, JAA 
2001). This is especially applicable for the co-pilots, who were unable to provide 
feedback or were not taken into account as part of the team. This aspect is 
further emphasised by the JAA regulations. 
 “The flight crew must be assessed on their CRM skills in accordance with 
a methodology acceptable to the Authority and published in the Operations 
 65 
Manual. The purpose of such an assessment is to: provide feedback to the crew 
collectively and individually and serve to identify retraining; and be used to 
improve the CRM training system.” (JAA 2001, Para 1.965). 
Furthermore, the CRM attributes in the core model were closely in agreement 
with findings of Flin (2003) and Van Avermaete (1998) for the development of 
the Non - Technical marking system (NOTECH). For example; 2 social skills, 
(Co-operation, Leadership and Management), and 2 Cognitive skills, (Situation 
awareness, Decision Making), were established as behavioural markers. (A 
listing of CRM and behavioural markers is at Appendix C).  CRM is also 
considered an essential safety element by the NTSB and FAA as it is quoted as 
one of major requirements in the “Most Wanted List” in 2003, 2004 and 2009 
(NTSB 2009b). Significantly, the FAA has now increased the requirement for 
CRM training (FAA 2012).  
Several examples of poor practice by the Captains contained in the business jet 
accidents reports are reflected in “Considering Others.” In the accident example 
quoted in Selective coding (where an orbit was suddenly included in the profile), 
the Captain did not consider the condition of the other crew member, even 
when the co-pilot openly expressed doubts about continuing. This supports the 
examples of poor practice evident in the NOTECH coding elements (Flin 2003). 
(An example of CRM Co-operation elements is shown at Appendix D.)  
The accident reports concerning leadership and management skills also include 
poor practices. Some crews did maintain the required performance standards 
(correct speed on approach). Others did not follow or maintain procedures 
(incomplete checklists). Similarly for Situation Awareness the good and bad 
practice includes the external environment and whether the pilot collects 
relevant information e.g. weather, traffic, etc., or the pilot ignores the information 
(Flin 2003). These failings are reinforced by Helmreich (2001) during an 
evaluation of Commercial Airline flights during a LOSA. Even though the LOSA 
was devised around airline operations, these same problem areas are evident 
from the business jet accident reports.  
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Although the Business Jet Accident Model has been developed purely from the 
evidence in the business jet accident database, it could be relevant to 
commercial airline operations since it contains the essential elements for a safe 
operation. However, as the business jet commercial operation is dictated for 
time and destination by the customer, there are essential differences in the type 
of operation. For instance commercial airlines do not normally operate to 
airports without ground personnel and engineering support. So the instance of 
the pilots arriving un-announced onto an ice covered runway is extremely 
unlikely. Also, as some airlines operate LOSA as part of their SMS, the pilots 
are more closely monitored during normal operations. The feedback from LOSA 
surveys and the routine flight data recorded by FDM would quickly highlight any 
inconsistencies, such as high airspeeds or inaccuracies on approach.  
Pilots are required to demonstrate adequate flying skills during the LST (CAA 
2010c) but the simulator training time could be limited (CAA 2009a).  During the 
periodic testing and recurrent training, the time dedicated to manual flying may 
be the minimum required. This may be the tests involving engine failures, 
including an engine failed approach and go-around (Ebbatson 2007, 2008).   
 
 Summary of the main findings 3.8
From the accident reports, it is evident that CRM, Leadership and Skill are the 
essential actions of the crew in completing the task or mission. However, they 
are not operating in isolation and the many outside factors and influences are 
evident in the accident reports.  
The importance of the outside influences and the attitudes of the company is re-
enforced by the initiatives of the IBAC safety programme – the International 
Standard for Business Aviation (ISBAO). (IBAC 2008b)   
The parallel between the safety initiatives and new airline training schemes and 
the core model, adds support and validity to the model. It confirms the primary 
areas of concern and yet is representative of business jet operations. The 
model could therefore be instrumental in suggesting improvements to the 
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components of CRM, SKILL and COMMAND, with an increased awareness of 
the importance of the SUPPORT ENVIRONMENT. 
As noted, both the CAA (CAA 2006a, 2009d) and IBAC (2012) reported that the 
majority of accidents have occurred during the approach and landing phase. 
Similarly, there was reference to the level of Pilot Skill and control during the 
approach. Therefore, the next Chapter reports on the assessment of pilot skills 
conducted in a business jet full mission simulator. 
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4 SIMULATOR STUDY 
 Introduction 4.1
The literature review indicated the concern for pilot performance on approach 
and landing. There has been research into the manual flying skills of airline 
pilots but not for those of business jet pilots. In a study of airline pilots, Wood 
(2004) found anecdotal evidence suggesting that pilots were very dependent on 
the automation and the autopilot and as a result their manual flying skills decay. 
As discussed in Chapter 2 the majority of accidents and incident occur during 
approach and landing. The Grounded Theory derived accident model presented 
in Chapter 3, highlighted the concerns for Pilot Skills and manual skills during 
the landing phase. Moreover, even though the majority of aircraft accidents 
have not only been on approach but also associated with an emergency or an 
engine failure (CAA 2006a), there has not been any business jet orientated 
research. Therefore, a study of business jet pilots handling skills during an 
approach was required in order to measure and record actual pilot performance 
under realistic conditions. A simulator trial was conducted with business jet 
pilots, who flew an instrument approach and this Chapter reports the findings of 
the trial.  
 
 Method 4.2
The first consideration was how to plan a trial for an aircraft on the approach to 
land, with an engine emergency. Although it may be desirable to replicate this 
by deliberately attempting several landings on an aircraft with one engine 
disabled, it was considered that the attendant risks were too high. Therefore a 
flight simulator would be the safest trial option. In addition, it would not be 
possible to guarantee sufficient repeatability on a real aircraft trial, since the 
conditions such as the weather, wind, temperature, aircraft weight and runway 
availability may not be constant. So, in order to obtain control and repeatability 
of the assessment, the decision was taken to evaluate the pilots in a full flight 
simulator training device.  
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To ensure that the pilots were representative of the business jet pilot 
community, it was determined that all flight crew would be licenced and 
operational within the business jet arena. However, although all the pilots would 
be correctly qualified for the trial, the level of recent flying experience and 
opportunity to practice manual flying which may provide various levels of 
expertise (Ebbatson et al. 2010). Similarly, the role of the commercial pilot has 
changed and in many ways the Captain is more of a manager, in contrast 
military flying has always concentrated on the “hands on stick and throttle” for 
piloting skills (Harris 2006), so there may be a variation among the pilots from 
different backgrounds. As the pilots are required to be at the required standard 
for the LST, this would set a benchmark level for the pilots prior to the trial. 
Therefore, the trial was during a specially organised additional 30 minute 
segment at the end of their annual Licence Proficiency Check (LPC).  
In line operations there are several approach options (depending on the 
weather conditions) For example, the pilots could fly visually and align with the 
runway to land. Another possibility is to use a radio beacon on or close to the 
airfield as the navigation aid for line up and complete a landing. During both of 
these approaches there is not an accurate tracking task that could be measured 
or recorded, since the visual approach could be from a curved or straight 
approach without a means of accurately tracking the required descent profile. 
Similarly, the radio aid approach utilises target altitudes along the approach with 
the descent profile at the pilot’s discretion. The ILS however is a precision 
approach aid designed for bad weather and poor visibility in instrument flying 
conditions, with both the lateral and vertical guidance displayed to the pilot. The 
deviation from the runway centreline and the descent profile is displayed and 
can be recorded. Each airfield and runway aid combination have their 
operational limits and weather operating minima so that the aircraft may be 
flown down to the approach minimum, normally 200 feet above the runway. At 
this point (the Decision Height, DH) the pilots would take over visually once they 
could see the runway, without further reference to the ILS. In terms of piloting 
skill, a critical point in the landing is the final touch down. However, this final 
landing segment is a visual landing task and would be flown depending on the 
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individual pilot judgement and flying style. Therefore, compared to the fixed 
centreline and glideslope reference on the ILS it would be difficult to determine 
satisfactory measures for the final few feet down to the runway. For this reason, 
the trial recording was terminated on the ILS at the decision height of 200 feet 
above touchdown.  
The participants were required to perform standard instrument approach in 
instrument meteorological conditions and with the aircraft in an asymmetric 
thrust condition (Flight with one engine inoperative). As discussed in Chapter 2, 
previous evidence had suggested that the most critical phase of flight was not 
only during the approach but also following an emergency procedure (CAA 
2009b, 2011), such as after an engine failure. Also, an earlier study (Ebbatson 
et al. 2010), had found that a simple lateral control task was insensitive to 
differences in experience and it was recommended that a more demanding 
lateral task, such as asymmetric thrust approaches required. Therefore, the 
flying task incorporated an operationally representative but demanding manual 
flight task for the short time available in the simulator. 
A major business jet training and Type Rating company based in the UK agreed 
to provide the use of their facilities, including the use of a high fidelity Hawker 
800 XP flight simulator, the flight simulator instructors, engineering data support 
and briefing facilities. 
 
 Description of the Flying Task 4.3
The task began from straight and level flight at 3000 feet, with the aircraft in the 
clean configuration at 210 knots (gear and flaps retracted), positioned to 
intercept the localiser and glideslope. From the ATC clearance the candidates 
were required to perform a standard terminal manoeuvring exercise and follow 
the ILS profile. From the initial conditions, the crew were required to use their 
judgement and reduce to the planned approach speed, to reconfigure correctly 
(according to their SOPs) for the approach and landing, then intercept and 
follow the localiser / glideslope. The candidates were briefed that the autopilot 
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and auto-throttle systems would not be available for the approach, so it would 
be a flown manually. The rest of the cockpit systems were set for normal 
operations, with the flight director available for use, the electronic flight 
information system (flight instrument display) was configured to show the flight 
data for the ILS display and the horizontal situation indicator set to display the 
aircraft position on the navigation map. Finally, the weather conditions at the 
decision altitude would prevent a visual acquisition of the runway; so that a 
single engine missed approach procedure would be necessary.  
This exercise would provide a suitably demanding but operationally pertinent 
flying tasks, whilst within the spirit of the simulator LST.  Tracking the ILS has 
been demonstrated as a good discriminator for piloting skills (Veillette 1995, 
Ebbatson et al. 2006) yet remaining valid for normal manual flying operations. 
Although, the simulated failure of an engine, provided an increase in the 
workload for the pilots it should be well within their capabilities, since it had 
been practiced and tested as part of the LST. The localiser and glideslope are 
examples of a closed loop tracking task representative of the piloting skills 
required to fly a constant angle of descent on a safe approach path for landing. 
Similarly, the closed loop task of maintaining the required airspeed on approach 
requires judgement of the drag changes due to selecting the gear and flap, 
whilst setting and monitoring the appropriate engine RPM. The cockpit systems 
and controls would all affect the closed loop dynamics and response for the 
task. In order to reduce briefing time and ensure that all candidates were 
familiar with the profile, London Gatwick was chosen for the ILS as it had been 
flown during the training details. (Runway 08 R, London Gatwick)   
Most importantly, the exercise can be easily measured using the chosen 
recorded parameters. The main instrument display, electronic horizontal 
situation indicator would display an expanded ILS display and other flight 
parameters, requiring a good standard of instrument scanning. Overall the task 
that was essential for the licence examination, representative of the real world 
and the majority of reported accident statistics (CAA 2006a).  
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 Equipment 4.4
The trial was conducted on 2 identical Flight Safety International Inc. Raytheon   
Hawker 800 XP simulators. (An external view of the simulator is shown at figure 
7). The company full flight simulators were complete with 6 degrees of freedom 
motion simulation cueing system with control loading and a Vital 9, 180 degree 
by 40 degree colour visual system, with a day/night/dusk capability). The 
simulators were approved to JAR STD 1A level D (JAA 2003) and were 
approved for training by the CAA and the FAA. The JAR STD simulator 
requirements are shown in Appendix E.  
 
  
 
Figure 7  Hawker 800 XP Simulator, external view. 
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The simulators were completely representative of the Hawker aircraft and a 
photograph of the Hawker flight deck is included in Figure 8. 
 
  
Figure 8 Hawker 888 XP, simulator cockpit. 
An instructor control station was loaded with a customised trial profile, which 
was available for the end of the LPC training session. The instructor console 
was loaded with the start conditions and the configuration for the trial scenario 
and was able to initialise the data recording. (Data were taken in real time and 
recorded during each run).  A single selection repositioned, set the aircraft 
position, configuration for fuel and weight along with weather and airfield for the 
start of the approach. Once the trial run was terminated, the simulator was 
frozen and held in position to indicate the end of the exercise. Data were saved 
and then converted off line into ARINC 717 format raw data bit streaming. 
(ARINC 717 is the standard data format for flight data and quick access 
recorders) 
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 Pre-trial Assessment  4.5
Normally, the line pilot would not critique the aircraft handling characteristics as 
the simulator was already certified to the required CAA standards. However, in 
this instance a test pilot was able fly the profile and review the pilot skills 
required and to confirm that there were no adverse handling characteristics or 
procedural issues compared to other types, previously flown.  
The pre-trial assessment was conducted by an Airline Training Captain (The 
author), who was rated on the Boeing 757 and Boeing 767 (with over 12900 
flying hours), and was also an experienced military test pilot and simulator 
acceptance pilot. Although the test pilot was not rated on the Hawker, he had 
flown several business jets including the Hawker 125 (Dominie) the Lear-jet and 
the Mystere Falcon. The pre -trial run was conducted to review the procedure 
and test the data recording system. The Test pilot results for Localiser, 
glideslope and airspeed are shown in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Test Pilot Profile, including the mean, SD, minimum and maximum 
values of airspeed, engine RPM, ILS tracking of the localiser and the glideslope. 
 
The test pilot flew the profile as briefed for the Hawker SOPs in the exercise 
and the results were within the CAA limits set out in the Guidance to Examiners 
Document (CAA 2010c). The airspeed profile on the ILS from 3000 feet to 200 
feet is shown in Figure 9.  
 
 MEAN SD MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
AIRSPEED 145.3 1.0 143.2 148.3 
LOCALISER 0.01 0.3   
GLIDESLOPE 0.01 0.1   
ENGINE RPM 74.0 2.1 71.1 80.6 
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Figure 9 Simulator Trial, Test Pilot, Airspeed tracking from 3000 feet to 200 feet 
on the ILS 
The test pilot also noted that the engine response to inputs was well simulated 
with no perceptible lag between throttle input (Power lever angle, PLA) and 
engine response. The plot of the engine RPM response to PLA during the 
assessment run from 3000 feet to 200 feet is shown at Figure 10.  
  
Figure 10 Simulator Trial, Test Pilot Time history plot of Engine RPM, (Blue) 
against Power Lever Angle (RED), from 3000 feet to 200 feet.  
 
 
130
140
150
160
170
180
1
1
9
3
7
5
5
7
3
9
1
1
0
9
1
2
7
1
4
5
1
6
3
1
8
1
1
9
9
2
1
7
2
3
5
2
5
3
2
7
1
2
8
9
3
0
7
3
2
5
3
4
3
3
6
1
3
7
9
3
9
7
4
1
5
A
i
r
s
p
e
e
d
 
 
Time at 0.25 second intervals 
Target speed 145 knots 
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
1
1
1
3
3
1
5
5
1
7
7
1
9
9
2
2
1
2
4
3
2
6
5
2
8
7
3
0
9
3
3
1
3
5
3
3
7
5
3
9
7
4
1
9
Engine % RPM 
= Blue           
Power lever 
Degrees = Red 
Time at 0.25 second intervals 
 77 
The engine response to pilot input was also confirmed from the engine data. 
The data recording was at a rate of 4 samples per second. So each data point 
is separated by a maximum of 0.25 seconds. Once a pilot PLA input is set, the 
data confirmed that the engine responded within one recorded data frame, thus 
the response was a maximum of 0.25 second. This is shown in Figure 11, for a 
step input of the PLA, the engine RPM responds rapidly and is increasing by the 
next data point.  
 
  
Figure 11. Simulator data for engine RPM response to pilot PLA input. 
The test pilot considered that the simulator did not display any flight simulation 
or control anomalies and the profile should be well within the capabilities of the 
average pilot. Also, the profile was representative of the procedures proposed in 
the Hawker Pilot’s Manual (Hawker 2008) for an engine failed approach. Finally, 
it was assessed that the approach represented both the pilot closed loop 
tracking task on the ILS and provided a representative workload to maintain the 
airspeed on the approach. 
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 Participants 4.6
4.6.1 Ethics 
As an encouragement to crew participation and reduce the stress on 
performance associated with crew testing, it was emphasised that it would be 
conducted after all the licence testing standards had been met and that the 
extra flight profile would be another training or practice opportunity. Also, the 
trial was conducted in accordance with ethical guidelines (BPS 2006). The 
candidates were fully briefed on the purpose of the research. The relaxed 
atmosphere for the trial was established to represent normal line flying 
operations, however, it was noted that crew performance whilst undergoing 
testing may be likely to exceed the unsupervised standards, especially for any 
abnormal, emergency, profiles (Baker and Dismukes, 2002). As the recurrent 
training had been the initial part of the session, it was normal to take a break 
prior to the trial for the crews to relax and conduct a final research trial briefing. 
The research was approved by the Cranfield University School of Engineering 
Ethics committee (The ethics proposal is shown at Appendix  F) and conformed 
to the British Psychological Society’s guidelines (BPS 2006) All the candidates 
confirmed their consent to participate by signing a consent form ( A copy is 
shown at Appendix G). The trial participation was entirely voluntary and was 
undertaken on a non-jeopardy basis, as the trial was supplementary to the 
recurrent training and the results would not be annotated on their training 
records.  
4.6.2 The participating Pilots 
The participants were 41 professional commercial pilots. All the pilots held a 
valid commercial pilots or air transport pilot licence and held a Hawker 800 XP 
type endorsement. 
A business jet training organisation provided access to a large range of 
candidates from varied backgrounds and experience. The licence renewal dates 
and roster requirements of the air operator/company dictated which pilots were 
available for the trial. Therefore the candidate’s selection was completely 
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random. The proposed flight crew were pilots conducting either their Licence 
renewal periodic training or completing their type rating on for the Hawker 800 
XP.  The candidates were allocated for training in pairs as captain and co-pilot. 
It was, however, a requirement that each pilot had passed their proficiency 
testing and was not undergoing a LPC retest. By allocating the pilots as they 
completed their recurrent training, a diverse sample of pilots could be provided 
from the existing business jet pilot workforce.  
It was noted that all the pilots would have completed a minimum of two days 
training and testing for their proficiency check prior to the assessment, it may be 
that their performance may be normalised. However, it was felt that the 
research aim to investigate pilot performance would still be possible, since the 
methodology measures for the population would still be representative of the 
work-force in attaining their licence prior to unsupervised line operations. 
Following the pre – trial briefing, the candidates provided their individual pilot 
qualifications, training and experience details. A copy of the background details 
proforma is shown at Appendix H. Data was recorded for proximal pilot flying 
practice i.e. .the number of approaches in the preceding days and if applicable, 
the number of days since the last flight to ascertain whether there was a 
prolonged period without flying. (The independent variables of the study). The 
CAA work and fatigue limitations define required resting periods for flight crew 
and all crew are required to have days every 7,14 and 28 days. (CAA 2004) 
Therefore, the questionnaire for flight recency data was defined accordingly. For 
this research, a manually flown approach is considered to be when the autopilot 
is disconnected prior to or at the final approach fix and the aircraft flown 
manually until the landing or go-around for a missed approach. Distal manual 
flying practice was evaluated from the information given on pilot’s total flying 
experience. 
 80 
 Measures  4.7
4.7.1 Demographic Variables 
The participants were asked to provide their background data including their 
career history, age and total number of flying hours their training history and 
standard demographic information (E.g. age, sex, experience). 
4.7.2 Flight Data Derived Performance Measures (Dependant 
Variables) 
The simulator Master Qualification Test Guide (MQTG) (ICAO, 2003) profile 
was used to store the initial set up, run and data store for all the data. The 
MQTG file recorded all the normal parameters that would be required for the 
simulator acceptance, however, many of the data points were not considered 
essential for the trial. From the MQTG file an essential listing of 22 parameters 
was annotated and a sample rate of 4 per second was utilised for the trial. (The 
simulator parameters are listed in Appendix I) The standard aircraft parameters 
were recorded from the flight data. However, the pilot ILS display was formatted 
to indicate deviation from the centreline of the runway and a descent angle of 3 
degrees to the horizontal. The instrument analogue display is marked for the 
optimum, centre point with two markings for half and full offset from the ideal, 
(Left and right for the localiser; above and below for the glideslope).  The half 
and full deflection are referred to as 1 or 2 “dots” deviation. The pilot tracking 
task is to maintain the central tracking index, an offset reading of zero. The 
simulator parameter was therefore set to a maximum scale of plus or minus 2 
as a representation of the pilot display and tracking task. The pilot’s control 
inputs for pitch, roll, yaw and thrust were also recorded.  
The simulator data were recorded from the initial point of release, until climbing 
through the altitude of 500 feet on the go-around. The simulator propriety 
information was then collected, collated and stored prior to being assessed. The 
final data format required conversion off line, since the initial simulator output 
was in ARINC 717 format. This was the format for aircraft quick access 
recorders which are used for analysis in flight monitoring programmes and was 
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not suitable for statistical analysis. The simulator data format was re-written into 
an Excel format for the final data reduction. The data set was defined for each 
run and the data set refined into 3 tasks, Airspeed control (maintaining the 
planned approach speed of 145 kn.), Localiser Tracking, Glideslope tracking 
The pilot tracking data were extracted from the once the ILS conditions were 
satisfied. The start point was defined as; 
 Tracking the localiser to within 0.5 dots displacement. 
 Tracking the glideslope to within 0.5 dots displacement. 
 Descending more than 50 feet below the initial 3000 feet altitude. 
The end point for the ILS task was passing the Decision Height of 200 feet 
above the runway. 
The performance metrics were assembled in an SPSS data file, along with the 
biographical and career data analysis. 
The outer loop, flight path performance metrics computed were the arithmetic 
mean and standard deviation of lateral and vertical deviations from the ideal 
flight path on the approach and the mean and standard deviation of airspeed 
error relative to the target approach speed. 
 
4.7.3 Pilot Handling Experience (Independent Variables) 
In order to gain details of the pilot qualifications, experience and demographic 
data, a pro-forma was developed. Data were recorded for proximal pilot flying 
practice i.e. the number of approaches in the preceding days and if applicable, 
the number of days since the last flight to ascertain whether there was a 
prolonged period without flying (The independent variables of the study). CAP 
371 paragraph 4.6 (CAA 2004) prescribes the fatigue limitations for flight crew 
such that all crew are required to have periods of rest every 7,14 and 28 days. 
Therefore, the questionnaire for flight recency data was defined accordingly. 
This data was the basis for relating recent experience and current practice in 
manual flying, to investigate any possible effects of recent exposure on pilot 
performance For this research, a manually flown approach is considered to be 
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when the autopilot is disconnected prior to or at the final approach fix and the 
aircraft flown manually until the landing or go-around for a missed approach. 
Distal manual flying practice was evaluated from the information given on pilot’s 
total flying experience. Other factors were also gathered which may have had 
an impact on the piloting ability, for example whether any recreational or 
aerobatic flying was  being conducted by the candidate, the flying training and 
licence qualification undertaken and the demographic information, including 
age, sex and experience. 
 
 Procedure 4.8
4.8.1 Experimental Procedure 
4.8.1.1 Simulator set up and start point. 
The Type Rating Examiner (TRE) conducting the candidate crew’s training 
detail volunteered to co-ordinate and observe the trial runs. Initially, the 
candidates were provided with the airfield approach briefings, a weather brief 
and aircraft mass and configuration data essential for the task. They were then 
allowed time to familiarise themselves and if necessary ask any final questions. 
The candidates were briefed to fly a standard terminal area approach, with a 
manually flown ILS commencing from straight and level flight, prior to the Final 
Approach Fix, 15 nautical miles from touchdown. The instructor briefing is 
shown at Appendix J, which lists the initial actions prior to the simulator release. 
In this way, although the Starboard engine was shut down, the crew were able 
to confirm the emergency drills were completed prior to flying the approach: 
 
 Emergency contingencies and crew briefing were complete. 
 Emergency Check List procedure had been completed. 
 Engine, fuel and generator controls were appropriate for the failed 
engine. 
 ILS, Decision Altitude and approach parameters were set and 
briefed. 
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 The aircraft weight and configuration inputs for the Flight 
Management Computers were all entered. 
4.8.1.2 Simulator release for the ILS 
The candidates were an established crew of a Captain and a co-pilot so they 
were briefed to perform the exercise using their SOPs. In this context; 
“established”, denotes a crew utilising a standard set of drills and procedures. 
The procedure should be to reduce speed, select the required Flap position (25 
degrees of flap), extend the landing gear and fly the ILS at the planned 
approach speed of 145 knots, as they would on any operational flight.  The 
duties of Pilot Flying (PF) and Pilot Monitoring (PM) were randomly assigned by 
the crew deciding who would fly the first profile. 
The flight task was initialised by the instructor at the initial point, but was 
“frozen“, in that the position, all controls and the aircraft response were all held 
fixed. The instructor completed his briefing. Once the crew was ready, the 
simulator was released in straight and level flight, gear and flap retracted at 210 
knots and 3000 feet altitude. However, the initial position was held at a fixed 
distance from touchdown while the PF disconnected the autopilot and auto-
throttle in order to settle into the aircraft condition, set the trim and thrust ready 
for the asymmetric approach. When the PF was quite ready the position 
released and the following Air Traffic Control instructions were given. 
 “Cleared to establish on the ILS and descend on the glide 
path. Reduce speed at your discretion. You are cleared to 
land. If you go around, climb straight ahead to 3000 feet.” 
4.8.1.3 Flying the ILS 
The reported weather conditions were above the Category One (CAT 1) minima 
required legally for the ILS, with the crew expecting a visual transition to land 
below the Decision Altitude. At the 4 nm distance from touchdown, the TRE 
passed an ATC repeat of the landing clearance and a weather update of the 
latest weather conditions. However, the simulated cloud-base and visibility had 
been set below the minima. Therefore, the crew would be forced to fly a missed 
approach as they would not be able to see the runway for landing. Upon 
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passing a height of 200 feet above the runway elevation, the crew performed a 
go around. The exercise was terminated once the crew was established in the 
climb away.  
4.8.1.4 Completion of the run 
After the first run, the simulator was reset to the initial conditions and 
reconfigured for the next run. The crew re – briefed ready for a repeat of the 
trial, with roles of PF and PM reversed. The exercise was repeated but the 
instructor commented that the weather condition had been re-set and it was 
hoped that a go around would not be required. (Note: the outside environment 
had not been changed). Once the simulator session was complete, the crew 
vacated the simulator and moved to a debriefing area. The participants were 
asked to complete the demographic feed- back pro-forma.  Time was taken for 
feedback and discussion concerning the trial and the candidates were thanked 
for their participation.  
 
 Results 4.9
4.9.1 Sample Characteristics 
The participants were 41 professional pilots (all male), comprising 28 captains 
and 13 first officers. The imbalance between captains and first officers was 
because some companies employed several captains who also flew as first 
officers. All held either Air Transport Pilot Licences (ATPL) or Commercial Pilot 
Licences (CPL) or the equivalent from the CAA, FAA, JAA or the RAF and they 
were all rated to fly the Hawker 800 XP (The summary of licence qualifications 
is shown in Table 10). Their mean age was 40 years, (SD 11 years) and had 
accumulated a range of experience from 800 flying hours to 16000 flying hours. 
(Mean 6143 hours, SD 4786). There was a large variation in experience, with a 
median of 4500 hours. Nine of the candidates had less than 2000 flying hours, 
in comparison with eleven of the candidates who had in excess of 10,000 flying 
hours. Similarly, there was a variation in the flying experience on the Hawker 
800 XP, with a mean of 1483 flying hours (SD 1283) and a spread of 
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experience ranging from pilots new to the type with 90 to 200 hours to a senior 
captain with 8000 hours on type. The overall range of flying experience, from 
newly qualified pilots to experienced captains, was representative of the pilots 
that were conducting their recurrent training on the Hawker 800 XP. 
 
Table 10 Summary of Pilot Candidate Qualifications. 
PILOTS RANK LICENCE 
AUTHORITY 
GRADE OF 
LICENCE 
Captains 28 CAA = 19 ATPL = 28 
 FAA = 3 CPL = 13 
First Officers 13 JAA = 13  
 RAF = 6  
 
 
As explained in Chapter 1, there are 3 main methods of accepted training 
schemes for gaining a commercial pilot’s licence. The courses are; an 
Integrated course, a Modular course or Military training. The candidates initial 
flying training courses were varied, but the representation was distributed as 
shown in Table 11. 
Table 11 Initial Flying Training: Number of Candidates from each course. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of Initial Flying 
Training.  
Number of Candidates 
Integrated Course 15 
Modular Course 10 
Military Course 16 
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4.9.2 Flight Data Derived Performance Measures 
The simulator trial initially yielded 43 runs but 2 runs were removed from the 
results due to data capture failures, yielding 41 effective runs. The Flight data 
Performance measures (dependant variables) were recorded in ARINC 717 
format. This was imported into an Excel format for data analysis. The outer loop 
flight path performance metrics computed were the arithmetic mean and 
standard deviation of lateral and vertical deviations from the optimum ILS flight 
path. Also, the mean and standard deviation airspeed error relative to the target 
approach speed. The data set was defined for each run and the data set refined 
into 3 tasks, Airspeed control (maintaining the planned approach speed of 145 
kn.), Localiser Tracking, Glideslope tracking. The data files were listed and co-
related from the start of the ILS, (with less than 0.5 localiser and glideslope 
deviation) and descending from 3000 ft. to the minimum Decision Height of 200 
feet above the runway.  Table 12 contains the summary of results from the 
sample size of 41 runs achieved during the trial.  
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Table 12 Summary performance data for flight path tracking metrics for the ILS 
approach from 3000 feet to 200 feet. 
 
 
The ILS instrument display is set to show the angle of error with regard to the 
central index. As explained earlier, the ILS tracking is recorded in “dots” 
deflection on the display. The pilot tracking data for full scale deflection, 2 dots, 
of the localiser is 2.5 degrees. Therefore at 10 nautical miles from touchdown 
0.5 dot deflection is actually 654 feet displaced from the centreline. At two miles 
from touchdown this equivalent lateral displacement is down to 130 feet. So, the 
pilot gain required as the approach progresses must increase as the lateral 
displacement is reducing, for the same instrument “dot” displacement. However, 
the change of gain required did not appear to present handling challenges to 
the pilots, as the localiser and glideslope mean error was 0.1 and 0.02 
respectively. A localiser deviation of 0.1 dots is only 9 feet of error at the 
decision altitude of 200 feet, barely the width of the cabin or less than ½ a wing 
Metric 
Parameter 
N Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Localiser –
mean error 
(dots) 
41 -0.34 0.20 0.1 0.09 
Localiser – 
Standard 
Deviation of 
error (dots) 
41 0.06 0.37 0.2 0.1 
Glide slope –
mean error 
(dots) 
41 -0.18 0.44 0.02 0.09 
Glide slope 
Standard 
deviation of 
error ( dots) 
41 0.06 0.51 0.15 0.08 
Airspeed 
mean (knots) 
41 143.3 163.5 148.2 3.7 
Airspeed 
Standard 
deviation of 
error (knots) 
41 0.86 12.4 4.8 2.9 
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span. In practical terms, for an instrument approach, this is a very narrow 
margin of error and would be more than adequate to allow a pilot to land in the 
centre of the runway.  
4.9.3 Pilot Tracking Task: Localiser. 
For the Localiser a positive value was deviation to the right and a negative 
value an offset to the left. With 2 dots of deviation showing the maximum 
tracking error, the trial resultant Localiser mean was 0.1 dots with a Standard 
deviation of 0.09, as shown in Table 12. The mean localiser value for each run 
is shown at Figure 12, and the localiser SD for each run is shown at Figure 13.  
  
Figure 12 . The mean localiser value for the trial runs. 
 
  
Figure 13 .Value of Localiser Standard Deviation for each candidate.  
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It is noticeable that candidate number 17 had a mean of - 0.348 and an SD of 
0.366 and this is discussed under the section for CAA tolerance. Furthermore, it 
was notable that this candidate was alone in having a negative value mean, i.e. 
an offset to the left. Since the starboard engine was inoperative, the resultant 
asymmetric power from the left side normally causes a bias to the right on 
approach, as shown by the other candidates. Also, another candidate displayed 
a large variation in performance was candidate number 14 who had a mean of 
0.201 and an SD of 0.366. However, even with a relatively high SD value 
(compared with the rest of the candidates), which suggests a large variation in 
tracking performance; this candidate did remain within the CAA tolerance. 
4.9.4 Localiser Data in Comparison with CAA Tolerance 
The data confirmed that the majority of candidates tracked the Localiser to 
within 0.5 needle deflection and were within the CAA tolerance to pass the 
Licence Skill test for ILS localiser tracking. The CAA tolerance on both the 
localiser and the glide path for the Licence skill test (CAA 2010 c) is a deflection 
of 0.5. However, the assessment of the maximum excursions determined that 3 
runs were outside the CAA tolerance. (With one run just at the CAA limit, value 
0.505). The final localiser deviations, for the candidates that exceeded the CAA 
tolerance are shown in Table 13 and the localiser deviations from 3000 feet to 
200 feet on the approach for runs 17, 43 and 5 are shown at figures 14, 15 and 
16 respectively.  
Table 13 Localiser values for the runs that exceeded the CAA tolerance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Run 
number 
Localiser 
Mean 
Localiser  
SD 
Localiser 
Maximum 
17 -0.35 0.37 0.74 
43 0.13 0.18 0.55 
5 0.12 0.22 0.50 
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Figure 14 . Run 17, Localiser variation from 3000 ft. to 200 ft. 
 
  
Figure 15  Run 43, Localiser variation from 3000 feet to 200 feet 
 
  
Figure 16  Run 5, Localiser variation from 3000 ft. to 200 ft. 
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4.9.5 Pilot Tracking Task: Glideslope 
The Glideslope display is a needle deflection, up or down, representing a 
deviation from the ideal glide path angle of 3 degrees, with the horizontal. On 
the Glideslope the positive value was above the glideslope and a negative value 
represented a displacement below. The majority of candidates achieved 
glideslope value less than 0.5 dots displacement. (With only one exception) The 
trial mean glideslope deviation was 0.021 with an SD of 0.093, as shown in 
Table 12. The Glideslope Mean and Standard deviation values for each run are 
shown Figures 17 and 18 respectively.  
 
  
Figure 17 The Mean Glideslope value for each run  
  
Figure 18  The SD of glideslope value for each run 
The highest mean value was recorded for run number 24 (mean = 0.44). This 
run did, however, record a SD of only 0.17 and the run remained within the CAA 
tolerance. The greatest SD value was for run number 10, which attained a 
mean of 0.08 and a SD of 0.51 but it also remained within the CAA tolerance. 
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4.9.6 Glideslope Data in Comparison with CAA Tolerance 
The only run which surpassed the CAA tolerance of 0.5 dots was run number 
31, where the glideslope varied throughout the run with 2 periods outside the 
CAA limit.  The glideslope values, for run number 31 are shown in Table 14 and 
glideslope deviations from 3000 feet to 200 feet on the approach are shown at 
Figure 19.  
Table 14 Glideslope values for run number 31.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 19  Run 31 Glide-slope variations from 3000 ft. to 200 ft. 
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Figure 20  Mean Airspeed for the trial runs. 
The majority of runs achieved mean airspeeds above the target airspeed of 145 
knots, with 4 candidates having a mean below the target approach speed. The 
highest mean airspeed was for run number 39 which recorded a mean airspeed 
of 163.59 knots. The Standard deviation for each run is shown in Figure 21. 
 
  
Figure 21 Airspeed Standard Deviation, in knots for each simulator run 
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there was a greater variation of airspeed. The maximum recorded was 180 
knots. The table of Maximum and minimum airspeeds is at Appendix K. 
 Mean Airspeed with Experience and Recent Flying 4.10
4.10.1 Pilot Experience 
There were no measures that correlated significantly with total flying 
experience. There was no evident improvement in pilot performance with 
increasing experience (ranging from 800 to 16000 hours). In fact the correlation 
of mean airspeed with regard to the total flying experience was as follows; 
 r (39) = 0.09, p = 0.278  
Therefore, there was no statistical evidence of an increase in accuracy with an 
increase in experience. The comparison of mean airspeed with experience is 
shown in Figure 22.  
 
  
Figure 22  Mean airspeeds related to total flying experience. 
4.10.2 Pilot Short term Flying History 
The pilot background data also requested the pilot’s details of the number of 
manually flown approaches in the previous 7, 14 and 28 days.  The data for the 
pilot experience during the previous month is shown in table 15. The 
candidate’s recent experience was very varied, as can be seen from the 28 day 
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data, the mean was 4.68 but with a SD of 7.19, within a total experience ranging 
from nil up to 40 sectors. 
 
Table 15 Pilot Short Term Flying History  
 
 
 
 
There correlations for mean airspeed in relation to the sectors flown in the 
preceding periods were non-significant, as shown in Table 16.  
There was, however, a significant correlation between the airspeed SD and the 
sectors during the 7 day flying period.  
  r (39) = 0.42, p <0.001 
Thus, the data suggests that the pilots displayed slightly less airspeed variation, 
depending for increasing practice in the preceding week. 
Table 16 Correlation Values for the mean airspeed against the sectors in the 
preceding days. 
 
Preceding flying 
period 
Value of r (39) Value of p 
7 Days 0.26 0.102 
14 days 0.05 0.74 
28 days 0.023 0.88 
 
 MEAN SD MAXIMUM MINIMUM 
Approaches in the last 7 days. 1.13 1.77 6 0 
Approaches in the last 14 days. 2.27 4.07 20 0 
Approaches in the last 28 days. 4.68 7.19 40 0 
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 Comparison of Training background with Airspeed 4.11
The information provided by the candidates confirmed the type of training 
undertaken by each candidate. The training backgrounds were; the Integrated 
course, the Modular course and Military trained pilots. The Integrated course 
pilots displayed less deviation from the target airspeed of approximately 1 to 2 
knots over the other groups. Also, the integrated group SD of 5.6 knots was a 
small improvement over the other 2 groups. The Military trained demonstrated 
slightly poorer speed control with an SD of 6.9 knots. Whereas it was 6.4 knots 
for the Modular trained group. The actual difference in mean airspeeds 
achieved was small. (Integrated 147.0 knots, Military 148.7 knots and Modular 
148.4 knots) 
A one – way between groups analysis of variance was conducted between the 
groups, according to their initial flying training background. There was no 
statistically difference in mean airspeeds for the 3 groups  
  F (2, 38) = 1.25, p > 0.05  
The comparisons of the training backgrounds against the airspeed mean are 
shown in Figure 23. 
  
Figure 23  Mean Airspeed for Modular, Military Trained and Integrated Course 
Pilots. 
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 CAA Licence Skill Test Tolerance for Airspeed  4.12
The CAA tolerance for Licence Skill tests for single engine flying is an 
allowance from the planned/required approach speed. The tolerance allows for 
a variation of Minus 5 knots up to a maximum of plus 10 knots (CAA 2010c). 
The planned approach speed for the aircraft weight and configuration was 145 
knots. Therefore, the candidates would have an airspeed range from a 
minimum of 140 knots up to a maximum of 155 knots. 
The range of values shown in table 16 indicates the failure rate to remain within 
the CAA tolerance during the ILS procedure. The table also includes the failure 
rates with a high airspeed for the start of the ILS at 3000 feet and finally the low 
airspeed limit at the Decision Altitude, 200 feet above ground level. 
 
Table 17. Failure rates for the Maximum and Minimum Airspeeds on approach 
compared with the CAA Tolerance 
 Below the 
CAA tolerance 
of 140 knots 
Above the 
CAA tolerance 
of 155 knots. 
Above the 
CAA tolerance 
at 3000 feet 
Below the 
CAA tolerance 
at Decision 
Altitude 
Number of 
runs with a 
speed outside 
tolerance 
 
11 
 
27 
 
22 
 
9 
Percentage of 
runs outside 
CAA tolerance 
 
26.8% 
 
65.8% 
 
53.6% 
 
21.9% 
 
During one run, the airspeed varied from a minimum of 132 knots to a maximum 
of 181 knots. This is a variation of 13 knots below and 36 knots above the 
planned airspeed of 145 knots. As the trial profile emulated part of the Licence 
skill test, the candidate would fail, if they exceeded the allowable tolerance i.e.to 
fly below 140 knots and above 155 knots. The requirement to pass the LST is to 
remain within the tolerance and therefore have no time outside these values. 
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The time period, for which each candidate was outside the tolerance, can be 
extracted from the data by annotating each time element outside the tolerance 
and then recording the percentage of the total time. From this definition, only 11 
runs achieved a zero value for time outside the tolerance and would have been 
acceptable for the licence test. In contrast, 30 runs were outside the tolerance 
with 27 flying above the required speed 12 below (9 runs were both above and 
below the tolerance). The distribution of those exceeding the CAA tolerance, 
including the successful runs with a zero score, is shown in Figure 24. The run 
mean and standard deviations for the percentage of the time outside the 
tolerance, during the approach are shown in Table 18. 
 
  
Figure 24 The run listing of percentage times outside the CAA tolerance, 
including the runs with a score of zero. 
Note: there were no runs showing an error for the zones between 41<50, 71<80 
and 91< 100. 
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Table 18 The listing of the Mean and SD for the Percentage Time outside the CAA 
airspeed tolerance. 
 N Mean percentage 
time  outside limits 
SD of percentage  
time outside limits 
Runs outside 
CAA tolerance 
30 18.5 2.0 
Runs above 
CAA tolerance 
27 20.2 19.6 
Runs below 
CAA tolerance 
12 5.8 9.2 
Runs above 
and below the 
CAA tolerance 
9 48.7 22.0 
 
The pass fail rate varied across the 3 types of training, Integrated, Modular and 
Military training. The military and the integrated course groups both had a pass 
rate of 5 trial runs. However, the modular course trainees only attained 1 pass 
during the trial. The pass/failure rate for the trained groups is shown at table 19 
and CAA criteria for each run are shown at Appendix M. 
 
Table 19 The Pass or Failure rate for each trained group. 
 
 
 
 
 
    Ch. Sq. (2, 41) = 2.43, p = 0.29 
The Chi-Square test did not show a statistical significance for the pass rates in 
the groups. However, it should be noted that there are cells with less than the 
Initial 
Training 
Modular 
Course 
Military 
Trained 
Integrated 
course 
Total 
PASS 1 5 5 11 
FAIL 9 11 10 30 
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expected frequency of 5.  Therefore, the results are likely to be unreliable. If 
anything, this may show a conservative result, i.e. It fails to show a significant 
effect where one may actually exist. 
 
 Airspeed commencing the ILS  4.13
The simulator profile was planned to represent a high gain task, by commencing 
at 3000 feet at 210 knots and 15 miles from touchdown, as reducing airspeed 
and increasing drag on approach, requires a certain level of energy 
management by the pilot. However, this should have been within the 
capabilities of the candidates since the task was representative of the CAA LST.  
Unfortunately, the candidates did not achieve this level of control. In fact, 20 
candidates (48.7%) commenced the approach at least 10 knots above the 
datum speed at 3000 feet, with a maximum airspeed recorded of 181 knots.  
Since the aircraft is in an emergency condition, with one engine failed, it is good 
airmanship and flying skill not to extend the undercarriage and flaps too early 
and risk slowing towards the stall. The procedure would normally consist of an 
early reduction towards the final speed, with a low flap setting prior to the 
glideslope. Once established for the approach, the final flap setting and the 
undercarriage would be selected. This is elaborated in the Pilots’ manual, 
Hawker Beechcraft Pilots operating manual. (Hawker 2008, P/N 140-590032-
007. Section V Flight Handling). During the more accurate runs, this procedure 
was followed, as shown by the candidate in Figure 25, who was able to extend 
the undercarriage and flaps and reduce speed towards 145 knots for the 
approach. 
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Figure 25 Simulator Trial, candidate Pilot, Airspeed from 3000 feet to 200 feet. 
In contrast, as the drag increased, other candidates were unable to maintain the 
airspeed, whilst it gradually decayed towards or below the approach speed. (An 
example is shown in Figure 26) The extremes of approach speed were evident 
during the approaches, with candidates commencing the approach well above 
the planned speed and often decaying to below the approach speed at the 
decision height (200 feet above touchdown).  
 
  
Figure 26 A candidate display of airspeed management from 3000 feet to 200 
feet. In that the speed is initially above 145 knots then reducing below it. 
 Minimum Airspeed on Approach. 4.14
From the CAA all aircraft accident data (CAA 2006a) the loss of airspeed and 
subsequent loss of control after engine failure is listed as a major factor in fatal 
accidents. It is essential that the pilot should monitor the airspeed and prevent a 
130
140
150
160
170
180
1
3
1
6
1
9
1
1
2
1
1
5
1
1
8
1
2
1
1
2
4
1
2
7
1
3
0
1
3
3
1
3
6
1
3
9
1
4
2
1
4
5
1
4
8
1
5
1
1
5
4
1
5
7
1
Airspeed in 
Knots 
Time at 0.25 second intervals  
Target speed 145 knots 
130
140
150
160
170
180
1
2
4
4
7
7
0
9
3
1
1
6
1
3
9
1
6
2
1
8
5
2
0
8
2
3
1
2
5
4
2
7
7
3
0
0
3
2
3
3
4
6
3
6
9
3
9
2
4
1
5
4
3
8
Airspeed in 
knots 
Time at 0.25 second intervals 
 102 
reduction of airspeed near the stall. Yet as shown in Figure 27, only 4 
candidates maintained the airspeed at or above 145 knots for the whole 
approach. It is notable that 3 candidates were 10 knots or more below 145 
knots.  
 
  
Figure 27  Minimum Airspeed recorded during each run 
Accurate airspeed control is essential for a safe approach and landing and the 
flight procedures allow a margin for error. For example, the Hawker 
recommended single engine approach speed with 20 degrees of flap is 145 
knots, which is 20 knots above the planned minimum speed on for the 
configuration (Vref). Thus the minimum Vref is 125 knots which also includes 
further safety factor as it is a minimum of 1.2 times the stall speed (VS.). The 
calculated stall speed for the aircraft is therefore 104 knots. However, by 
reducing speed to 132 knots as shown by 2 candidates in Figure 27, the 
candidates have reduced the safety margin to 28 knots. Since the margin is 
reduced, a turn with 45 degrees of bank would place the aircraft very close to 
the stall. Also, in turbulence the aircraft would only have a margin of 1.4 g. 
above the stall. 
Some of the candidates may have accepted that being single engine could be 
critical and it may be preferable to keep speed in hand early in the approach to 
guarantee remaining safe. It would then be reasonable to assume that the final 
segment to landing could be flown at the correct speed. As the plot of airspeed 
Target 145 
 103 
at the critical 200 feet decision height demonstrates, Figure 28, this was not the 
case. In the final segment a total of 20 pilots were below 145 knots and 9 of 
those were below 140 knots. Notably, for an aircraft limited by 50% thrust 
descending below 200 feet whilst below the approach speed severely restricts 
the aircraft performance (Hawker 2008).  
 
 
  
Figure 28  Airspeed at 200 feet above touchdown 
 Engine Handling Data 4.15
Once the aircraft is configured for the approach, gear and flap extended, the 
airspeed is primarily controlled by the variation of engine thrust. The range of 
engine RPM measured during the trial varied from 49% to 95%. However, the 
mean engine RPM had a much lower range of values, from a minimum of 67% 
to a maximum of 76%. Also, the RPM standard deviation ranged from 1.3% to 
9.2%.  Thus, some pilots were using more RPM variation than others. During 
the runs which passed the CAA criteria there was a mean variation of engine 
RPM of 13%, whereas the mean variation of engine RPM for the failure runs 
was between 20% and 30%. The mean variation of 30% was on the run which 
achieved speeds outside the tolerance for 90% of the approach.  
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There was an increase in RPM SD with an increase in time outside the CAA 
tolerance, as shown in Figure 29. There was a strong correlation between the 
time outside the CAA tolerance and the variation of RPM used, so the data 
suggests that the pilots who remained within or just outside the CAA tolerance 
utilised a narrower RPM range.  
  r (39) = 0.71, p<0.001 
 
  
Figure 29 Plot of engine RPM SD against the percentage time outside the CAA 
tolerance.  
 Modulus 4.16
The modulus of the airspeed error from the required value of 145 knots, gives 
an overall comparison for all runs, which is not linked to the CAA tolerance 
levels. Also, the standard deviation of the RPM would demonstrate the level of 
smoothness of the pilot (Ebbatson et al. 2010). The relationship between the 
mean airspeed error and the SD of the engine RPM demonstrated that the 
range of RPM utilised increases with the increase in airspeed error, as shown in 
Figure 30. There was a strong correlation for the mean modulus of airspeed 
error against the standard deviation of the mean engine RPM. 
  r (39) = 0.72, p< 0.001 
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Figure 30  The plot of the engine RPM SD against the Mean Airspeed Error, from 
145 knots.  
However, the statistical values and trends did not illustrate the engine handling 
for all cases. For example there is an isolated value of 20 knots mean airspeed 
error shown in Figure 30. In this example on run 39, there was an extreme error 
of approximately 35 Knots for most of the approach, as shown in Figure 31. 
During this approach the airspeed reduced from the maximum of 180 knots to a 
final airspeed well below the planned approach speed of 145 knots. However, 
as the airspeed did not stabilise, this can be to the reducing engine RPM on the 
approach.  
  
Figure 31 Candidate 39 Trial run, Airspeed variation with time from 3000 feet to 
200 feet on the ILS. 
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Initially, the engine RPM utilised was held at 80%, followed by a prolonged 
period at 65%. This is shown at Figure 34. Finally the RPM was reduced to 59% 
and the airspeed decayed to approximately 10 knots below the planned 
approach speed. (Mean RPM: 68%, SD: 9.1%). In this case, the large variation 
of RPM is reflected in the high SD of 9.1%. As the SD could be a utilised as an 
indicator of smoothness, the relatively high SD is indicative of broad power 
changes and it is represented by large airspeed errors. 
 
  
Figure 32 Run 39 Engine RPM time history, from 3000 feet to 200 feet. 
 
As shown in an example plot at Figure 32, the variation of engine RPM utilised 
were varied across the trial and are related to engine handling techniques. The 
runs which achieved a CAA pass had a mean engine RPM standard deviation 
of 2.75. In comparison, the runs which failed for more than 60% of the time 
there was an RPM mean SD of 6.5%, a clearer indication of engine utilisation 
and thrust settings could be demonstrated by plotting the real time RPM values 
for the approach as discussed in the next paragraph. 
 Engine Control Strategy  4.17
Even though the statistical data defines the RPM range for each run, a clearer 
understanding of their control strategy is available. The candidates utilised 
various engine control strategies, which was reflected in the airspeed accuracy. 
The candidates, who passed the CAA criteria, applied a reducing RPM as the 
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target speed was approached and adjusted to a stable RPM at the approach 
speed. 
However, as the less accurate candidates applied a broad series of Power 
Lever (throttle) inputs to control the airspeed, the possibility of poor engine 
response or control delays must be considered. Fortunately, as shown in the 
pre-trial assessment, the data confirmed that the engine response time 
following an input was less than 0.25 sec. All the engine input/engine response 
characteristics were examined and even for the most inaccurate, there was no 
perceptible lag between the pilot inputs and the RPM. Thus the data confirmed 
a large variation of engine control strategy across the pilot population was 
representative of the pilot inputs.  
The more accurate pilots were able to utilise a smaller RPM range and achieve 
a more concise control of the airspeed. From the airspeed data, there were 7 
candidates who were the most accurate, and remained well within the CAA 
tolerance, for the duration of the approach. By plotting the RPM parameters 
during the profile, it can be seen that relatively small adjustments were made 
and a narrow RPM band was utilised. The stable RPM for each candidate was a 
setting of approximately 70% to 72% RPM, with fine adjustments around this 
figure. The engine rpm time histories for the most accurate candidates on 
approach are shown in Figure 33. 
  
Figure 33  RPM settings for the seven strongest candidates, from 3000 feet to 
200 feet. 
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However, in comparison, the RPM settings were more varied for the candidates 
with the highest airspeed variation. Therefore, the RPM settings for the 7 
weakest candidates who failed the CAA tolerance by the greatest margin, from 
90% to 42% were considered and are shown at Figure 34. The overall engine 
response varies from above 90% to below 50%, with large variations and very 
short time periods of stable RPM. 
 
  
Figure 34 RPM settings for the seven weakest candidates, from 3000 feet to 200 
feet.  
In conclusion, it can be demonstrated by Figures 33 and 34, that the more 
accurate pilots were able to establish what RPM was required very quickly on 
the approach. In contrast, there did not appear to be a consolidated strategy for 
the less accurate pilots as they did not establish a final RPM, to maintain the 
target airspeed. The RPM inputs for the weakest candidates varied throughout 
the approach by as much as 20%.  
 
 Discussion 4.18
The simulator trial was successful in recording piloting skills, including pilots of 
CAA, FAA and JAA licence qualifications, during an operational task that was 
representative of line operations. Even though only 41 runs were achieved, this 
was considered to be adequately representative of the pilot population. 
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Significantly, all the candidates had completed the required skill tests for their 
licence renewal and were expected to have achieved the required standards. 
4.18.1 Localiser and Glide slope 
The tracking accuracy for the Localiser and glide path was within limits for all 
but 3 of the candidates and one had only had a momentary lapse of standards 
outside the tolerance of 0.5 dots displacement. All the other candidates 
performed well with recorded overall localiser mean of 0.069 dots  (SD of 0.089) 
and a glideslope mean of 0.021 dots  (SD of 0.09). 
4.18.2 Airspeed Tracking and CAA Test Tolerance  
The airspeed tracking task was indicative of the pilot performance in a 
representative emergency situation. However, the airspeed mean of 148.18 
knots and the SD of 4.81 knots did not fully illustrate the overall pilot 
performance with regard to the single engine flying task. Even though the 
candidates had passed their LST, during 30 (73%) runs there was failure to 
meet the CAA tolerance. Also, 8 runs were below 140 knots at 200 feet above 
touchdown (at the Decision Height), which is consistent with previous accident 
reports, where pilot handling or loss of airspeed were significant factors (CAA 
2006a, CAA 2009b). One run was as slow as 132 knots, 13 knots below the 
planned speed. Is it possible that they had lost or did not have the required 
skills to fly accurately, even though they had passed the LST on the same day? 
The pilots had each completed their recurrent training and had completed less 
than 4 hours duty for the simulator session prior to the trial. As a consideration 
for possible fatigue, the total duty was organised to be well within the regulated 
duty periods allowed. In fact, for the worst case of an overnight duty and 8 
sectors, the regulations would have allowed up to 9 hours of duty. An extract of 
Cap 371 (CAA 2004) is shown at Appendix M. Therefore, a 4 hour duty period, 
with several simulator sectors and a final approach to land could be considered 
very representative of a normal working day and not unduly stressful. 
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4.18.3 Pilot Training Background, Recent Flying and Experience 
For the three pilot training backgrounds, included in the pilot sample, the group 
mean airspeeds varied by less than two knots across the training types. As the 
pilots should have received comparable engine and airspeed control training, 
this was reflected in the group statistics and there was little statistical difference 
in performance across the three groups. With the pilot experience ranging up to 
16000 hours, the data did not provide evidence of increasing accuracy with the 
gaining of experience. However, this supports the evidence of previous studies 
with Commercial Airline Pilots (Todd et al. 2012). The evidence also suggests 
that for up to 28 days, the pilot performance accuracy was not significantly 
affected by the number of approaches in the preceding days. 
4.18.4 Minimum and Maximum Airspeed 
The simulator data supported the Accident Data Investigation derived in 
Chapter 3, where pilot skill, specifically airspeed control was listed as a major 
factor. Part of the simulator task was the requirement to manage the aircraft 
speed and configuration prior to commencing the ILS. However, several 
candidates were up to 20 to 35 knots fast at the 3000 feet point for the ILS. With 
such an excess of speed as they initiated the glide-slope descent, it is perhaps 
not surprising that airspeed control became a problem. Furthermore, the 
importance of maintaining the correct airspeed has been discussed in Chapter 2 
and as a reminder, the cardinal rule is “Maintain airplane control and a safe 
airspeed at all times” (Hawker 2008). If the airspeed is so important, why so 
many fail the “cardinal rule number one” and only 3 candidates maintained 
speeds above 145 knots for the approach? Essentially, the performance of the 
majority of the candidates was below the required CAA criteria.   
4.18.5 Engine Control Strategy 
Flying a passenger aircraft with asymmetric thrust this requires a different 
control strategy to balanced two engine flights, in that the pilot should be 
conservative in both thrust and configuration changes. The most critical is the 
configuration change and the extra drag created by the undercarriage and flaps, 
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once they are extended. The trial procedure was established according to the 
standard approach profile for the Hawker, with a speed reduction and a drag 
increase approaching the ILS. Once the landing configuration is attained, the 
engine thrust setting is varied to maintain the airspeed. During the trial, the 
engine RPM demonstrated significant variations, the larger the airspeed error, 
the greater the RPM spread. 
Although beyond the scope of this accident study, the type of engine control 
strategy among business jet pilots could be evaluated in future simulator trials, 
pilot opinion surveys or during line flying. 
The training background of the pilots did not demonstrate a clear separation in 
tracking accuracy or engine control strategy, with mean airspeeds that varied by 
only 2 knots. 
4.18.6 TRE Tasks and Responsibilities  
During simulator training and testing, the examiner is required to set and run the 
simulator, monitor the pilots actions, including CRM and at the same time act as 
the ATC controller. For the examiner, an LST involves checking that all the 
tolerances have been met, such as localiser and glideslope tracking or heading 
and radio beacon tracking plus monitoring airspeed and altitude accuracy. As 
the test progresses, there would be several tasks such as monitoring the 
candidates’ procedures, and observing the flying accuracy, from a position 
behind the crew seats. It may be that the conditions make it difficult to make 
accurate observations or notice minor deviations whilst conducting the test and 
running the simulator.  The recorded simulator data provided sufficient real time 
data to determine the candidate’s performance within the tolerance parameters 
and decide the pass/fail criteria. The examiners task could be similarly 
simplified by setting the prescribed limitations and presenting a pass/fail on the 
instructor console. 
4.18.7 Flight Data Monitoring 
The trial did represent a standard approach under benign conditions, and in 
accordance with normal SOPs but for 30 runs the pilots did not achieve the 
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CAA standards. However, it is not possible to predict the pilot standards once 
the crews return to line operations. In scheduled airline operations, aircraft 
above 27 tonnes are required to maintain a FDM programme (CAA 2003), 
where such a set of parameters are recorded for post flight evaluation. The 
Hawker trial aircraft is below the regulated weight limit for mandatory FDM and 
is therefore not a regulatory requirement. The airspeed tracking result has 
highlighted and supports the latest CAA initiative for its 7 Significant Safety 
concerns, where increased pilot training and improved in flight monitoring is 
advocated (CAA 2011b). 
 Summary  4.19
The skills of business jet pilots were investigated to review any weakness in 
pilot handling. The data was consistent with the findings of the accident model 
described in Chapter 2, where pilot skill was a major factor in the final model. 
An area that was highlighted was the airspeed tracking task, within the limits 
laid down for the Commercial Licence qualification, although all the pilots had 
passed this test. As the simulator data could define a pass / fail parameter, an 
automatic method could be proposed for assessing the pass/fail pilot 
performance during the Licence Skill tests. The lack of proper airspeed control 
has been significant in the accident data, on one side by flying too slowly and 
losing control on the other side, by attempting to land too fast, where it has 
contributed to the overrun accidents (IBAC 2012, EASA 2013). Even though the 
principles of engine control are included in early pilot training by both the 
military (CFS 1995) and civilian schools (AOPA 1994), further research could 
examine the type of engine control training received by pilots and suggest 
improvements. 
In terms of the HFACS definitions, a lack of accuracy could be considered 
under “Unsafe Acts”. However, it is debatable whether they constitute “Skill 
Errors” or “Inadequate Supervision” (Wiegmann & Schappell 2003). Command 
and leadership was considered a significant figure in the Accident Data 
Investigation in Chapter 3. So if the captains accept poor standards of flying and 
do not demand accuracy from the co-pilots, then this could be accepted as the 
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norm and perpetuated among the pilots. However, long term Skill fade has been 
reported among airline pilots (Wood 2004) and in a study of General Aviation 
accidents, Keller (2013) reported evidence of pilots failing to maintain airspeed 
and maintain control from as few as 100 days after their instrument licence test.  
However, the trial candidates had passed the LST within hours of flying the trial; 
so long term skill fade could be unlikely. 
If skill fade is unlikely, to continue the concept of expected crew capabilities, 
Chapter 3 contained evidence that the captains were prepared to accept poor 
standards of drills and flying. Similarly, if the simulator instructor does not 
demand high standards and rate accordingly, do the pilots strive to improve? 
From the simulator trial it is not possible to identify the causes. There may be 
several aspects including; training, handling procedures, and skill levels. The 
results, therefore suggest that further research into business jet piloting skills 
would be beneficial. Also, the statistical analysis of recording the mean and 
standard deviation did not immediately illustrate the real time task and the 
measure of pilot performance with regard to the accepted limits. The measure 
of allowable tolerance and maximum deviation was more successful in both 
simulator and aircraft data monitoring, to provide an appropriate measure for 
pilot accuracy.  
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5 CONCLUSION 
 Introduction  5.1
This chapter first provides a recap of the thesis background and then presents 
summaries of the 3 key research studies, followed by a summary of the 
simulator trial limitations. Finally it presents the overall conclusion of the 
research. 
As discussed in the opening paragraph of this thesis, business jet operations 
have a poorer long term safety record than scheduled airline operations (IBAC 
2008, 2010, 2011, 2012). Also the CAA had noted the situation, as part of its 
Safety Plan (CAA 2009b). This Business jet Safety and Accident study supports 
this concern and proposes guidance to remedial action. The study provides 
substantive evidence of the concerns and has investigated the manual flying 
skills of the crews.  
As stated in the introduction, the aim of the study was to investigate Business 
jet Operations and determine operational areas in need of improvement, with 
the following 3 key research objectives: 
 
 Review and discuss the business jet operations, regulations, 
operating conditions, accident data, and crew skills compared to 
commercial airline operations. 
 Conduct a study of the business jet accident data, to describe an 
overall accident model relevant to their operating conditions. 
 Carry out a simulator trial assessment of business jet pilots’ 
operating skills. 
The Study presented in this thesis has successfully addressed each of these 
principal objectives. The literature and accident data review has provided an 
overview of business jet operations, regulations, operating conditions, accident 
data and crew skills compared to commercial airline operations. The accident 
data investigation then provided an accident data model that was pertinent to 
the particular style of business jet operations and highlighted the major areas of 
concern.  
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Subsequently, considering the results from the accident data review and the 
proposed accident model, a pilot simulator trial study was devised to provide the 
final area for study, an assessment of business jet pilots’ operating skills. 
5.1.1 STUDY ONE: Review Business Jet Operations  
The review of business jet operations and accident data provided background 
and information on the particular type of operations. Several key topics were 
presented in the literature review, in Chapter 1, and from these topics, the 
following was amplified during the study. 
There are at least 18000 business jets in use around the world. In contrast to 
the major airlines where large numbers of aircraft are operated from established 
airports, with established facilities and support, the business jets are often part 
of small operations from smaller airfields. For example in 2010, 75% of the 
company operators had only one aircraft and 12% had just two aircraft, with 
only 13 % having 3 or more aircraft (NBAA 2010).   
The lack of compliance with the rules and regulations was demonstrated by 
crew operating outside the weather limits, where pilots also conducted 
operations from runways that were unsuitable or too short. Business jet 
operations are not conducted along defined routes and timetables. Therefore, 
the operators are not limited to fixed destinations, as these are dictated by the 
customer. So, the business jets have a more varied itinerary and would present 
difficulties for the regulator. At present the EASA is setting out its regulations 
and has issued an initial definition for commercial operations, which does not 
limit or define the size and type of passenger carrying operations (EU OPS 
2008), so this may be influential on future business jet operations. 
The airfield categories was noted a factor, as the lack of facilities and the 
problems associated with business jets operating to smaller, less sophisticated 
airfields was evident in the accident data. 
The pilot performance, with special regard to flying skills and airspeed control 
was a major factor in the accident data, especially during the approach and 
landing phase of flight. The pilot performance with regard to landing ability, 
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stable approaches and poor crew CRM was all evident in the accident reports 
and is further reflected in both Chapters 2 and 3. 
The accident data investigation statistics were for 2007 to 2010 but the data for 
the following year, 2011 supports this study and highlights the pressing need for 
improvement. The 2011 statistics for both United States registered and Non 
United States registered business jets were; a total of 27 accidents, with 17 
(62%) on landing where 14 lost control and 8 had airspeed as a factor (IBAC 
2012). There were also 4 accidents with US registered aircraft that were 
technical faults or failures.  
The 2011 accident data for both the USA registered and non- USA registered 
aircraft, as presented by IBAC (2012), is included at Appendix N. 
The several safety initiatives by both the regulators and the business jet 
associations  (e.g. IBAC), have concentrated on the operational aspects found 
in the review, such as pilot skills, rushed approaches, requisite landing 
conditions, (wet, snow, ice etc.). Business jet operators routinely send aircraft; 
with only a pilot crew, to wide ranging destinations so the IBAC has a safety 
programme in place  which monitors companies in an attempt to improve the 
operating standards across the industry. The results are published in their 
annual accident reviews (IBAC 2008b) 
With over 18000 aircraft in use world-wide, regulatory oversight could be an 
onerous task. Also, as discussed in Chapter 1, the CAA has raised their 
concerns and cited the difficulty of regulatory oversight, and considers this may 
be one of the causal factors for the business jet poor safety record (CAA 
2009a). 
The apparent lack of support in some areas and technical failures was 
supported by this thesis and The Accident data investigation for the proposed 
accident model. The Grounded Theory model outline included Outside Support 
as it proved representative of the business jet operations. This aspect is further 
reflected in the 2011 accident data which includes 4 technical failures (IBAC 
2012).  
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5.1.2 STUDY TWO: Accident Data investigation 
The Accident Data Investigation and Grounded Theory accident model revealed 
the interlinking of several major factors in the accidents. The business jet core 
model was able to consolidate the evidence to show an overview of the 
operation as a whole. Furthermore, the primary crew factors of CRM, Command 
and Skills, with a further influence of the Support Environment are in agreement 
with the findings of Harris (2006) and Klinect (2001) who found similar crew 
factors during routine airline operations. This Grounded Theory study found that 
the apparent lack of CRM among the crews directly affected performance. This 
is in accord with the CRM and NOTECHs procedures proposed by Flin (2003). 
The inclusion of Pilot Skills in the final model supports the findings of previous 
annual safety reviews (CAA 2008). However, the piloting skill was not limited to 
purely “stick and rudder”, but was also demonstrative of lacking systems and 
performance knowledge among the crews. 
5.1.2.1 CRM 
The results of the Grounded Theory and the proposed accident model suggest 
that CRM was a major safety factor in business jet operations. The accident 
reports highlighted examples of actions by the Captains that were listed as poor 
standards as set out in the NOTECHs for crew behaviour. This again, supports 
the findings of Flin (2003) .The results of the study also support the principles of 
CRM (CAA CAP 737). In addition, the actions of the captains and the co-pilots’ 
reluctance to act both supports previous research and re-enforces the FAA 
directives which state the importance of CRM training (FAA 2012).  
5.1.2.2 Command 
The findings of this grounded theory study suggested some captains displayed 
good leadership, closely followed the drills, briefed the crews and achieved a 
safe conclusion. However, further accident report evidence disclosed 
inadequate actions or supervision by other captains, such as running out of fuel, 
failing to comply with the regulations and deliberately attempting manoeuvres 
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outside the aircraft and crew capabilities. This reflects on the standard of 
command and supports the CAA requirements (CAA 2010d, 2011c). The 
findings of this study have supported the inclusion of Command as a significant 
factor.  
5.1.2.3 Skills  
The pilot’s capabilities varied across the range of experience. This supports the 
findings of Ebbatson (2009). Furthermore, the skill retention and dependency on 
automation of airline pilots has been reported by Wood (2004) and Ebbatson 
(2007) but this has not been investigated for business jet pilots. Although, the 
study has offered an accident model that proposes concern for the piloting 
skills, the evidence also proposed a greater understanding of the aircraft was 
equally important. Even though piloting skills was a major factor, the evidence 
suggests crew deficiencies in both understanding the aircraft’s runway 
performance and also the aircraft systems and supports the CAA accident data 
summary (CAA 2006a).  
5.1.2.4 Support Environment  
The final factor in the consolidation of the business jet accident model was 
Support Environment. As they are frequently operating to minor, less 
established or even unmanned airfields, the business jet operational arena is 
more varied than that of scheduled airline operations. Moreover, aircraft 
operations may not be considered in isolation. External factors such as ATC, 
aircraft maintenance and operational planning support are essential. An 
element of the support environment personnel could link directly to the CRM 
discussion above, as the operations and maintenance personnel should be 
considered part of the overall “team members”. Similarly, this study reflects the 
proposed safety initiatives, such as an improved SMS for all operators (IBAC 
SMS) to promote a better level of safety awareness. 
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5.1.3 STUDY THREE Simulator Trial  
The third study used the results of the previous 2 studies to define a task that 
was both challenging, and met the expectations of every commercial pilot. 
However, the simulator trial indicated that the performance of the majority of 
pilots, according to the regulations (CAA 2010c), would have been a licence 
failure. The simulator study suggested that when a piloting task is considered, it 
is not only the manual tracking tasks that should be investigated but also the 
cognitive aspects. As the aircraft had an engine failed, it would not be able to 
sustain level flight with the flaps and undercarriage deployed ready for landing. 
Therefore, an element of the task is the judgement and capability to understand 
the planning required for the profile, without losing airspeed and becoming 
dangerously slow. This would provide extra workload, as the pilot was required 
to reduce speed and deploy the undercarriage and flaps, commensurate with 
the reduced thrust available whilst monitoring the flight parameters to join the 
ILS. This supports the findings of Ebbatson (2009). The inner loop close control 
of aircraft attitude and short term trajectory in the ILS tracking proved adequate 
for the simulator. The outer loop control of aircraft performance and airspeed 
due to the reduced thrust requires a different control strategy in the long term, 
deploying gear and flaps, and the short term, speed control on the ILS. 
The energy management consideration, both commencing and ending the ILS 
proved to be a challenge for some crews who were either fast at 3000 feet or 
slow at 200 feet. Although the metrics of airspeed and ILS tracking were 
statistically evaluated, it was the more fundamental measures of airspeed 
variation and maxima that revealed the real crew capabilities. The pilots’ 
performance was consistent with a lack of appropriate long term energy 
philosophy, as shown by the extremes of airspeed at 3000 feet, (up to 180 
knots). For the short term airspeed tracking task, the accurate pilots refined the 
engine setting very quickly and stabilised the airspeed. In contrast, the 
performance of the less accurate pilots was consistent with an inappropriate 
engine strategy being applied. The poor standard of airspeed accuracy was not 
limited to the less experienced and the increase in experience was not 
 121 
commensurate with increased accuracy. In comparison with commercial airline 
pilots, this supports the findings of Todd & Thomas (2013). 
5.1.3.1 Performance Measures  
The majority of the candidates (38) were very consistent, with for both the 
localiser and glide path tracking, remaining well within the CAA tolerance limit of 
0.5 dot displacement. However, three candidates failed to maintain the CAA 
tolerance for the localiser and glide path tracking tasks for short periods. It was 
considered that the outer loop tracking task of the aircraft trajectory and tracking 
the vertical and lateral flight path was satisfactorily achieved. This supports the 
findings of Ebbatson (2009) in that the average ILS tracking error was very 
close to zero for most of the subjects.  
The second relatively complex outer loop task of configuration control and 
energy management ready for landing (Lowering the undercarriage and the 
flap) was reflected in the relatively large airspeed variation. It was in closer, 
inner loop task of airspeed control that required further investigation. Although 
the control strategy metrics and control input frequencies were not evaluated, 
the initial validation of the airspeed against the CAA standard illustrates the 
actual performance. 
Whilst each pilot had received identical training profiles and testing regimes 
prior to the trial, there was a large variation of engine management. Moreover, 
there was a broad range of experience, varied career paths among the 
candidates and the higher experience levels did not reflect in improved 
performance. Also the 3 basic pilot training backgrounds demonstrated similar 
performance and similar engine management. 
The degree of RPM and throttle input combined with the outer loop performance 
measures could suggest reliable measure of piloting skills. As the more 
accurate pilots utilised a narrower RPM band, this supports the hypothesis of 
Ebbatson (2009) that confirmed that more skilled performance was shown by a 
reduction in control input across all frequency bands. 
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5.1.3.2 Energy management 
Since the aircraft is in an emergency condition, with one engine failed, it could 
be good airmanship and flying skill not to extend the undercarriage and flaps 
too early and risk slowing towards the stall. The procedure would normally 
consist of an early reduction towards the final speed, with a low flap setting prior 
to the glideslope. Once established for the approach, the final flap setting and 
the undercarriage would be selected (Hawker 2008). The simulator profile was 
planned to represent a high gain task, in that reducing airspeed and increasing 
drag on approach, requires a certain level cognitive skill by the pilot. However, 
this should have been within the capabilities of the candidates since the task 
was representative of the CAA licence skill test. The candidates did not achieve 
this level of control. In some cases, as the drag increased, the candidates were 
unable to maintain the airspeed, whilst it gradually decayed towards or below 
the approach speed. The extremes of approach speed were evident during the 
approaches, with candidates commencing the approach well above the planned 
speed and often decaying to below the approach speed at the final decision 
height.  
From the accident data (CAA 2006a) the loss of airspeed and subsequent loss 
of control after engine failure is a major category for fatal accidents. It is 
essential that the pilot should monitor the airspeed and prevent a reduction of 
airspeed near the stall. Yet, only 4 candidates maintained the airspeed at or 
above 145 knots for the whole approach. Thus some candidates were recording 
very low airspeeds during an emergency approach, in cloud. Finally, at the 
decision point only 200 feet above the runway, the aircraft is in a poor condition, 
slow and low, with little time or height in which to recover. Critically, this is 
representative of previous accident data (CAA 2006a).  
5.1.3.3 Pilot skills and training 
The results of the simulator trial also support the accident data evidence (CAA 
2006a) in that a major factor in both fatal and non-fatal accidents is pilot 
handling, resulting from the lack of adequate airspeed control. Similarly, it is 
considered that the performance distribution of performance issues is 
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commensurate with the complexity of the task, requiring a more complex mental 
model, for example, and landing with an engine failure (Veillette 1995). The 
simulator trial demonstrated, for future trials, that consideration should be given 
to designing a task which is challenging to both the cognitive aspects of pilot 
performance as well as the physical tracking tasks. It is uncertain whether the 
failings are due to skill errors or a lack of adequate training and this should be 
further investigated. However, the quality of simulator training and lack of 
manual flying practice has already been raised by the CAA (CAA 2009a, Vivian 
2004) An improved recurrent training programme (ATQP)  has already been 
instigated for airline operators, this may have benefits for the business jet 
operators, providing that manual flying skills are adequately addressed.  
Moreover, Wood (2004) reported that design of modern aircraft and the ATC 
environment rarely allows for manual flying in preference to full use of the 
autopilot. Finally, the findings of the investigation support earlier subjective 
evidence concerning the loss of manual flying skills. (Curry 1985, Wiener 1989, 
Wood 2004, Ebbatson et al. 2007). 
5.1.3.4 TRE rating and examination 
For the training and examination criteria, it is notable that the pilots had attained 
a pass grade for their LST within hours of the simulator trial. However, for the 
trial, several candidates exceeded the CAA tolerance for more than 40% of the 
approach. Significantly, the criteria for the trial included that all candidates 
would have passed their recurrent training and therefore had already performed 
to the required standards. During normal operations, AOC holders are 
responsible to the CAA for the crew standards and the CAA inspectors may 
observe crews and critique company operations (CAA 2010d). Unfortunately, it 
was not possible to observe the training sessions prior to the trial procedure. 
Therefore the pre-trial training cannot be commented on in the study. 
In order to conduct a LST, the TRE is required to monitor several parameters 
during the approach (e.g. Localiser, Glideslope, Airspeed, flap, undercarriage, 
Air Traffic Control calls). Therefore, an automatic data recording function to 
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show a pass/ fail for all the parameters would aid the test process whilst 
recording the candidate’s performance. 
 
5.1.3.5 Simulator trial limitations  
The simulator trial was conducted on a Level D, CAA and FAA approved 
simulator. The candidates were taken from the pool of pilots undergoing 
recurrent training for their licence renewal. However, the time opportunities 
were limited as the simulator was in almost constant use, which restricted the 
time available. The Simulator Company was, however, very supportive and 
enabled the successful runs to take place over a 2 year period. However, as 
each candidate had received the required training and achieved the required 
standard, it was considered that the sample could be considered as 
representative. 
The simulator trial was limited in that the approaches were all conducted on one 
aircraft type (Hawker 800 XP). Ideally, it would have been preferable to conduct 
a series of trials across several aircraft types and a larger sample of pilot 
candidates. Under the actual time and simulator constraints this was not 
possible but should be considered for further trials of this type. 
Furthermore, it would have been desirable to obtain further data and observe 
the full training details. From the review of the trial data, further data runs, 
especially for the LST would have been beneficial. Unfortunately, due to the 
constraints, this was not possible.  
 Conclusion 5.2
This Business Jet safety and accident thesis has achieved the research aims 
proposed in Chapter 1 by identifying the major factors in business jet accidents. 
The Literature Review has confirmed the different operating environment of the 
business jets, often operating at short notice to a destination of the customer’s 
choice, that may be isolated and lacking in some ATC or airfield facilities. In 
contrast, the airlines are have regular schedules predominantly to major well 
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supported airports. Many business jet operations have less than three aircraft 
(NBAA 2010), only a few pilots and lack the full ground support available to the 
major airlines. This evidence suggests that the supervision and regulation of 
such a large and varied aircraft fleet across the globe presents unique 
problems. The annual safety data published by the CAA and IBAC illustrates 
that the business jet safety record has consistently been below the level of 
commercial airlines. This has been recognised and several safety initiatives 
have been proposed by both the regulators and the industrial organisations 
(CAA 2011b, IBAC 2008b). In both the commercial airline and the business jet 
industry training improvements such as ATQP (CAA 2011c) have been 
implemented to broaden the recurrent training in a manner more appropriate to 
the individual operator. Also, both the CAA and EASA has publicised safety 
issues such as the loss of aircraft control and excess airspeed an approach for 
all operators, regardless of aircraft type (CAA 2011b, EASA 2011). 
In the Accident Data Investigation the influence of Command and CRM in the 
accident reports, especially including failures to adhere to regulations were 
significant flight safety concerns. Although the primary factors were crew 
related, the outside influence of the Support Environment and inputs from the 
outside agencies were still significant and safety initiatives are being 
implemented to improve these areas.  
The pilots’ skills simulator trial has amplified previous work by Wood (2004) and 
Ebbatson (2009) by raising the concerns for pilot skills during routine line flying. 
Although previous research has investigated pilot operations, there has not 
been any similar investigation to record pilot handling performance during a 
simulated emergency on a commercial licence qualification profile. Since the 
LST is common to all commercial pilot recurrent training, it would be beneficial 
to conduct an identical trial among airline pilots. Subsequently further 
information could be gained concerning the quality of training for the 
fundamental tasks such as engine control strategies. The simulator results have 
suggested that even though the fundamentals of aircraft performance and 
engine control is taught at the first stages of pilot training, there is an apparent  
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degradation of ability. The dominance of poor airspeed control reported in the 
loss of control related accidents (CAA 2006a) and the results of this thesis 
should provide the emphasis for improved engine and airspeed management 
either by improved training or monitoring the standards of licence examination. 
This thesis has shown the importance of a reliable measuring technique to 
evaluate pilot performance with regard to the statutory licence requirements. 
The simulator results were able to track the pilot performance to within one knot 
and provide the TRE with an immediate measure of the pilot capability. 
Furthermore, the results demonstrate the need to improve aircraft control by 
including the inner loop input measures (RPM management) as a training 
requirement and thus better refine the measurement of the outer- loop tracking 
task (Airspeed)  
The direct comparison of the airspeed data with the CAA examination 
tolerances gave an immediate and accurate measure of the pass or fail time 
period for each candidate. This method, therefore, gave a more measured 
indication of the candidates’ performance with regard to the actual task and 
highlighted major failings in both energy management and flying ability. 
The training and evaluation system should ensure that every pilot is up to the 
task; 
 Can the pilot fly the aircraft and land safely with an engine failed? 
 
 Suggested future research 5.3
This study has identified the major factors associated with the particular aspects 
of business jet operations. However, considering that only one aircraft type was 
evaluated, a broader scope with more evidence of actual aircraft operations 
would be beneficial as well as an appraisal of airline pilot skills. Therefore, the 
following considerations are suggested for future research: 
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5.3.1 Training and Simulation 
 The scope of this study was limited to the approach and landing phase of 
flight, since there are also significant flight phases that have not been 
included, (e.g. Take-off), it is suggested that further investigation is 
conducted to include airline operations and all flight phases. 
 The pilot skill of airspeed tracking was identified as weak during the trial, 
therefore it is suggested that further research be conducted into the pilot 
training for engine/airspeed control and strategy. 
 The major factors of Command and CRM were of equal status alongside 
Skills in the Accident Data Investigation. It is suggested that further 
research is conducted to determine the training areas that are lacking in 
Command and CRM. 
 Business jet training should include more pilot handling emphasis and 
promote ATQP for pilot recurrent training. 
5.3.2 Licence Skill Test and Flight Data Monitoring. 
 It is suggested that research be conducted to investigate an automated 
system for pilot tracking during the critical phases of the LST in order to 
provide an automatic pass/fail result for the TRE 
 Further research into a monitoring programme for evidence of piloting 
skills from real world derived data would also be beneficial. The analysis 
could show improvements in engine handling and also demonstrate pilot 
skill levels in the business jet community. This may be integrated into an 
improved FDM category to include the lighter business jets, at present 
below the 27 tonne minimum. 
5.3.3 Support Environment and Pilot Opinion. 
 It is suggested that a pilot survey among the business jet community, 
should be conducted to obtain data and feedback on the particulars of 
their operations, and background information on engine management 
philosophy. 
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 The Support Environment, such as ground operations, maintenance and 
Air Traffic Control, was a major influence and it is suggested to research 
the effect of on-going safety initiatives such as the IBAC improved SMS 
programme. 
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Appendix A : CAA / FAA Regulations for passenger 
Aircraft. 
Adapted from FAR 21, 91 , 135 and CAA 2010 a. 
 
 
  
FAA FAR 121 FAR 135 FAR 135 ON 
DEMAND 
FAR 91 
 Airline Operators: Large 
transport airplanes 
operating 
Scheduled/non- 
scheduled revenue 
flights. 
Regulations limit Part 
121 operations to 
controlled airspace and 
controlled airports that 
have available specific 
weather, navigational, 
operational, and 
maintenance support. 
A scheduled passenger-
carrying operation that 
flies to smaller airports 
not providing the 
services required to 
support Part 121 
operations.  
Includes commercial air 
carriers flying smaller jet 
and turboprop aircraft  
Commercial 
Operators, where 
air travel is at the 
request of the 
traveller in both 
time and 
destination.  
This is restricted 
to less than 5 
round trips per 
week, between 2 
or more points, 
on published 
flight schedules. 
Operations 
where no fee 
or payment is 
involved. 
Including:  
Ferrying, 
Aerial work. 
Demonstration 
& training 
Company 
flights 
CAA TYPE A ROUTE 
LICENSE 
TYPE B ROUTE 
LICENSE- 
SCHEDULED 
TYPE B 
LICENSE NON-
SCHEDULED 
GENERAL 
AVIATION 
 Airline operators: The 
Type A Operating 
License is granted to 
companies permitted to 
carry passengers, 
cargo and mail on 
aircraft with 20 or more 
seats for both 
scheduled and non-
scheduled (Charter) 
operations   
The Type B Operating 
License is granted to 
companies permitted to 
carry passengers, cargo 
and mail on aircraft with 
fewer than 20 seats 
and/or weighing less 
than 10 tones. 
 
The Type B 
Operating 
License is 
granted to 
companies 
permitted to carry 
passengers, 
cargo and mail on 
aircraft with fewer 
than 20 seats 
and/or weighing 
less than 10 
tones.  
General 
aviation and 
industry. 
Similar 
constraints 
and type of 
flights as per 
FAR 91. The 
overriding 
consideration 
must be not 
for Hire or 
reward. 
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Appendix B Airfield Categories 
The Airfield Categories and conditions are as follows (JAROPS 1, 2008): 
(a)  Category A. An airfield which satisfies all of the following requirements: 
(i) An approved Instrument approach procedure. 
(ii) At least one runway with no performance limited procedure for take-off and/or 
landing. 
(iii) Published circling minima not higher than 1000 ft. above the airfield level. (AAL) 
 and 
(iv) Night operations capability. 
(b)  Category B 
An airfield which does not satisfy the Category A requirements or which requires extra 
considerations such as: 
(i) Non-standard approach aids and/or approach patterns; 
Or (ii) unusual local weather conditions. 
Or (iii) unusual characteristics or performance limitations. 
Or (iv) any other relevant considerations including obstructions, physical layout, lighting 
etc. 
(c) Category C 
A Category C airfield that requires additional considerations to a Category B airfield and 
requires the extra training restrictions listed below. 
Pilot operations to a category A airfield are unrestricted. However, prior to operating to a 
Category B airfield, the pilot in-command should be briefed, or self- briefed by means of 
programmed instruction, on the Category B airfield(s) concerned. It is a requirement that he/she 
should also certify these instructions by annotating the company Flight Report accordingly.  
Prior to operating to a Category C airfield, the pilot-in-command should be briefed and visit the 
airfield as an observer and/or undertake instruction in a flight simulator approved by the 
Authority for that purpose. The observation and/or simulator instruction SHALL be recorded on 
the pilot’s training record. (JAR OPS 1, 2008) 
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Appendix C CRM Elements and Behavioural markers 
 Categories and Elements of NOTECHS (Adapted from Flin 2003) 
CATEGORY ELEMENT 
1.CO-OPERATION -Team building and maintaining 
-Considering Others 
-Supporting others 
-Conflict Solving 
2. LEADERSHIP AND MANAGERIAL 
SKILLS 
-Use of authority and assertiveness 
-Providing and maintaining standards 
-Planning and co-ordination 
-workload management 
3. SITUATION AWARENESS -Awareness of aircraft systems 
-Awareness of external environment 
-Awareness of time 
4. DECISION MAKING -Problem definition and diagnosis 
-Option generation 
-Risk assessment and option selection 
-Outcome review 
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Appendix D CRM Co-operation Elements 
Co-operation category: elements and behavioural markers (Adapted from Flin 
2003) 
Element Good practice Poor practice 
   
Team building and 
maintaining 
Establishes atmosphere for 
open communication  
Blocks open communication 
 Encourages inputs and 
feedback from others  
Keeps barriers between 
crewmembers (CM) 
 Does not compete with 
others  
Competes with others 
Considering others Takes notice of the 
suggestions of other CM 
even if s/he does not agree  
Ignores suggestions of other 
CM 
 Takes condition of other CM 
into account  
Does not take account of the 
condition of other CM 
 Gives personal feedback  Shows no reaction to other CM 
Supporting others Helps other CM in 
demanding situations  
Hesitates to help other CM in 
demanding situations 
 Offers assistance  Does not offer assistance 
Conflict solving Keeps calm in interpersonal 
conflicts  
Overreacts in interpersonal 
conflicts 
 Suggests conflict solutions Sticks to own position without 
considering a compromise 
 Concentrates on what is right 
rather than who is wrong  
Accuses other CM of making 
errors 
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Appendix E  JAROPS STD 1A Simulator Requirements 
Appendix 1 to JAR –STD 1A 0.30 (continued) Section 1 Minimum technical 
requirements for qualifying JAA Level A, B, C and D Flight Simulators 
Qualification 
Level 
General Technical Requirements Maximum Credits 
           A 
 
The lowest level of flight simulator 
technical complexity.  
An enclosed full scale replica of the 
aeroplane cockpit/flight deck including 
simulation of all systems, instruments, 
navigational equipment, communications 
and caution and warning systems. 
An instructor’s station with seat shall be 
provided as shall be seats for the flight 
crewmembers and one seat for 
inspectors/observers. 
Control forces and displacement 
characteristics shall correspond to that of 
the replicated aeroplane and they shall 
respond in the same manner as the 
aeroplane under the same flight 
conditions. 
The use of class specific data tailored to 
the specific aeroplane type with fidelity 
sufficient to meet the objective tests, 
functions and subjective tests is allowed. 
Generic ground effect and ground 
handling models are permitted. Motion, 
visual and sound systems sufficient to 
support the training, testing and checking 
credits sought are required. 
The visual system [shall] provide at least 
45 degrees horizontal and 30 degrees 
vertical field of view per pilot. A night 
scene is acceptable. 
The response to control inputs shall not 
be greater than 300 milliseconds more 
than that experienced on the aircraft. 
Wind shear need not be simulated. 
 
Suitable for: 
 
– Crew procedures training. 
– Instrument flight training. 
– Transition/conversion 
training, testing and checking 
except for take-off and landing 
manoeuvres. 
– Recurrent training, checking 
and testing (type and 
instrument rating 
renewal/revalidation) 
 
           B 
 
As for Level A plus: 
Validation flight test data shall be used as 
the basis for flight and performance and 
systems characteristics. Additionally 
ground handling and aerodynamics 
As for Level A plus: 
– Recency of experience 
(three take-offs and landings 
in 90 days). 
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programming to include ground effect 
reaction and handling characteristics 
shall be derived from validation flight test 
data. 
 
– Transition/conversion 
training for take-off and 
landing manoeuvres. 
– Transition/conversion testing 
and checking except for take-
offs and landings. 
 
            C 
 
The second highest [l] level of [flight] 
simulator performance. 
As for Level B plus: 
A daylight/twilight/night visual system is 
required with [a] continuous, cross-
cockpit, minimum collimated visual field 
of view providing each pilot with 180 
degrees horizontal and 40 degrees 
vertical field of view. 
A six axes motion system shall be 
provided. 
The sound simulation shall include the 
sounds of precipitation and other 
significant aeroplane noises perceptible 
to the pilot and shall be able to reproduce 
the sounds of a crash landing. 
The response to control inputs shall not 
be greater than 150 milliseconds more 
than that experienced on the [aeroplane]. 
Wind shear simulation shall be provided. 
 
As for Level B plus: 
 
– Transition/conversion testing 
and checking of take- offs and 
landings for flight 
crewmembers whose 
minimum experience level is 
defined by the Authority. 
 
           D 
 
The highest level of flight simulator 
performance. 
As for Level C plus: 
There shall be complete fidelity of sounds 
and motion buffets. 
 
As for Level C plus: 
– Transition/conversion testing 
and checking of take-off and 
landings for flight crews, who 
may be required to meet a 
minimum experience level 
defined by the Authority. 
 
 
 
 150 
Appendix F Ethics Proposal  
Proposal Submitted by: Rodney Sears . Department of Systems Engineering 
and Human Factors 
School of Engineering r.sears@cranfield.ac.uk  
 Supervised by: John Huddlestone 
Date: 9 June 2010 
The proposed study is scheduled to commence 2 August 2010. 
BACKGROUND 
The growth of air transport since the Second World War has allowed much 
more freedom to travel. One major area has been the increase in the use of 
private jets or business jets by private individuals and companies. There are 
now in excess of 16600 business jets in use according to the Flight Global 
listing for 2009. Modern scheduled air transport has been made safer over the 
years and now has a very good safety record for fatal accidents. Unfortunately 
the statistics for the business jet operations are far worse. The poor safety 
record was highlighted as long ago as 1994 and shows no sign of improving. 
The NATS report, US accident rate 2008 states the accident rate per 100,000 
hours for scheduled airlines (FAR 121) was 0.145 but the comparable rate for 
non-scheduled flights (FAR 135) was 2.410. The situation is repeated by the 
IBAC in their global accident survey 2003 to 2007 showing a high global rate for 
all business jet operations of 1.09, which is far higher than the rate of 0.145 for 
Airlines reported by the NTSB.  
Although there have been several safety initiatives and attempts to improve 
standards across the industry, the poor accident record continues. Pilot 
performance is often quoted as a concern in both Human factors (including 
CRM related accidents) and pilot flying skills. In CAP 776, World Accident Data 
2006, figure 8 lists the accidents by phase of flight. The approach, landing and 
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go-around phases accounted for 47% of all fatal accidents and 42% of all on 
board fatalities. 
AIM 
The Aim of the study is to: 
a. Study the level of flying skill of Business Jet Pilots. 
b. Study the training background of Business Jet pilots. 
It is proposed to conduct a simulator trial of an approach and go-around that is 
representative of both the accident data and the required standards for the 
issue of a commercial pilot licence. It is hoped that the study will give some 
insight into the pilot skills of the business jet operators. It may also be possible 
to compare the skill levels with regard to the accident rates of scheduled and 
non-scheduled operators. 
A pilot background questionnaire will be administered prior to the simulator 
session to make a similar comparison of experience levels. 
METHODOLOGY 
A licensing requirement for all UK air transport pilots is to complete a BI-annual 
simulator proficiency check. Whilst this check is being conducted, an extra 
approach will be flown  
The simulator trial will address this by running a single engine ILS profile and 
recording relevant control inputs and flight parameter errors including localiser 
and glide-slope. In this way the flight data can be assessed and the pilot 
performance reviewed. The ILS profile is already part of the regulatory Licence 
Skill Test (LST), so the licence examiners conducting the simulator session will 
be asked to provide observational assessments of the pilot performance. 
Subsequently, the participating pilots will be asked to provide their career 
background and experience information. This will be an anonymous information 
pro-forma, following the simulator session. 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
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Informed Consent   
As the participants report for the pre-flight briefing, and at a time, which does 
not interfere with the normal pre-briefing activities, the instructor (an airline or 
simulator examiner or licensed instructor) will introduce the research. Also, 
he/she will provide full information in the form of a briefing and introductory 
letter, requesting their participation and explaining how the data they provide 
will be used. The participants will be asked to provide written consent if they 
wish to participate in the research. It must be emphasised that the study will not 
affect the LST and that non-participation would not be viewed negatively.  
Both the British Airline Pilots Association (BALPA) and the Independent Pilot’s 
Association (IPA) have been briefed and given their consent to approach the 
pilots.  
The simulator profile is a standard approach and one that must be completed 
within 6 months of a previous validation. This profile will be flown on a voluntary 
basis after all aspects of the LST have been completed, so does not prejudice 
the licence renewal.  
Deception 
There is no requirement or intention to deceive the participants. During the 
briefing, the participants will be informed that the general purpose of the 
research is to investigate pilot handling performance. This will not detail the 
specific phases of the profile in order to avoid influencing the response. Any 
further information will be given at the final debrief. 
Freedom of participation – It is the free choice of every pilot whether he/she 
participates or not. However, every pilot will be encouraged to participate with 
an initial letter containing information about the study. 
Confidentiality – All information and data is collected anonymously and there 
will not be a possibility to trace individual answers back to individuals. Data sets 
will be identified and collated according to their time and date when obtained 
and will be treated with strict confidence. Any published data will be anonymous 
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and as part of an aggregated set. Results will be reported in form of a 
comprehensive report and the thesis. Every response is handled with great 
confidentiality and no individual data record will ever be presented. 
Risk to Participants – There is no physical danger associated with the 
proposed research, neither is there any likelihood of psychological harm. The 
proposed study already uses the existing licence test profile and therefore does 
not alter any procedure or standard by which pilots are assessed and will take 
place in the environment in which pilots are currently trained. This means that 
existing health and safety policies and procedures will apply. 
Protection of Participants– The participants will be assured of confidentiality 
and briefed on the data processing. Any data downloaded will be de-identified 
and stored securely at Cranfield University. They will also be encouraged to 
contact the researcher if they wish to discuss any concerns.  
Right to Withdraw from the investigation – During the briefing, it will be 
stressed that participants have the right to withdraw from the research at any 
time and that any data collected up to that time will be destroyed. This right to 
withdraw is assured and respected. However, due to the fact that data will be 
recorded anonymously, it will not be possible to identify an individual response 
to withdraw from the study once the data has been extracted from the simulator. 
Since it will have been de-identified and aggregated with other data. 
Debriefing – The pilots will be given the opportunity to debrief and make any 
comments concerning the trial profile. They will also be debriefed on the exact 
nature of the study and be provided with a written explanation of the research. 
Pilots will receive a letter containing the contact details of the researcher, 
should they require any further information and will contain thanks for their 
participation. Participants will also be asked to refrain from discussing the 
research with other potential participants to avoid biasing their performance.  
Observational work – Observations will be conducted with the participants 
during their simulator check. However, observations are a normal part of the 
assessment for the LST and would be expected by the examinee. The 
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observers in the simulator will be either qualified type rating instructors or type 
rating examiners as is normal for Licence Skill Test. 
Professional Conduct – All research work will be conducted in a professional 
manner, as would be expected to uphold the continued reputation of Cranfield 
University. Any commitment made to participants when soliciting their co-
operation will be respected. The researcher will maintain professional standards 
to ensure the continued support of the pilot community and associated 
companies for similar work.  
Prior to the study, final approval will be obtained from the Cranfield University 
Ethics Committee. 
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Appendix G Candidates Consent Form 
        
PARTICIPANT NUMBER: _____________ 
I, ___________________________________________ (please print your name in block 
capitals) confirm that I agreed to participate in the Cranfield Flight Simulator Study. 
I understand that Cranfield University will only use the data collected for research purposes as 
part of the Investigation into Business Jet Safety. All data collected will be stored in accordance 
with the UK Data Protection Act (1998). 
I understand that all personal information that I provide will be treated with the strictest 
confidence and I have been provided with a participant number to ensure that all information 
remains anonymous. I understand that although the information I provide will be used by 
Cranfield University for research purposes, it will not be possible to identify any specific 
individual from the data provided during the simulator study 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any stage during the session simply by 
informing a member of the research team. I also understand that I will not be able to withdraw 
my data after the session has been completed. 
If you have any questions about the research, please do not hesitate to ask a member of the 
research team.  
I confirm I have read and completely and fully understand the information provided on this form 
and therefore give my consent to taking part in this research. 
 
  
Signature: _________________________   Date: _________________ 
Full name: __________________________  Contact number: _________________________ 
      OR 
Address:  ____________________________   Email address:   _________________________ 
    ____________________________  (Number and mail both optional)  
 
   ____________________________   
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Appendix H Pilot Questionnaire 
 
 
            Pilot Questionnaire 
This data form is part of the Cranfield University’s Human Factors Department study of the 
operations and safety aspects of Business jet operations. Even though all the data will be 
anonymous, we would like a representative sample of pilots. (You will not be required to provide 
your identity) So, we would be grateful if you would participate in the research and provide the 
following information. Thank you very much for your help. 
Candidate Number 
Rank   CAPT ,   FO ……….Licence,    Age 
Were you pilot flying during the 1
st
 or 2
nd
  run  
 
Total Flying Hours (fixed wing) Hrs. (to the nearest 100) 
Hours on Current Type Hrs. (to the nearest 100) 
Approximate number of sectors flown as PF within the past 7 days  sectors 
Approximate number of sectors flown as PF within the past 14 days  sectors 
Approximate number of sectors flown as PF within the past  28 days sectors 
Beginning with the most recent, please list the previous aircraft types you have operated (only 
list type variants individually if their flight decks differ significantly), together with the 
corresponding number of flying hours and type of operation e.g.. Corporate, Private Charter, 
Low Cost, Freight etc. 
                Aircraft Type           Number of Hours(To nearest 100) Type of Operation 
 
 
 
JAA / CAA / FAA.  
ATPL/CPL 
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 Please identify the training route you undertook to achieve your current 
licence (tick one box)  
                  Integrated ab initio course with flight training organisation  
Modular courses with flight training organisation(s) 
Conversion following flying career in the military 
Other, brief explanation please ……………………………………………… 
Recent Flying Experience 
 Please consider your flying experiences whilst acting as the PF over the 
previous 6 months 
At what altitude do you typically engage the autopilot following take-off? ft. 
At what altitude do you typically disengage the autopilot prior to landing?  ft. 
Approximately what percentage of the approaches that you flew during this period 
 were classified as Precision Approaches? 
Please consider the definition of a ‘manual approach’ to be an approach 
where the autopilot is disengaged either before or upon commencing the final 
approach (i.e. requiring a prolonged period of manual flight). The approach 
may be flown with or without the use of auto throttle or flight director systems. 
Approximately how many days have passed since you last flew a manual approach? 
Approximately how many manual approaches have you flown in the past 7 days?  
Approximately how many manual approaches have you flown in the past 14 days?  
Approximately how many manual approaches have you flown in the past 28 days ?  
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 Do you regularly participate (or have you previously participated) in flying 
activities outside of  work or initial training? (Please tick the appropriate boxes 
and indicate how frequently/when you participated) 
                                                                                Approximate hours        Dates  (E.g. 1997-
present) 
 Gliding (non aerobatic) 
 GA powered, fixed wing (non aerobatic) 
 GA rotary wing 
 Aerobatics (powered or gliding) 
 Flight instruction (powered or gliding) 
 Other (please describe) 
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Appendix I Simulator Parameters 
Data  at Initial Release 
Time 
Gross Weight (Lbs.) 22500.0000  Centre of gravity (%MAC) 23.4326 
Flap Deflection (Deg) 0.0732  Flap Lever Position, (DEG) 
Gear Position (0=Up, 1=Dn) 0.0000 Gear Lever Position 
Weight on Right Gear (Lbs.)  Nose Gear Position 
Calibrated Airspeed (Kits) 220.0011 Ground Speed (Kits) 
Mach Number    Pressure Altitude (Ft) 2999.9937 
Radar Altitude (Ft)    Angle of Attack (Deg) 
Outside Temp (Deg C) 0.0000  Fuel Weight (Lbs.) 5000.0000 
Elevator Tab (Deg) 0.3592   Column Position, Pitch   
Elevator (Deg) -2.4822 
Aileron Tab (Deg) 0.1735   Wheel position, Roll 
Average Aileron (Deg) 0.0000 
Rudder Tab (Deg) -6.7878   Rudder (Deg) 6.0755 
Pedal Position (Deg)   Yaw Damper (0=Off, 1=On) 1.0000 
Wind Speed (kn.) 15.0000   Wind Direction (Deg) 120.0000 
Rate of Climb (FPM) -0.0013  Pitch Attitude (Deg) 2.9155 
Bank Angle (Deg) 0.0000   True Heading (Deg) 130.0000 
Sideslip Angle (Deg)   X, Y, Z, Acceleration  
Left Engine N1 (%) 76.1301  Left Engine Thrust Reverse NIL 
Left Engine Power Lever 76 % 
Right Engine N1 (%) 10.9733  Right Engine Thrust Reverse. NIL. 
Right Engine Power Lever idle 
Localiser (NilDot)    Glideslope (NgDot) 
Total 43  
 
Simulator trial  Recorded Parameters 
Time    KCAS   Angle of Attack 
Aileron Position  Wheel Position 
Column Position  Elevator Position 
Rudder Position  Rudder Pedal Position 
Left Engine N1 %  Left Power Lever Angle 
Right Engine N1 %  Right Power Lever Angle 
Flap  Deflection   Ground Speed  Pitch Attitude 
Pressure Altitude  Radar Altitude  Sideslip angle 
Gear Position 
Localiser error, Dot  Glideslope Error, Dot 
 
Total 22 
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Appendix J  FSI Hawker Instructor Briefing Notes 
Simulator Trial - Initial set up. 
Aircraft initial position: Approximately 15 miles from touchdown.  
Heading 130 deg. 220 Kn. IAS Set at 3000 FT QNH, on intercept heading for a 
manually flown ILS.  
The FMC should be set for an approach at Gatwick but the route and NAV 
display is not required for the ILS. EGKK approach  ILS 08R / 110.9, INBOUND 
079 
Initial conditions:  QNH 1013, Surface temperature 15 deg. C  
Wind 120/15.  Weather CAT ONE 
   FUEL 5000 LB ZFW 17500 LB 
   AUW 22500 LB. 
   FLAP 25 APPROACH. V-REF 125, V-APP 145 
Crew Instructions and confirm initial cockpit set-up: 
  Start APU 
 Select Chart Display if required  CAT1 DA 400 FT 
 Gear and Flap retracted 
Single engine, N1 Approximately 80%  
 Number 2 Engine- HP Cock OFF 
    LP Cock OFF 
    Wing Cross Feed Open. 
 Main Air No 1 closed / no 2 closed 
 Right ALT OFF   GROUND PROX FLAP  
 OVERRIDE 
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 Right Gen. TRIP 
 Yaw damper on 
Select Auto-pilot prior to commencing run and disconnect once stable after 
simulator release: Allow simulator to trim and settle down.  
ATC instructions:  Cleared to establish on the ILS and descend on the 
glide path. Reduce speed at your discretion. Cleared to 
land. If you go around, climb straight ahead to 3000 
feet. 
Release simulator freeze: Once stable, then disconnect auto-pilot and 
continue for the ILS. 
 Pilot flown approach.  
Reduce to 180 Kn, clean at 3000 ft.  
  Reduce to 160 Kn, Flap 15 establish on Localiser. 
  Once glide-slope at 1 Dot, Gear down, and Flap 25, reduce to  
  145 kn. 
 Go Around   
  At 200 ft. above touchdown, Go Around  
Press GA button. Flap 15. 
Positive climb Gear Up. 
Select heading 079, Flight level change. 
Straight ahead climb to 3000 ft. 
When above 1000 ft., above touchdown 180 Kn Flap up. 
Stop trial run during climb out. Set Simulator stop and freeze at the end of the 
trial. If required set up for second run with the second pilot. 
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Appendix K Simulator Results: Maximum and Minimum 
Airspeeds  
Run  Airspeed 
at 3000 ft. 
Maximum 
Airspeed 
 Airspeed at 
Decision 
Height 
Minimum 
Airspeed 
2 
3 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
165.74 
156.86 
150.7 
161.84 
147.96 
152.68 
156.29 
151.34 
157.23 
150.57 
156.54 
147.13 
154.7 
144.88 
154.98 
152.87 
159.56 
145.42 
150.29 
144.43 
155.55 
158.48 
153.24 
152.24 
162.13 
163.36 
164.77 
165.74 
156.86 
156.97 
163.9 
150.97 
163.88 
156.29 
151.34 
157.23 
150.75 
161.37 
149.7 
154.7 
147.64 
154.98 
152.87 
159.56 
148.1 
157.93 
152.36 
158.03 
158.48 
155.15 
155.89 
163.04 
165.71 
167.76 
139.21 
146.93 
132.55 
139.37 
146.95 
143.72 
144.21 
143.37 
145.12 
144.59 
146.75 
146.47 
147.36 
146.11 
143.16 
147.51 
145.83 
145.54 
145.46 
141.91 
145.88 
145.19 
145.88 
146.99 
141.78 
137.52 
137.84 
138.13 
142.19 
132.55 
138.13 
142.36 
138.66 
142.07 
139.44 
141.15 
144.37 
146.75 
144.67 
144.03 
143.86 
141.75 
144.49 
142.69 
143.71 
139.41 
137.75 
143.93 
144.11 
141.36 
145.24 
141.78 
136.61 
137.84 
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30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
 
156.1 
161.04 
154.33 
156.09 
174.36 
167.86 
153.11 
149.82 
166.43 
181.14 
150.61 
154.87 
157.18 
180.09 
 
158.82 
161.24 
154.33 
157.8 
174.36 
167.86 
159.47 
149.84 
166.43 
181.14 
150.61 
154.87 
157.18 
180.18 
 
142.38 
143.43 
139.93 
142.69 
145.51 
150.2 
146.67 
146.8 
139 
134.43 
144.17 
142.92 
145.25 
143.34 
 
141.87 
143.43 
139.93 
137.34 
145.51 
146.29 
143.97 
144.16 
136.59 
134.9 
142.53 
140.19 
143.71 
141.69 
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Appendix L Airspeed Exceeding CAA Tolerance 
This table shows the percentage time for each run that was either above 155 
knots or below 140 knots and the total percentage time outside the CAA 
tolerance.  
 
Per  cent time above 
155 knots 
Per cent time 
below 140 knots 
Per cent time 
outside CAA 
tolerance 
33 
2.2 
2.2 
33 
 23.8 
3 
0 
9.2 
 39.7 
 
 
 
 
 2.2 
 10.9 
0 
9.3 
2.6 
3.1 
12.2 
56.6 
32.6 
42 
17.8 
25.2 
0 
6.9 
24 
31.9 
23 
0 
0 
24 
 2.5 
0 
7 
0 
 0 
 
 
 
 
 0 
 8.8 
17.6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
30.5 
25 
0 
0 
1 
14.2 
0 
0 
56 
2.2 
2.2 
57 
Pass 
26.3 
3 
7 
9.2 
Pass 
39.7 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass 
2.2 
Pass 
19.7 
17.6 
9.3 
2.6 
3.1 
12.2 
56.6 
63.1 
67 
17.8 
25.2 
1 
21.1 
24 
31.9 
 165 
22.4 
 26.9 
81.6 
 
 1.6 
49.1 
  
0 
 13.7 
6.1 
 
 0 
0 
  
22.4 
Pass 
40.6 
87.7 
Pass 
Pass 
1.6 
49.1 
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Appendix M CAP P 371 EXTRACT 
Extract from CAP 371 ( The Avoidance of Fatigue In Aircrews)  
The following are the definitions for duty periods that would be allowed under 
the existing regulations.  For example, a crew member must be well rested and 
not suffering from “jet lag due to change of time zones , so the term 
acclimatised is defined prior  to commencing a duty. 
(Unless otherwise defined below all words, phrases, definitions, and 
abbreviations, have identical meanings to those described in Article 129 of the 
Air Navigation Order 2000, as amended.) 
1) 'Acclimatised' 
When a crew member has spent 3 consecutive local nights on the ground within 
a time zone which is 2 hours wide, and is able to take uninterrupted nights 
sleep. The crew member will remain acclimatised thereafter until a duty period 
finishes at a place where local time differs by more than 2 hours from that at the 
point of departure. 
The maximum Flight duty period (FDP) is set down with regard to the time of 
day for the duty commencing and the number of sectors planned for the duty. 
13.1 Standard reporting times prior to flight must be specified by an operator. 
Pre-flight 
 
CAP 371 The Avoidance of Fatigue In Aircrews- Section B Page 9 
13.3 Tables A and C apply when the FDP starts at a place where the crew 
member is acclimatised; Table B applies at other times. 
Table A Two or more flight crew - Acclimatised 
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Appendix N NTSB data (2011) adapted from IBAC 2012 
 
2011 Accident data US Registered Aircraft, Brief Description Flight Phase 
JANUARY 
FEBRUARY 
MARCH 
APRIL 
APRIL 
MAY 
MAY 
MAY 
JUNE 
JUNE 
JULY 
SEPTEMBER 
OCTOBER 
OCTOBER 
DECEMBER 
 
A/C LANDED HARD IN VMC 
OVERRUN HYDRAULIC FAILURE 
OFF SIDE OF RUNWAY  
CRASHED ON TAKE OF, TEST FLIGHT. 
WING STRUCK RUNWAY 
DITCHED, IN CLIMB, TECHNICAL 
LANDED GEAR UP, TECH FAULT 
SKIDDED OFF RUNWAY,  
GEAR UP, GO AROUND GEAR DOWN, LAND 
OVERSHOT LANDING 
WING STRUCK RUNWAY, WIND SHEAR 
CRASHED ON LANDING 
TAXI INTO DITCH 
BRAKE FAIL, OVERSHOT RUNWAY 
TO ABORT, OVERSHOT, GEAR COLLAPSED 
 
LANDING 
LANDING 
LANDING 
TAKE OFF 
LANDING 
TAKE OFF 
LANDING 
LANDING 
LANDING 
LANDING 
LANDING 
LANDING 
ON GROUND 
LANDING 
TAKE OFF 
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2011 NON US REGISTERED ACCIDENTS 
  
2011 Accident data Non US Registered Brief Description  Flight Phase 
FEBRUARY 
FEBRUARY 
FEBRUARY 
MARCH 
MARCH 
MARCH 
MARCH 
JUNE 
JULY 
OCTOBER 
OCTOBER 
DECEMBER 
 
CRASHED TO, SNOW, LOW CLOUD  
OVERSHOT RWY ON TO 
LOST CONTROL  APPROACH, DAY VMC 
LOST CONTROL ON TO 
STRUCK LIGHTS LOC ANTENNA, IMC 
TSUNAMI, ON GROUND 
DISAPPEARED ON LOCAL FAM FLIGHT? 
LANDED OFF SIDE OF RUNWAY 
OVERSHOT ON LANDING 
TAXI BRAKES FAILED 
OVERSHOT ON LANDING 
VEERED OFF RWY, INTO RAVINE 
 
TO/LOC 
TO/LOC 
LANDING 
TO/LOC 
LANDING 
GROUND 
CRUISE 
LANDING 
LANDING 
GROUND 
LANDING 
LANDING 
 
 
 
Summary of accident data ; Total  27. 
Including, On ground   3 On Landing  17 
 Loss of control   14 Airspeed related  8 
 
 
 
 
 
